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THE HISTORY OF ITALY,

Written in *Italian* by

FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI,

A Nobleman of *Florence*.

IN TWENTY BOOKS.

Tranſlated into ENGLISH by the

Chevalier AUSTIN PARKE GODDARD,

Knight of the Military Order of St. *Stephen*.

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HISTORY

OF

The WARS in ITALY.

BOOK XV.

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A, D. 1522.

THOUGH the late Victory over the *French* had compoſed the Affairs of *Lombardy*, it had not however leſſened the Jealouſy that the King of *France*, having his Kingdom entire, and at Peace, and the Generals and Men at Arms that he had ſent into *Italy* returned in Safety, would, before it was long, make a freſh Attack on the Dutchy of *Milan*, eſpecially conſidering that the *Swiſs* were as ready as before to enter into his Pay, and the *Venetian* Senate perſevered in their antient Confederacy with him. The Conſideration of this Danger engaged the *Cæſarian* Generals to maintain and keep in Pay the Army, which was very difficult for them to do, becauſe

Italy under Fear of a new *French* Invaſion.

cauſe they received no Money from *Cæſar* nor from the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the State of *Milan* was ſo far exhauſted as to be inſufficient of itſelf alone to quarter ſuch Numbers of Soldiers, and ſupport ſuch great Expences. Wherefore, without paying any Regard to the Cries of the People, or the Remonſtrances of the College of Cardinals, they had ſent the greater Part of the Troops to take up their Quarters in the eccleſiaſtic State: And Don *Carlo di Lanoja*, newly appointed Viceroy of *Naples* in room of *Raimondo di Cardona* deceaſed, in his Paſſage through *Rome*, ſettled, in a Conferrence with Don *Giovanni Manuel*, the Contributions, determining that for the Three next Months the State of *Milan* ſhould pay every Month Twenty Thouſand Ducats, the *Florentines* Fifteen Thouſand, the *Genoeſe* Eight Thouſand, *Siena* Five Thouſand, and *Lucca* Four Thouſand. Though every Body exclaimed againſt this Tax, yet ſuch was their Dread of the victorious Army that they were under a Neceſſity of ſubmitting to it. The Im- A. D. 1522.

A. D. 1522. poſers aſſuring them that it was indiſpenſably neceſſary, becauſe on the Preſervation of thoſe Forces depended the Defence of *Italy*; and, at the End of the Term the Impoſition was renewed, but in much eaſier Sums.

In this melancholy Situation of Affairs in *Italy* oppreſſed with a Train of Evils, and under Apprehenſions of greater to come, the Arrival of the Pope was impatiently expected as a ſeaſonable Help, by Means of the pontifical Authority, for compoſing a Multitude of Differences and providing againſt manifold Diſorders: The Pontiff was earneſtly intreated by *Cæſar*, who was at that Time on his Voyage by Sea to *Spain*, and had by the Way a Conference with the King of *England*, to wait for him at *Barcelona*, whither he would come in Perſon, and acknowledge and adore him for Pope. But he refuſed to wait his Coming, either on account of the Diſtance of *Cæſar*, who was as yet in the farthermoſt Parts of *Spain*, which would not ſuffer him to loſe

ſo

so much Time as to force him afterwards to fail in an unfavourable Season; or from a Suſpicion that *Cæſar* ſought to make him defer his Paſſage to *Italy*; or, as many would have it, becauſe he would not give too much Ground for the Opinion which had been entertained of him from the Beginning, that he could not help being too much devoted to *Cæſar*, which would obſtruct the Negotiation of an univerſal Peace among Chriſtians, which he had reſolved to take upon him. He paſſed then by Sea to *Rome*, where he made his Entry on the Twenty Ninth of *Auguſt*, amidſt a vaſt Concourſe of People, by whom tho' his Coming was deſired with the utmoſt Impatience, becauſe *Rome*, without the Preſence of Pontiffs, is more like a Deſart than a City, yet the Sight created a Sort of Uneaſineſs in the Minds of all who conſidered that they had got a Pope of a barbarous Nation, quite unexperienced in the Affairs of *Italy*, of the Court, and even of thoſe Nations which, by long Intercourſe were grown familiar

A. D. 1522.

Pope *Adrian* enters *Rome*.

A. D. 1522.

to *Italy*. The Sadneſs of theſe Reflexions was heightened by a Plague, which breaking out at *Rome* at his Arrival was interpreted as a very bad Omen of his Pontificate, and made great Devaſtation during the whole Autumn.

THE firſt Reſolution of this Pope was to uſe his Endeavours for the Recovery of *Rimini*, and to accommodate the Differences which had ſubſiſted between the Duke of *Ferrara* and his two laſt Predeceſſors. For theſe Purpoſes he ordered into *Romagna* Fifteen Hundred *Spaniſh* Foot which he had brought with him as a Convoy to ſecure his Paſſage by Sea. While he was intent on theſe Things, it appearing to *Cæſar* that it was of great Importance for the Settlement of the Affairs of *Italy* to detach the *Venetians* from the King of *France*, in Hopes that the Senate, from the Diminution of the *French* Power and Intereſt, were diſpoſed to embrace a Peace, and not for the Intereſts of others to run the Hazard of transferring the War into their own Dominions; he communicated his Purpoſe to the King

of *England*, who had before privately lent him Money to help him againſt the King of *France*, but afterwards laid aſide his Diſſimulation, and now openly eſpouſed the Cauſe: They both ſent Ambaſſadors to *Venice* to ſollicit the Senate to enter into a Confederacy with *Cæſar* for the Defence of *Italy*. The Ambaſſador for *Cæſar* was *Girolamo Adorno*, and for the King of *England Richard Pacey*, and there was an Ambaſſador expected from *Ferdinand*, Brother to *Cæſar* and Archduke of *Auſtria*, whoſe Intereſt was neceſſary, whatever Peace ſhould be made, on account of the many Diſferences between him and the *Venetians*. The King of *England* ſent alſo an Herald to denounce War to the King of *France*, if he would not make a general Truce with *Cæſar* for Three Years in all Parts of the World, in which ſhould be included the Church, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines*, complaining alſo that he had ceaſed to pay him the Fifty Thouſand Ducats which he was obliged to pay every Year. The King refuſed to conſent to a Truce, and roundly anſwered that it was not proper to pay Money to one who aſ-

A. D. 1522.

Cæſar and the King of *England* ſollicit the *Venetians* againſt the *French*.

ſiſted

A. D. 1522. sisted his Enemies with Money. By this Means the Animosities between them being exasperated, the Ambassadors at each Court were dismissed.

THIS Year Don *Giovanni Manuel*, who had been *Cæsar*'s Plenipotentiary at *Rome*, departed out of *Italy*. At his Departure he delivered to the *Florentines* a Schedule of his own Hand-writing, in which it was related how *Cæsar* by a Schedule written in *September* 1520 promised Pope *Leo* to confirm and grant anew to the *Florentines* the Privileges of the State, the Authority, and the Lands which they possessed, within Six Months after the first Diet held since the Coronation which was celebrated at *Aix la Chapelle*; for he had first promised them to make this Concession within Four Months from his Election; but said he had not been able, for just Reasons, to expedite it to them at that Time; but Don *Giovanni* in the Name of *Cæsar* promised to make good the Contents of the Schedule, which was ratified by *Cæsar* in *March* 1523, and expedited by a Deed in a very ample Manner.

THIS

A. D. 1522.

THIS Year *Cæsar*, as was said before, passed into *Spain*, where, on his Arrival, he proceeded with Severity against many who had been Authors of the Sedition, and discharged all the rest without inflicting any Punishment: And to accompany his Justice and Clemency with Examples of Rewards, on taking into Consideration that *Ferdinando* Duke of *Calabria*, refused to be Leader of the seditious Multitude, and chose rather not to leave his Confinement in the Castle of *Sciatina*, he sent for him with great Honour to his Court, and not long after gave him in Marriage *Germana*, Widow of the late Catholic King, and rich, but barren, with a View that in him, who was the last Defcendant from old *Alfonso*, King of *Aragon*, that Family might become extinct, for his two younger Brothers were both dead before, one in *France*, and the other in *Italy*.

BUT what rendered this an unfortunate Year, with very great Reproaches to

Island of *Rhodes* conquered by *Solyman* the *Turk*.

A. D. 1522. to the Christian Princes was that, towards the End of it *Solyman* the *Ottoman* took the Island of *Rhodes*, under the Government of the Knights of *Rhodes*, before called Knights of *Jerusalem*, who taking up their Residence in that Island, after they had been chased from *Jerusalem*, had for a very long Time, with vast Honour to their Order, preserved it tho' situated in the Midst between the *Turk* and the *Soldan*, Princes of such mighty Power, and made it considered as the Bulwark of Christendom in those Seas, tho' the Knights had it laid to their Charge that, amidst their daily Cruises on the Ships of the Infidels, they sometimes took the Liberty to make Prizes of Vessels belonging to Christians. This Island was, for many Months, besieged by a very powerful Army, with the great *Turk* in Person, who lost not the least Time for harrassing the Defendants, sometimes by very furious Assaults, sometimes by working of Mines and Trenches, and sometimes by raising very large Cavaliers

liers of Earth and Timber, which over-topped the Walls of the Town, by which Works tho' carried on with great Slaughter of his Men, the Number of the Garriſon was conſiderablely diminiſhed; ſo that at length being ſpent with the continual Fatigues, and their Powder falling ſhort, they were no longer in a Condition to reſiſt ſuch a Multitude of Diſtreſſes and Inconveniencies, the Mines having penetrated into many Places of the Town, in which the Beſieged, being forced to abandon one after another the advanced Poſts, were more and more ſtraitened, till at length reduced to the utmoſt Neceſſity they capitulated with the *Turk*, and it was agreed that the Grand Maſter ſhould ſurrender to him the Town, with Liberty for himſelf and all the Knights and *Rhodians* to depart thence in Safety, and to take with them as many of their Effects as they could carry, and for their Security in ſo doing the *Turkiſh* Fleet was to have Orders to quit thoſe Seas, and the Army to draw off to the Diſtance

A. D. 1522.

A. D. 1522. Distance of Five Miles from the Town of *Rhodes*. By Virtue of this Capitulation, which was faithfully observed, the *Turks* took Possession of *Rhodes*, and the Christians passed over to *Sicily*, and afterwards into *Italy*, having found in *Sicily* a Fleet of Ships fitted out tho' but slowly, thro' the Fault of the Pontiff, for throwing into *Rhodes*, as soon as the Wind should serve, a Supply of Provisions and warlike Stores. After the City was evacuated *Solyman*, for the greater Disparagement of the Christian Religion, made his Entry into the Place on the Day of the Nativity of the Son of God, and on that Day, solemnised with an Infinity of Hymns and Music in Christian Churches, he caused all the Churches in *Rhodes* that were dedicated to the Worship of Christ to be converted into Mosques, which according to the Custom of the *Turks*, the Christian Rites being totally abolished, were dedicated to the Worship of *Mahomet*. Thus ended the Year 1522, with so much Ignominy to the Christian Name, and such

such was the Fruits of the Diſorders of our Princes, tolerable however if the Example of paſt Loſſes had given Inſtructions for the Time to come, but the Continuation of the Diviſions among the Princes occaſioned as great Calamities in 1523. A. D. 1522.

In the Beginning of this Year the *Malateſti* knowing themſelves too weak to reſiſt the Forces of the Pope, by the Interpoſition of the Duke of *Urbino*, were content to yield up *Rimini* and its Caſtle, with a View, tho' uncertain, of obtaining a Maintenance for *Pandolfo* during his Life, which did not take Effect. The Duke of *Urbino* afterwards waited on the Pontiff, and the glorious Memory of Pope *Julius* pleading in his Favour with his Holineſs, and with the greater Part of the Court, he obtained Abſolution from Cenſures, and to be re-inveſted with the Dutchy of *Urbino*, but with the Clauſe, *without Prejudice to Rights*, with a View of not prejudicing the Aſſignment which had been made of *Montefeltro*, 1523. Pope receives into Favour the Duke of *Urbino*.

A. D. 1523. *teſeltro* to the *Florentines*, who affirmed that they had lent Pope *Leo* for the Defence of that Dutchy Three Hundred and Fifty Thouſand Ducats, and that they had expended about Sixty Thouſand Ducats more ſince his Death, in ſeveral Places for the Preſervation of the State of the Church.

And the Duke of *Ferrara*.

THE Pope alſo received into Favour the Duke of *Ferrara*, reinveſting him not only with *Ferrara*, and all the Lands which, before the War made by *Leo* againſt the *French*, he poſſeſſed belonging to the Church, but, highly to his Diſgrace, or that of his Miniſters, who impoſed upon his Ignorance in thoſe Affairs, left him alſo in Poſſeſſion of the Caſtles of *San Felice* and *Finale*, which being acquired by him when he entered into a War with *Leo*, and afterwards loſt before his Death, he had taken the Opportunity of the Vacancy of the See to poſſeſs himſelf of anew. The Duke of *Ferrara* obliged himſelf to aſſiſt the Church with a certain Number of Troops,

Troops when they ſhould be wanted for the Defence of its State; and bound himſelf under moſt grievous Penalties, ſubjecting himſelf alſo to the Diſannulling of his Inveſtiture, and the Forfeiture of all his Rights in caſe he ſhould for the future offend any more the Apoſtolic See. The Pope gave him good Hopes of his Intentions to reſtore him to the Poſſeſſion of *Modena* and *Reggio*; but as to this Point, on a Repreſentation to his Holineſs of the Importance of the Affair, and from the Example of his Predeceſſors, what an Infamy ſuch a Step would caſt upon his Name, he became more and more averſe to reſtore thoſe Cities. *A. D.* 1523.

Caſtle of *Milan* ſurrendered to *Cæſar*.

At this Time the Caſtle of *Milan* labouring under a Scarcity of every Thing excepting Bread, and the Garriſon being very ſickly, capitulated to ſurrender on Condition of Safety to Perſons and Effects, if it were not relieved by the 14th Day of *April*, at which Term the Capitulation being obſerved, moſt of the People in the Place were found to be dead. *Cæſar* con-

A. D. 1523. conſented that the Caſtle ſhould be reſigned into the Hands of *Franceſco Sforza*, the Duke, for which he was highly commended by the *Italians*. And now the *French* had nothing left in their Poſſeſſion in *Italy* but the Caſtle of *Cremona*, which was ſtill abundantly provided with Neceſſaries. Theſe Succeſſes however were no Relief to the Miſeries of the Inhabitants of the *Milaneſe*, who were extreamely aggravated by the *Cæſarian* Army, becauſe they did not receive their Pay. For the ſame Reaſon, when they were on their March to take up their Quarters in *Aſti* and in its Territory, they mutinied, and plundered all the Country as far as *Vigevano*; ſo that the *Milaneſe*, to put a Stop to theſe Deveſtations, and to ſave the Country from being entirely ruined, were conſtrained to promiſe them their Pay at certain Terms, which amounted to about One Hundred Thouſand Ducats. Theſe Hardſhips, however, did not in the leaſt mitigate the Hatred of the People towards the *French*, being kept ſteady, partly by Fear, remembering the Injuries they

they had received from that Nation, and partly by Hopes that whenever the Danger of a freſh Attack from the King of *France* upon that State was ceaſed, they ſhould be eaſed of ſo great a Burden, becauſe there would be no Neceſſity for *Cæſar* to keep any ſtanding Forces in the *Milaneſe*. A. D. 1513.

Peace negotiated between *Cæſar* and the *Venetians*.

At this ſame Time was under continual Negotiation an Agreement between *Cæſar* and the *Venetians*, which on account of the many Difficulties that aroſe, and the various Delays interpoſed by them, kept the Friends of both Parties in Suſpenſe concerning the Iſſue. This Tediouſneſs, and perhaps alſo the Difficulty of the Negotiation were increaſed by the Death of *Girolamo Adorno*, who being a Perſon of a great Spirit and Experience, tho' a young Man, managed the Treaty with Authority, and with ſingular Dexterity. In his Room was ſent from *Milan*, with a Commiſſion from *Cæſar*, *Marino Carracciolo*, the Apoſtalical Prothonotary, who many Years after was by Pope

A. D. 1523. *Paul* III. advanced to the Dignity of the Cardinalſhip. This Treaty, which was carried on at *Venice*, was under Debate many Months, becauſe on the other Side the King of *France* by his Ambaſſadors, laboured with the greateſt Diligence and Aſſiduity in oppoſing it, ſometimes promiſing by Letters, ſometimes by truſty Agents, to paſs into *Italy* with a very potent Army. On this Occaſion there was great Variety of Opinions among the Senators, and continual Diſputes; for many adviſed not to abandon the Confederacy with the King, in Confidence that he would ſoon ſend an Army into *Italy*. This Hope the King endeavouring with the utmoſt Induſtry to cheriſh, had, beſides many others, lately ſent to *Venice* *Renzo da Ceri*, to make the ſame Promiſe, and to ſignify that the Preparations were in Readineſs. Others from Experience of paſt Events, conſidering that King's Negligence in executing his Projects, could not perſuade themſelves that his Paſſage could take Effect; and they were confirmed in this Opinion by the Letters of *Giovanni*

Giovanni Badoaro, their Ambaſſador in *France*, who giving Credit to what had been reported to him of the Duke of *Bourbon*, (who had already very ſecretly conſpired againſt the King, and wiſhed that the *Venetians* would join with *Cæſar*) aſſured them that the King of *France* would neither paſs in Perſon, nor ſend an Army this Year into *Italy*. Others were intimidated by the ill Succeſs of the King, and by the good Fortune of *Cæſar*, and with the Conſideration that the Duke of *Milan*, the *Genoeſe* and the *Florentines*, with all *Tuſcany* eſpouſed the Party of *Cæſar*, and it was believed that the Pope would do the ſame: And out of *Italy*, *Cæſar* was in cloſe Alliance with the Archduke of *Auſtria* his Brother, a Neighbour to the *Venetian* State, and with the King of *England*, who was continually making War in *Picardy*. In this Variety of Opinions among the principal Members of the Senate as well as others, the Maturity of Affairs, and the moſt preſſing Inſtances of the Ambaſſadors of *Cæſar* not admitting of any further Delay in coming to a Reſolution, the Council of

A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. the *Pregadi* was at laſt convoked in order to determine their Choice. Here *Andrea Gritti*, a Perſon of the higheſt Authority in that Republic for his Adminiſtration of the moſt important Affairs, and his many remarkable Exploits, and whoſe Name was very famous over all *Italy* and in the Courts of foreign Princes, made a Speech, as it is ſaid, in Subſtance as follows.

Speech of *Andrea Gritti.* "Though I am ſenſible, moſt excellent Senators, there is cauſe to fear that if I ſhould give my Advice not to ſeparate ourſelves from our Confederacy with the King of *France*, ſome may underſtand by it that I am more influenced with reſpect to the long Converſation I have had with the *French* than by a regard to the Commonwealth, I ſhall not however forbear on that account to expreſs my Mind freely as it is the Right and Duty of a good Citizen; nay, that Citizen and Senator is of no Service who, for any Reaſon whatſoever, ſhews himſelf backward in perſuading others to what he thinks in his own Mind to be for the Benefit

A. D. 1523.

Benefit of the Republic. I perſuade myſelf however that this Interpretation will not take Place with Men of Prudence, becauſe they will conſider not only what have been my Manners and Actions at all Times, but alſo that I have never treated with the King of *France*, or with his Miniſters, but as your Miniſter, and by your Commiſſion and Orders. But beſides this I ſhall be juſtified, if I deceive not myſelf by the Probability of the Reaſons which induce me to embrace this Opinion. We are debating whether we ought to make a new Confederacy with *Cæſar*, contrary to the Faith we have given, and to the Obligations of the Confederacy in which we are engaged with the King of *France*; a Point which, in my Opinion, means no other than to eſtabliſh the Power of *Cæſar*, already formidable to every one, in ſuch a Manner as that it being impoſſible for us to find any further Remedy for moderating or repreſſing it, we ſhall ſee it continually increaſing to our manifeſt Prejudice. We have no Reaſon that can juſtify this Reſolution, for the King

A. D. 1523. has always obſerved our Confederacy, and if the Effects have not anſwered in being ſo ready as we could wiſh to renew the War in *Italy*, it is very well known that, ſince he was ſtimulated to do it, by his own Intereſt, there can be no other Cauſe for his Backwardneſs than the Impediments which he has met with, and ſtill finds in the Kingdom of *France*, which indeed have been ſufficient to make him defer his Deſigns, but will never be able wholly to cruſh them. For ſo ardent is his Deſire to recover the State of *Milan*, ſo great is his Power, that as ſoon as he has repelled the firſt Efforts of his Enemies, which he will eaſily ſuſtain, nothing will retard him from ſending afreſh a very great Force on this Side the Mountains. We have before our Eyes in both theſe reſpects the repeated Example of King *Lewis*, who, when *France* was attacked by Armies much more potent than thoſe which at preſent moleſt it, almoſt the whole World having conſpired againſt him, by the Greatneſs of his Force, the Strength of the Places on his Frontiers, and the Fidelity of his People, eaſily defended

fended himſelf, and when all Men were of Opinion that the Fatigues of the War muſt have laid him under a Neceſſity of taking ſome Time for Reſt, on a ſudden he deſcended into *Italy* with powerful Armies. Did not the preſent King do the ſame in the Beginning of his Reign, when every one believed that becauſe he was newly come to the Crown, and found the royal Treaſury exhauſted by the infinite Expences of his Predeceſſor, he muſt have been under a Neceſſity of deferring the War to another Year? We ought not therefore to be intimidated by this Slowneſs, nor would it be a ſufficient Excuſe for our Variations, ſince our Confederate is nor retarded by his Will but by the Impediments that have intervened, not from any juſt Cauſe that we have to complain of his Conjunction, nor from any decent Pretence afforded us to ſeparate ourſelves from his Alliance. This Reſolution demands of us a Regard to Decency, a Regard to the Dignity of the *Venetian* Senate; but it requires no leſs a Regard to our Utility, or rather to our Safety. For who is ſo ignorant as not

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to

A. D. 1523. to know of what great Benefit it may be to us, and from how many Dangers it may free us, if the King of *France* recovers the State of *Milan*, and what a peaceful Situation for many Years it may produce in our Affairs? This we may learn from the Example of what happened but a few Years ago, when the Recovery of the *Milaneſe* by that King was the Cauſe that we, who before at a vaſt Expence and Hazard attended to the Defence of *Padoua* and *Trevigi*, recovered *Breſcia* and *Verona*; was the Cauſe that, while he kept quiet Poſſeſſion of that Dutchy, we enjoyed abſolute Peace and Security in all our Dominions. Theſe are Examples that ought to have much greater Weight with us than the antient Memory of the League of *Cambray*, for the Kings of *France* have learned by Experience, what they had not comprehended by Reaſon, the great Damage they would receive by being ſeperated from our Alliance; a Point of which they will without compariſon be more ſenſible at the preſent Juncture, in which that King has for a Rival an Emperor, Sovereign of ſo many Kingdoms,

doms, and of ſuch Greatneſs, whoſe Power will neceſſitate him to deſire and to ſet the higheſt Value upon our Confederacy. But on the contrary who is he that ſees not, and knowns not in what a dangerous Situation our Affairs will remain as ſoon as the King of *France* ſhall be totally excluded from making any Attempt upon *Italy*? Who can hinder *Cæſar* from appropriating to himſelf or to his Brother the Dutchy of *Milan*, of which he has not to this Day ever granted the Inveſtiture to *Franceſco Sforza*? And if, as it is very plain, he will have the Power to do it, what Security can be given of his Will? Who is he that can promiſe that, ſince the Dutchy of *Milan* ſerves as Stairs for aſcending to the Empire of all *Italy*, *Cæſar* will be more influenced by a Regard to Juſtice and Honour, than by Ambition, and a Covetouſneſs proper and natural to all great Princes? Shall we perhaps be ſecured by the Moderation and Temperance of his Miniſters in *Italy*, who are almoſt all *Spaniards*, a deceitful and moſt rapacious Nation, and inſatiable above all others? If *Cæſar* then or *Ferdinando*

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A. D. 1523. *dinando* his Brother ſhould appropriate *Milan*, what will be the Condition of our State, when ſurrounded by them on the Side of *Italy*, and of *Germany*? What Remedy can we expect for our Dangers, the Kingdom of *Naples* being in his Hands, the Pope and the other States of *Italy* his Dependants, and every one of our Friends ſo exhauſted of Money, and bare of Troops, that no Aſſiſtance can be hoped from them? But if the King of *France* ſhould get Poſſeſſion of the Dutchy of *Milan*, Affairs reſting in a Balance between two ſuch Princes, whoever ſhould have Reaſon to be apprehenſive of the Power of one would be regarded and Supported by that of the other: And even the Fear alone of his Coming ſecures all others, ſince it conſtrains the Imperialiſts to lie ſtill, and not to employ themſelves in any Enterpriſe. Wherefore it ſeems to me that we are rather to laugh than to be terrified at the Vanity of thoſe who threatens that, if we confederate not with *Cæſar*, they will turn their Arms againſt us, as if to engage in a War with the *Venetian* Senate were an eaſy Undertaking, and

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there was Reaſon to hope for a ſpeedy Victory, and as if it were a Means for preventing the Paſſage of the King of *France*, and not rather a Cauſe of the contrary: For who doubts that, when they have provoked us, we ſhall be obliged to propoſe ſuch Conditions to the King as would induce him to paſs, even tho' he were of himſelf averſe to it. Was not this the very Caſe in the Time of King *Lewis*, when their Injuries and treacherous Dealings induced us to ſtimulate that King, when I from his Priſoner became your Ambaſſador, that at a Juncture when he was not apprehenſive of being very powerfully attacked in *France*, he ſent his Army, tho' with ill Fortune, into *Italy*? Can you imagine that if the Imperialiſts had thought that the Way to procure them our Friendſhip, or to keep the King of *France* out of *Italy*, was to fall upon us, they would have hitherto delayed to begin Hoſtilities, becauſe perhaps their Generals had no covetous Deſires to enrich themſelves with Plunder and the Gains of War, or elſe perhaps were under no Neceſſity of eaſing the Country

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A. D. 1523. Country of their Friends of its Burden of quartering Troops, of getting Money for diſburthening it, and to maintain the Army upon free Quarters in the Territories of others? But they have found by Experience that our Power renders it too difficult to force us to this Inconvenience, and they know it is not for their Intereſt, who are every Day apprehenſive of a War with the King of *France*, to involve themſelves in another War, and to give Occaſion to a State powerful in Forces and Money, from the Greatneſs of their Injuries, to ſtimulate a *French* Invaſion. While they remain in theſe Doubts and Jealouſies they will not ſeize on the Dutchy of *Milan* for themſelves, nor ever after affront us but with vain Menaces. If we ſecure them from theſe Apprehenſions it will lie in their Power to accompliſh either, and if they ſhould put their Scheme in Execution, as probably they will, of whom can we chiefly complain but of ourſelves and of our exceſſive Timidity, and immoderate Deſire of Peace? Peace indeed is deſirable, and a Bleſſing, when it is ſecure from Jealouſies, when it en-

encreaſes not the Danger, and when it induces Men to think themſelves at Liberty to enjoy Reſt, and to free themſelves from Expences. But when it produces contrary Effects, it is, under the inſidious Name of Peace, a pernicious War, and under the Name of a wholſome Medicine, a deſtructive Poiſon. Wherefore if our joining in Confederacy with *Cæſar* excludes the King of *France* from making an Attempt upon *Italy*, we give *Cæſar* the Liberty of ſeizing at his Pleaſure on the Dutchy of *Milan*, and when he is once poſſeſſed of that State to ſtudy our Deſtruction. Hence it will follow that, with the greateſt Reproach to our Name, and with the Violation of the Faith of this Republic, we purchaſe the Aggrandiſement of a Prince who has extended his Ambition no leſs than his Power, and who pretends with his Brother that all we poſſeſs on the *Terra Firma* belongs to them; and that we exclude from *Italy* a Prince whoſe Greatneſs is a Security to all others, and who would be neceſſitated to continue in the ſtricteſt Union with us. Now a Perſon who propoſes ſuch evident

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A. D. 1523. and palpable Reaſons cannot be charged as under the Influence of a new Affection rather than of Truth, or of private Intereſt, rather than of Love to the Republic, of whoſe Safety we have no Reaſon to doubt if it ſhall pleaſe God to grant ſo much Succeſs to your Reſolutions as he has beſtowed Wiſdom on this moſt excellent Senate."

But *Giorgio Cornaro*, a Citizen of equal Authority, and of as high a Reputation for Wiſdom, as any Member of that Senate, made the following Speech in Oppoſition to this Advice.

"The preſent Debate moſt illuſtrious Senators, is certainly of great great Importance, and very difficult. And yet when I conſider the Ambition and Faithleſſneſs of the Princes of our Times, and the Incongruity of their Nature with the Nature of Republics, which not being governed by the Will of a ſingle Perſon, but by the Conſent of many, proceed with more Moderation, and with greater Reſpects, nor ever arbitrarily depart, as is frequent

frequent with Princes, from what has some Appearance of Juſtice and Honour, I cannot but conclude with myſelf that it muſt be very pernicious to us that the Dutchy of *Milan* ſhould be under a Prince more powerful than ourſelves. For ſuch a Vacancy will of Neceſſity keep us under continual Jealouſies and Uneaſineſs, and tho' we may be at Peace, it will be proper for us to be almoſt perpetually plotting on War, notwithſtanding any Confederacy or Convention that may ſubſiſt between us. Of this we find infinite Examples in antient Hiſtorians, and ſome in our own Writers; but what greater and more illuſtrious Examples can there be than thoſe, the bitter Memory of which are engraven in all our Hearts? This Senate introduced *Lewis* King of *France* into the Dutchy of *Milan*, at which unfortunate Reſolution many of us were preſent. We religiouſly obſerved the Articles of our Confederacy with him, tho' we were invited by the *Spaniards* and *Germans* with great Rewards, and on different Occaſions, to detach ourſelves from him, and were aſſured that he was often

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A. D. 1523. ten plotting our Deſtruction. Not the Benefit received, nor the Faith given, nor the perpetual Train of our good Offices for cultivating his Friendſhip, were capable of mollifying his Spirit, which was entirely bent on our Ruin, for which Purpoſe he at laſt reconciled himſelf with his antient and moſt bitter Enemies, and joined with them againſt us in the moſt pernicious League of *Cambray*. To avoid therefore the Dangers which will be continually hanging over our Heads from the inſidious and deceitful Neighbourhood of great Princes, it will be neceſſary for us, if I miſtake not, to direct all our Reſolutions with a View that the Dutchy of *Milan* might not fall into the Hands of the King of *France* nor of the Emperor, but may come into the Poſſeſſion of *Franceſco Sforza*, or of ſome other who is not formidable for his Kingdoms or great Dominions. On this Reſolution depends the preſent, and, if the Condition of the Times ſhould alter, the future Augmentation and Aggrandiſement of our State. We are not to conſult whether we ought to continue in Friendſhip with the King of *France*,

or

or join in Confederacy with *Cæsar*: One of these two Resolutions totally excludes *Francesco Sforza* from the Dutchy of *Milan*, and gives Admittance to the King of *France*, a Prince so much more potent than ourselves; the other tends to confirm and secure *Sforza* in the Possession of that Dutchy, which *Cæsar* proposes to include as the principal Article of our Confederacy, and has promised the King of *England* to observe it. Wherefore if he should attempt to deprive him of that State, he would not only offend us, and the other *Italian* States, to whom he would give Occasion to have recourse once more to the *French*, but disoblige the King of *England*, for whom, all the World knows, he ought to have the greatest Respect, and would besides provoke the People of the *Milanese*, who are perfectly devoted to *Francesco Sforza*. By such a Step he would involve himself into a Multitude of Difficulties and Dangers, and highly to his Dishonour, be guilty of a Breach of Faith, which he has hitherto, for ought that appears, preserved inviolable, which cannot be said of the *French*, A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. nay, what is more, his reſtoring to *Franceſco Sforza*, after the Death of Pope *Leo*, the State of *Milan*, reſigning into his Hands the Fortreſſes ſucceſſively as he acquired them, and at laſt, contrary to what many expected, putting him in Poſſeſſion of the Caſtle of *Milan*, muſt be taken as manifeſt Signs that he intends to fulfil his Engagement. Why then ſhould we heſitate in preferring a Reſolution which gives us great Hopes of anſwering our Intentions before one that manifeſtly tends to an End repugnant to our Views? In Oppoſition to this we are told it would be more dangerous to this Republic for the Dutchy of *Milan* to be under the Dominion of the Emperor than of the King of *France*, becauſe that King, by the Greatneſs of *Cæſar*, and the Emulation between them, would be in a manner neceſſitated to perſevere in ſtrict Alliance with us; but from *Cæſar* we may expect quite the contrary, both on account of his Power and of the Claims which he and his Brother pretend to have on our State. I believe that whoever has ſuch an Opinion

on of *Cæſar* is not deceived, conſidering the Nature and Manners of ſuch great Princes; and I heartily wiſh he may not deceive himſelf who has not the ſame Opinion of the King of *France*. Many of the ſame Reaſons were in Force under his Predeceſſor, who was however more ſwayed by Covetouſneſs and Ambition than by a Senſe of Honour, or of his own Profit. Beſides the Reaſons which might oblige him to continue united with us are not perpetual, but vary from Time to Time, according to the Nature of human Affairs. *Cæſar* is ſubject to the common Lot of Mortals, and, like other Princes greater than himſelf, liable to infinite Accidents of Fortune; and how long ago is it that, when all *Spain* was in an Inſurrection againſt him he appeared more worthy of Commiſſeration than Envy? And at leaſt there is not ſo much Difference between one Danger and another as there is between a Reſolution that certainly excludes us from obtaining our End and one that probably will lead us to its Accompliſhment. Moreover the Reaſons alledged by the worthy Sena-

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A. D. 1523. ter have a Reſpect only to future and diſtant Dangers; but if we conſider the preſent State of Affairs it is not to be doubted that if we refuſe an Alliance with *Cæſar* we ſhall immediately expoſe ourſelves to greater Diſtreſſes and Dangers. For if we break off our Confederacy with the King of *France* it is very probable that he will defer his military Operations till a more convenient Time and Opportunity; but if we are in Conjunction with him, he may perhaps think fit immediately to enter upon Action, which will of Neceſſity create us Trouble and Expence. But in what Caſe is the War with the King likely to be attended with the greateſt Danger to our State? If we join with *Cæſar* we may almoſt conclude for certain that the Victory will fall on our Side: An Event which we cannot ſo well promiſe ourſelves by an Union with the King of *France*. And by confederating with *Cæſar* even the Victory of the King would not prove of ſuch dangerous Conſequence as would reſult from a contrary Reſolution; for in ſuch a Caſe the whole Force

of

of the victorious Arms will be turned a- *A. D.* 1523.
gainſt us, and *Cæſar* would not only find himſelf under leſs Reſtraint, and fewer Impediments, but prompted in a manner by Neceſſity, to ſeize on the Dutchy of *Milan*. To what is urged concerning our Tie of Confederacy the Anſwer is eaſy; for we promiſed the King of *France* to defend the States which he poſſeſſed in *Italy*, not to recover them after he had loſt them; there is nothing to that Purpoſe in the Inſtrument of our Articles, nor do theſe Reaſons at all affect us. We fulfilled our Obligation when at the Loſs of *Milan*, occaſioned by their Want of Proviſions for its Defence, our Troops ſuffered more than the *French*: We fulfilled them when we ſent our Forces to the the Aſſiſtance of *Lautrech* on his Return with the *Swiſs*. We went beyond our Obligations when we ſuffered ourſelves to be induced by them with vain Hopes and Promiſes to wait for ſo many Months together the Coming of his Army. If Will detained him, why ſhould we ſeek to bear the Puniſhment of his Faults? If Neceſſity, is not that ſame

A. D. 1523. Reaſon ſufficient to juſtify us to him, even tho' we were under any Obligations? I know not for what we ſhould be any longer bound to the King of *France*, ſince we have firſt been abandoned by him. I know not what farther is required of one Confederate from another, or how our Dangers can do him any Service. I affirm not that the imperial Generals have at preſent any Thoughts of going to War with us, nor will I preſume to aſſert the contrary, conſidering the Neceſſity they lie under of ſubſiſting the Army on the States of their Neighbours, and the Hopes they may have of drawing us by that Means into an Alliance with them, eſpecially if the King of *France* ſhould not paſs, of which if any one doubts, he has, in my Opinion ſufficient Reaſon for his doubting from the Negligence of the *French*, and their Want of Money of which they have been exhauſted by the Wars, in which they are engaged beyond the Mountains, with two ſuch Princes. Nor can he be juſtly blamed who believes this to be true on the Credit of your Ambaſſadors, for Ambaſſadors

baſſadors are the Eyes and Ears of States. In ſhort I repeat it again as my Opinion that we ought to uſe our utmoſt Endeavours, and be moſt ſollicitous that the Dutchy of *Milan* may be ſettled on *Franceſco Sforza*, whence it will follow that a Reſolution which conducts to this End is more for our Utility than one that totally excludes us from it." A. D. 1523.

THE Authority of two ſuch Perſonages, and the Efficacy of their Reaſons rather more perplexed than determined the Minds of the Senators, whence the Senate prolonged as much as poſſible, their coming to a Reſolution, induced to this Delay by their own Nature, the Weightineſs of the Affair, and a Deſire to ſee firſt ſome further Progreſs of the King of *France*; many Difficulties alſo were thrown in their Way ariſing from a Neceſſity of their coming to an Agreement with the Archduke. The King of *France* increaſed their Doubts and Suſpenſion of Mind by his preſent careful Attention to the Preparations of War, and

A. D. 1523. and his ſending the Biſhop of *Bayeux*, to intreat them to delay their Reſolution for the Whole next enſuing Month, declaring that before the End of that Term he would paſs into *Italy* with a greater Army than had ever been ſeen in that Country within the Memory of Man. While they remained under this Ambiguity, the Doge *Antonio Grimano* happened to die, and *Andrea Gritti* was elected in his Room, which was rather a Diſſervice to the *French* Intereſt than otherwiſe; for *Gritti* ſeated in that high Dignity left the Reſolution entirely to the Senate, and would never from that Time, either by Words or Actions, ſhew himſelf inclined to either Party. At laſt the King continually ſending to the Senate new Agents with very large Offers, and it being aſſured that *Anne de Montmorency*, afterwards Grand Conſtable of *France*, and *Federigo de Bozzole* were coming to *Venice* on the ſame Buſineſs, the Imperial and *Engliſh* Ambaſſadors, who were very jealous of this Delay, proteſted to the Senate that they would depart at the End of three Days, and leave

Andrea Gritti Doge of *Venice.*

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the whole Affair unfiniſhed. The Senate therefore being under a Neceſſity of coming to a Reſolution, and putting no Faith in the Promiſes of the King of *France*, whoſe Credit was diminiſhed by his having amuſed them for ſo many Months together, with vain Hopes, but much more by the Intelligence they received from their Ambaſſador reſiding at his Court in contradiction to the Agents Promiſes, determined to embrace the Friendſhip of *Cæſar*, with whom they made a Convention on the following Conditions. *A. D.* 1523.

Articles of a Treaty between *Cæſar* and the *Venetians*.

THAT between *Cæſar*, *Ferdinando* Archduke of *Auſtria*, *Franceſco Sforza* Duke of *Milan*, on one Part, and the *Venetian* Senate on the other, ſhould be a perpetual Peace and Confederacy: That the Senate ſhould be obliged to ſend, whenever there ſhould be Occaſion, for the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, Six Hundred Men at Arms, Six Hundred Light Horſe, and Six Thouſand Foot; and the ſame Force for the Defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*; in Caſe

A. D. 1523. Caſe it ſhould be moleſted by any Chriſtian Power; which Limitation was inſerted becauſe the *Venetians* refuſed to oblige themſelves in general to defend that Country, that they might not provoke a War with the *Turks*. *Cæſar* entered into the ſame Obligation to defend whatever was in the Poſſeſſion of the *Venetians* in *Italy*: And the *Venetians* were to pay the Archduke, on account of old Differences, and of the Agreement made at *Worms*, in the Space of Eight Years, Two Hundred Thouſand Ducats. As ſoon as this Convention was made the *Venetians* diſmiſſed from their Service *Teedoro da Trivulzio*, and elected for Governor General of their Forces, on the ſame Conditions, *Franceſco Maria* Duke of *Urbino*.

Duke of *Urbino* made General of the *Venetians*.

It was generally thought all over *Italy* that the King of *France*, on hearing that thoſe from whom he expected Aſſiſtance were become his Enemies, would lay aſide for this Year all Thoughts of invading the Dutchy of *Milan*; but when it was known

known that he not only continued his Preparations but had began to put his Army in Motion; thoſe who dreaded the Conſequences of his Victory, entered into a new Confederacy againſt him, and prevailed on the Pope to be at the Head of the League. A. D. 1523.

ADRIAN deſirous of a general Peace on his firſt coming into *Italy*, had intreated *Cæſar* and the Kings of *France* and *England* to lay down their Arms, ſo pernicious to the Chriſtian Commonwealth, and eſpecially at a Time when the *Turks* were in ſuch a Career of Succeſs; and that they would ſend to *Rome* their reſpective Ambaſſadors with full Powers. They all apparently complied at once with his Requeſt, but no ſooner began to treat than they found it would be all Labour loſt; for a Peace was obſtructed by infinite Difficulties, and a ſhort Truce was not pleaſing to *Cæſar* becauſe it procured him no Advantage, and to a long one the King of *France* would not

A. D. 1523. not consent. The Pope therefore influenced either by his antient Benevolence towards *Cæsar*, or persuaded that the King of *France* had no real Thought of coming to an Agreement, began more than usual to give Ear to those who persuaded him not to permit the King to get Possession anew of the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Cardinal *de' Medici* in Favour at *Rome*.

The Cardinal de *Medici*, who till now had kept himself retired at *Florence* for fear of a Persecution from his many Adversaries, and especially from the Cardinal of *Volterra* who seemed to have had a great Sway with the Pope, taking Courage at this Change of Measures, came to *Rome*, and was received with particular Marks of Respect by the greatest Part of the Court. He began immediately to confer with the Duke of *Sessa*, the Imperial Minister, and the *English* Ambassadors, and all jointly sollicited his Holiness to favour the Cause of *Cæsar*. *Volterra*'s bad Fortune at this Time, getting as usual the better of his Prudence and of all his Artifices, greatly injured his Affairs, put his Person in Danger, and at the same

ſame Time gave an Opportunity to Car- A. D. 1523.
dinal *de' Medici* to increaſe his Favour and Authority with his Holineſs, who had hitherto ſhewn a great Partiality for *Volterra*, becauſe with great Dexterity, ſolid Reaſons and fine Speeches, he had him believe he had greatly at Heart the Peace amongſt Chriſtian Princes.

Volterra impriſon'd.

BUT when *Franceſco Imperiali* after his Baniſhment on his Way to *France*, by means of the Duke of *Seſſa*, was ſtopped at *Caſtelnuovo*, in the Neighbourhood of *Rome*, in ſearching his Papers ſome Letters were found written by *Volterra* to the Biſhop of *Sens* his Nephew, exhorting him to preſs the King of *France* to invade *Sicily* with a Fleet; which obliging *Cæſar* to attend to its Defence, would render more eaſy the Recovery of the Dutchy of *Milan*. The Pope was amazed at this Diſcovery, and thinking he had been groſly deceived, and at the ſame Time being vehemently ſollicited by the Duke of *Seſſa*, and Cardinal *de' Medici*, he ſent for *Volterra*, confined him in *Caſtel Sant' Angelo*, and gave Orders to have

A. D. 1523. have him tried as a Delinquent againſt the Pontifical Majeſty, for inviting the King of *France* to forcibly attack *Sicily*, a Fief of the Holy See. The Proceſs however was carried on but ſlowly, and after he had been examined, was allowed Council to plead: But the ſame Moderation was not practiſed in regard to his Effects, for the Day he was arreſted *Adrian* ſeized on all the Goods and Money in his Houſe. By means of the Cardinal's Impriſonment a Plot alſo was diſcovered of ſome *Sicilians* in favour of *France*, for which Count *Camerata*, *Maeſtro Portulano*, and the Treaſurer of the Iſland were quartered.

THIS Proceeding had greatly incenſed *Adrian* againſt the King, and after conſulting for ſeveral Days the Cardinal *de' Medici*, at laſt the Rumour continually increaſing of his Majeſty's Deſigns, he came to a Reſolution of oppoſing him, and in a Conſiſtory, after expatiating on the imminent Danger of Chriſtendom from the Grand *Turk*, on account of the King of *France*'s Obſtinacy in refuſing to come into

into the Truce in Agitation, which would have removed all Apprehenſions. It was, he ſaid, the Buſineſs of the Vicars of CHRIST, Succeſſors of the Prince of the Apoſtles, to be anxious for the Preſervation of the Peace amongſt the Faithful, and therefore his Zeal for the public Welfare, obliged him to join thoſe who laboured to prevent Diſturbances in *Italy*; becauſe on that depended the Peace of the whole World. Conformable to the Intent of this Harangue, on the Third Day of *Auguſt*, the Vice King of *Naples* being come to *Rome* for that Purpoſe, a League and Confederacy was ſigned between the Pope, the Emperor, the King of *England*, the Archduke, the Duke of *Milan*, the Cardinal *de' Medici* for the *Florentine* State, and the *Genoeſe*, for the Defence of *Italy*, to laſt during the Life of the Confederates, and a Year after any one of their Deaths, and Room was left for any Prince to accede, provided it were with the Approbation of the Pope, *Cæſar*, the King of *England*, and the Archduke, and ſhould give Security that he would proſecute his Pretenſions by the Way

A. D. 1523.

A League between *Adrian* and other Powers againſt *France*.

A. D. 1523. of Juſtice and not by Force of Arms. That for the Defence of any of the Confederates who might be attacked in *Italy* an Army ſhould be raiſed; that the Pope ſhould furniſh Two Hundred Men at Arms, *Cæſar* Eight Hundred, the *Florentines* Two Hundred, the Duke of *Milan* Two Hundred, and alſo Two Hundred Light Horſe. That the Pope, *Cæſar*, and the Duke of *Milan* ſhould provide the Artillery and Ammunition, and be at all the Charges attending them. That for the Maintainance of the Foot and other Expences of the Army, the Pope, the Duke of *Milan*, and the *Florentines* ſhould contribute each Twenty Thouſand Ducats *per* Month, the Emperor Thirty Thouſand, the States of *Genoa*, *Siena*, and *Lucca* Ten Thouſand between them. The *Genoeſe* beſides were to pay the Coſt of their Marine, and for what Troops were neceſſary to defend their own Dominions. That every one's Quota ſhould be paid for Three Months certain, and as long after as the Pope, jointly with the Emperor and the King of *England*, ſhould declare it neceſſary. That the

the Pope and *Cæsar* should have the Nomination of a Captain General; and the Vice King of *Naples* was expected to be the Man, especially as he was proposed by the Cardinal *de' Medici*, who was in great Repute with the Emperor, and bore a great Malice against *Prospero Colonna*. The Marquis of *Mantoua* was but indirectly admitted into this Confederacy, because the Pope and *Florentines*, had constituted him their General at their own Charge. A. D. 1523.

But neither the League which the *Venetians* had made with the Emperor, nor the Union of so many Potentates contracted with such vast Provisions were able to cool the Ardor of the King of *France*, who, lately arrived at *Lions*, was bent on passing into *Italy* with a numerous Army, where the very Rumour of his Coming had begun to excite new Tumults. *Lione*, Brother to *Alberto Pio*, recovered by Surprise the Town of *Carpi*, which was negligently guarded by *Giovanni Coscia*, who had been placed there by *Prospero Colonna*, to whom the Empe- *Lione takes Carpi.*

A. D. 1523. ror had given that Town, after declaring *Alberto* a Rebel of the Empire.

Bonifacio Viſconti attempts to murder the Duke of *Milan*.

But a greater Accident had like to have happened in the Dutchy of *Milan*; for as *Franceſco Sforza* was riding on a Mule from *Monza* to *Milan*, his Horſe-guards following at a Diſtance that he might be leſs annoyed with the Duſt raiſed by the Horſes, which is very troubleſome in the Plains of *Lombardy* during the Summer; *Bonifacio Viſconti*, a young Man more regarded for the Name of his Family than for his Riches, Honours, or other good Qualities, being near him mounted on a mettleſome *Turkiſh* Horſe, when he came to a Place where Four Roads meet, giving his Horſe a ſudden Jerk ſtruck at the Duke's Head with a Dagger: But not being able to keep his fiery Horſe ſteady, and the Mule ſtarting at the ſame Time he miſſed of his Aim, and *Bonifacio* being much the taller and on a larger Beaſt, the Dagger directed to the Head grazed on the Back. *Bonifacio* then drawing his Sword made another Stroke

Stroke, but that alſo grazing only with the Edge of the Blade on his Side he received no Hurt. By this Time the Duke's Retinue coming up, *Viſconti* rode away, and tho' purſued by the Guards, by the Goodneſs of his Steed got ſafe into *Piedmont*. What induced him to perpetrate ſo wicked a Fact, was that a few Months before *Monſignorino Viſconti* was aſſaſſinated in *Milan* by *Girolamo Morone*, and, as was ſaid, at the Duke's Inſtigation. If Fortune had rewarded this cunning and bold Attempt, we muſt have beheld an Example which has very rarely or never before happened, that on the public Road at noon Day, ſo great a Prince, attended by ſo numerous and armed a Guard, in the Midſt of his Dominions, ſhould fall by the Hands of a ſingle Man and that the Aſſaſſin ſhould make his Eſcape. * The Duke thus wound-

A. D. 1523.

* *Viſconti* owed the Duke a Grudge for being broke at the Siege of the Caſtle of *Milan*, and afterwards for being refuſed the Government of a Town; and laſtly for the Death of *Aſtorre Viſconti* here called *Monſignorino*, who was his Uncle.

A. D. 1523. ed returned to *Monza*, being fully perſuaded that there was ſome Plot carrying on againſt him at *Milan*; *Proſpero*, and *Morone* entertained the ſame Suſpicion, and inſtantly ſent to apprehend *Viſconti*'s Brother the Biſhop of *Aleſſandria*, who, without any Reſiſtance, truſting to *Proſpero*'s Honour, delivered himſelf up to him, and after Examination was committed to the Caſtle of *Cremona*. But the Opinions of the Public was various as to his being conſcious or not of the Fact.

Biſhop of *Aleſſandria* impriſoned.

Valenza taken by *Birago*.

About this very Time *Galeazzo Birago* with other *Milaneſe* Exiles, aſſiſted by ſome *French* Soldiers that were in *Piedmont*, was admitted into *Valenza*, through the Treachery of the Governor, a *Savoyard*, but *Antonio da Leva*, taking with him ſome light Horſe and the *Spaniſh* Foot that were in *Aſti*, inſtantly laid Siege to the Town, which being in a weak Condition, and the Enemy not having had Time to fortify it, after planting the Artillery he reduced in two Days, and had the ſame Succeſs with the Caſtle, having killed

and retaken by *Leva*.

killed in the Two Aſſaults above Four Hundred Men, and taken many Priſoners, amongſt the reſt *Birago* the Author of theſe Diſturbances. *A. D.* 1523.

THE *French* Army all this While was paſſing the *Alps*, and was to be followed by the King, who was prevented by the Diſcovery of a Plot formed by the Duke of *Bourbon*, who for his Nobility, being of the Blood Royal, for his vaſt Eſtate, for the Dignity of his Office of Great Conſtable, and for the univerſal Fame of his Valour, was the firſt and moſt regarded Perſonage in the Kingdom of *France*: He had been out of the Royal Favour for ſome Years, and on that account was not let into the Secrets of the Cabinet, nor truſted in thoſe Poſts to which his Dignity ſeemed to intitle him. To this was added, that the King's Mother, on ſome old Claims, ſollicited the Parliament of *Paris* to decree away his Eſtate in her Favour. The Duke finding he could obtain no Redreſs from the King, full of Reſentment, by the Means of *Bu-* *Bourbon's Plot.*

A. D. 1523. *ren* the Emperor's Confident, and Great Chamberlain, had entered very ſecretly into a Confederacy, a few Months before, with *Cæſar* and the King of *England*, and to conſolidate this Alliance *Cæſar* agreed to give him in Matrimony, his Siſter *Eleonora*, the Widow of *Emanuel* King of *Portugal*. The Execution of the Plot depended on the King's going in Perſon to the War, which was artfully promoted by the King of *England*, who made him believe that he might reſt ſecure of his not moleſting the Kingdom of *France* that Year; as ſoon as *Francis* had paſſed the Mountains *Bourbon* was to enter *Burgundy* with Twelve Thouſand Foot, who, with *German* and *Engliſh* Money, were already ſecretly inliſting. *Bourbon* was confident that, when once the King was abſent from the Kingdom, he ſhould accompliſh his Ends. Of the Conqueſts that he ſhould make in *France*, he was to keep for himſelf, *Provence*, which he claimed thro' the Rights of the *Anjouins*, and it was to be created into a Kingdom in his Favour; all the reſt of the conquered

quered Places were to remain to the King of *England*. A. D. 1523.

THE Duke in order to excuſe his not attending his Majeſty into *Italy*, ſtopped at *Moulins*, where he feigned himſelf ſick; the King, in paſſing thro' that Town in his Way to *Lions*, having received ſome blind Intimation of this Plot, frankly told the Duke, that ſome People had endeavoured to render his Conduct ſuſpicious, but that he could reſt ſecure on his experienced Virtues and Loyalty. The Duke returned moſt humble Thanks to his Majeſty for treating him with ſo much Freedom and Confidence, then thanking God for giving him a King incapable of being prepoſſeſſed by idle Stories and falſe Calumnies, promiſed that as ſoon as his Health would permit, which, from the Slightneſs of the Indiſpoſition he had Reaſon to think might be in a few Days, he ſhould follow him to *Lions*, and accompany him wherever he went.

BUT

A. D. 1523.

The Plot discovered

But the King was no ſooner arrived at *Lions*, than he received Intelligence that, on the Frontiers of *Burgundy*, there were aſſembling a Number of *German* Foot, which, adding to his former Suſpicions, and ſome intercepted Letters making a clearer Diſcovery, he ordered *San Valerio*, *Boiſi*, the Brothers of *Paliſſe*, the Maſter of the Poſts, and the Biſhop of *Autun* to be apprehended as Accomplices, and the Grand Maſter was ſent with Four Hundred Horſe and Four Thouſand Foot to *Moulins* to ſecure the Duke of *Bourbon*, but was too late, for *Bourbon* ſuſpecting a Diſcovery, and fearing the Paſſes might be guarded, had, in a diguiſed Habit, got into *Franche Compté*.

San Valerio and others impriſoned.

Bonivette goes into *Italy* with the Army.

This important Diſcovery put off the King's Journey into *Italy*, but did not however prevent him, after retaining part of the Forces deſigned for the new War, from ſending thither *Bonivette* the Admiral of *France*, at the Head of Eighteen Hundred Lances, Six Thouſand *Swiſs*,

Swiſs, Two Thouſand *Gaſcons*, Two Thouſand *Valleſſe*, Six Thouſand *Germans*, Twelve Thouſand *French*, and Three Thouſand *Italians*, who paſſing the Mountains with this Army, after approaching the State of *Milan*, made a Feint as if he intended to march to *Novara*, and as that City was unprovided with Men, and had no Out-works, the Duke of *Milan* ſent Orders to ſurrender the Town, but not the Caſtle. *Vigevano* for the ſame Reaſon acted in the ſame manner, ſo that all the Country beyond the *Teſino* came into the Poſſeſſion of the *French*. *A. D* 1523. *Novara* ſurrenders and *Vigevano*.

PROSPERO COLONNA, who was labouring under a tedious Infirmity, did not imagine that, after the *Venetians* had entered into a Confederacy againſt the King of *France*, and *Bourbon*'s Plot had been diſcovered, *Francis* would perſiſt in his Reſolution of aſſaulting the Dutchy of *Milan* this Year; and on this Suppoſition he had not proceeded with proper Diligence in getting together his Men who were diſperſed in ſeveral Places, nor had

A. D. 1523. had he made any other neceſſary Preparations againſt ſuch an Invaſion. But now on the Approach of the Enemy he earneſtly attended to aſſemble his Troops in order to diſpute the Paſſage of the *Teſino*, forgetful of what had happened to himſelf, when on a like Occaſion he had endeavoured to prevent *Lautrech* from croſſing the *Adda*; and thought he was ſo ſure of Succeſs, that he took no Care to repair the Baſtions and Fences of the Suburbs of *Milan*, which having been totally neglected were in a ruinous Condition. He drew together his whole Force on the Ground which lies between the River *Biagraſſa*, *Bufaloro*, and *Turbico*, a Situation convenient for the Defence of *Pavia* and *Milan*. But the *French* who were at *Vigevano* found the Waters much lower than *Proſpero* expected, and at Four Miles Diſtance began to paſs the River, part of them waded, whilſt others croſſed in ſmall Boats; they laid alſo a Bridge for the Conveniency of the Artillery, at a Place where they met with no Guard nor Obſtacle. On this unforeſeen Accident *Proſpero* being obliged

to

to alter his whole Syſtem, ſent immediately *Antonio da Leva* with One Hundred Men at Arms, and Three Thouſand Foot to defend *Pavia*, and with the Remainder of the Army retired himſelf to *Milan*, where in a Council of War it was unanimouſly allowed that *Milan* was not tenable if the *French* without Delay directed thither their March, becauſe the Baſtions and Fortifications of the Suburbs, having been neglected ever ſince the laſt War, lay moſtly in ruins. That the Confidence with which *Proſpero* had undertaken to defend the Paſſage of the *Teſino*, had been the Occaſion that the neceſſary Reparations had been neglected, and that it would take up Three Days Time to put the Fortifications in a State of Defence. That they ought to take this whole Affair into their Conſideration and then immediately ſet about the Reparations, but at the ſame Time, leaſt the *French* ſhould come upon them the Firſt, Second, or Third Day, be prepared to retire to *Como*, if they marched by the Way of *Pavia*, or to *Pavia* if they came by *Como*.

A. D. 1523.

Antonio de Leva at *Pavia*.

Proſpero retires to *Milan*.

But

A. D. 1523.

The *French* lose the Opportunity of taking *Milan*.

But the evil Genius of the *French*, darkning as uſual their Intelects, would not permit them the Profit of ſo fine an Opportunity; for either out of Negligence, or waiting till the whole Army was aſſembled (for a great Part was not yet come up) they continued Three Days on the *Teſino*, and then joining together all their Forces between *Milan*, *Pavia* and *Binaſco*, marched to *San Criſtofaro* a Place ſituated but a Mile from *Milan*, between the *Roman* and *Teſin* Gates. The Pioneers having cleared the Way they planted the Artillery in their Front, making believe they were moving to aſſault *Milan*, but without making any further Attempt, they pitched their Camp in that Place, and after a few Days removed it to the Abbey of *Chiaravalle*, where they deſtroyed the Mills, and cut the Pipes that ſupplied *Milan* with Water, propoſing to themſelves a Siege rather than an Aſſault; for beſides the vaſt Number of People who had taken up Arms with a ſettled Averſion to the Name of the King of *France*, there were in *Milan* Eight Hundred Men at Arms,

Arms, Eight Hundred Light Horſe, Four Thouſand *Spaniſh* Foot, Six Thouſand Five Hundred *Germans*, and Three Thouſand *Italians*. *A. D.* 1523.

Death of *Adrian*.

In the Midſt of theſe Broils died Pope *Adrian* on the 14th Day of *September*, to the no ſmall Detriment of the Confederates, who were deprived not only of the Pontifical Authority, but alſo of the Subſidies for which, by the Articles of the Treaty, he was engaged. He left behind him no great Eſteem of his Abilities, either becauſe his Reign was ſhort, or that he had little Experience in Affairs; his Death was no way diſpleaſing to the Courtiers, who wiſhed to ſee the Papal Chair filled with an *Italian*, at leaſt with a Perſon educated in their Country. *Adrian*'s Death cauſed ſome Diſturbances in the eccleſiaſtic State, where, during his Life, ſome Sparks were diſcovered which prognoſticated a future Combuſtion, and would then have dilated themſelves if, partly by Accident and partly by Care, they had not been prevented.

A. D. 1523.

THE College of Cardinals before the Pope's Arrival into *Italy*, had committed the Care of *Reggio* and *Rubiera* to *Alberto Pio*, who under divers Pretences and Excuſes continued to keep Poſſeſſion of their Caſtles, having taking Occaſion of *Adrian*'s little Experience, to deſpiſe his Orders. He had alſo agreed that, as ſoon as War broke out, *Renzo da Ceri* with a Party of Horſe and a good Body of Foot ſhould quarter at *Rubiera*, and from thence make Excurſions, when Opportunity offered, on the *Roman* Road between *Modena* and *Reggio* in order to intercept the Money and Diſpatches which ſhould be tranſmitted to *Milan* from *Naples*, *Rome*, and *Florence*, and be at Hand for undertaking any Thing of importance when Occaſion offered. But *Franceſco Guicciardini* the Governor of thoſe Towns, having in Time dived into the Deſign, had made *Adrian* ſenſible of the End for which *Alberto* accompanied his Requeſts with ſuch ſmooth Speeches, and of the Dangers to which the eccleſiaſtic State on that Side would be expoſed

Alberto Pio Governor of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*.

The Hiſtorian Governor of *Modena* and *Reggio*

poſed, obtained that the Pope, enraged at *Alberto*'s Proceedings, by Threats of uſing Force obliged him to reſtore the Caſtles, for the Affairs of the *French* were not in ſuch Forwardneſs as to enable him to make a Reſiſtance. But thoſe of the Family of the *Pii* having afterwards got Poſſeſſion of *Corſica*, *Proſpero Colonna* in order to recover it, was the Cauſe that *Guido Rangone* was taken into the Pay of the Confederates with One Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horſe, and One Thouſand Foot, and that the Duke of *Seſſa*, who had enliſted One Thouſand *Spaniards* at *Rome*, which were to join the reſt at *Milan*, was ordered to ſtop with them at *Modena*. A. D. 1523.

In the mean Time *Renzo da Ceri*, whoſe Fame together with Hopes of Plunder had drawn about him great Numbers of Horſe and Foot, began to make Excurſions, and infeſt the whole Country and unexpectedly one Night, after the Pope's Death, attempted with Two Thouſand Men to take *Rubiera*, but the Gar-

A. D. 1523. riſon behaving gallantly, he found that Place was not to be eaſily taken by Storm; *Triſtano*, a *Corſican*, one of his Captains of Foot, was made a Priſoner in the Aſſault. *Renzo*'s Troops aſſembled afterwards on ſeveral Occaſions in theſe Parts, and were the Cauſe of Undertakings of greater Moment, for after the Pope's Death the Duke of *Ferrara*, tired with vain Promiſes, ſo often made him of the Reſtoration of his Towns, and finding that by the Abſolution he had procured from *Adrian*, it was leſs difficult to obtain a Pardon for what he had forcibly taken, than a Reſtoration of what he had loſt, and having fully perſuaded himſelf of what was the univerſal Belief, that on account of the Diſſentions which ſince *Leo*'s Death had been ever encreaſed among the Cardinals, the Election of a new Pope would be carried to a great Length, he determined to attend to the Recovery of *Reggio* and *Modena*. Amongſt the many Opportunities for accompliſhing his Scheme, was offered that of conveniently joining with *Renzo da Ceri*, who had already

already got together Two Hundred Horſe, and above Two Thouſand Foot, he therefore enliſted Three Thouſand Men, and after ſending Ten Thouſand Ducats to *Renzo*, marched towards *Modena*, which had no other Garriſon than Count *Gajazzo* and his Troops, which had been hired by the Confederates. Tho' the Inhabitants of *Modena* deteſted the Government of the Family *d' Eſté*, yet as the Walls were weak, and built after the old Faſhion without Baſtions, the Ditches filled up, and no Sort of Reparations had been made for a long time, there ſeemed a Neceſſity for a larger Garriſon, wherefore the Governor and the Count, after compoſing the Differences which had for ſome Time ſubſiſted between them, unanimouſly perſuaded the *Spaniſh* Foot (which after entering *Tuſcany*, came on but ſlowly, and had hitherto given them various and ambiguous Anſwers whether they would ſtop at *Modena* or proceed forwards) and at laſt after many Entreaties prevailed on them to enter the Town. The Duke of *Ferrara*, who was arrived at *Finale* with Two Hundred Men at Arms, Four A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. Four Hundred Light Horſe and Three Thouſand Foot, being appriſed of the Introduction of the *Spaniards*, was inclined to proceed no farther, but as he had no Certainty of the Fact, and hoping at leaſt that he might by his Conjunction with *Renzo* obtain *Reggio*, and not deſpairing alſo but that ſome Diſorder might ariſe amongſt the Enemies Infantry on account of their Arrears, he reſolved to advance. Nor did he entertain ſuch Hopes on light Grounds, for the College of Cardinals, who by the Governor had been appriſed of his imminent Danger, made no Sort of Proviſion, nor indeed returned any Anſwer to his Letters and Expreſſes, and it was not in his Power to content the Soldiers with the public Money, for the Day was come in which the ſecond Month's Pay was due to the *Spaniards*, and had he been able to raiſe the Money he could have no Hopes of enliſting more Men, and by dividing the Soldiers between *Modena* and *Reggio* neither of theſe Towns would be ſafe, for *Reggio* had no Garriſon, and the Diſpo-

Diſpoſition of the People was quite different from that of the *Modeneſe*. A. D. 1523.

In this Perplexity the Governor and Count *Guido*, after judging it was more prudent to preſerve *Modena* as a Town of greater Importance for its Vicinity to *Bologna*, more united to the eccleſiaſtic State, and which lay more convenient for receiving Succours and Proviſions, ſent Five Hundred Men to *Reggio* under *Vincenzo Maiatto* of *Bologna*, an Officer of Count *Guido*, with Orders to retire into the Citadel if the Town could not be preſerved, as they had ſome Hopes it might, at leaſt for ſome Days; they ſent alſo ſome Money to the Governor *Giovan Battiſta Smeraldo*, of *Parma*, to enable him to get together Three Hundred Men, and they tried but in vain to prevail on the Community of *Reggio* to contribute a Sum for raiſing more Men, as they were neceſſary not only for the Defence of the eccleſiaſtic State but alſo for their own Security.

A. D. 1523.

Guicciardini's Speech to the Modeneſe.

When the Governor of *Modena* found that without Money he could not well preſerve the Town, he aſſembled a good Number of the Citizens and acquainted them, that Affairs were reduced to ſuch a Criſis, that ſince for want of Money the *Spaniſh* Foot could not be paid, nor other Neceſſaries provided, the Town muſt of courſe come into the Hands of the Duke of *Ferrara* which otherwiſe might defend itſelf. That there was no Method of guarding againſt this Calamity, if they themſelves did not take upon them to prevent the preſent Danger, for he was well aſſured, that the new Pope, or the College of Cardinals would for the future effectually provide for their Defence. He ſaid there was not one preſent who had not experienced both the Government of the Duke and that of the Church, and therefore it would be Time loſt to make uſe of Arguments and Reaſonings to convince them of what they allowed. He only begged they would not make any Difficulty of lending him the Sum he

he now required, which was but a trifle both to each Particular, and to the Public, in compariſon to the Change of a Government under which they were happy. A. D. 1523.

THIS Speech being agreeable to the Audience, who were of the ſame Sentiments, they raiſed that very Day Five Hundred Ducats by a Tax laid on themſelves, with which the *Spaniards* being paid, and other Neceſſaries procured, they were in no farther Danger from the Duke of *Ferrara*, who not laying a greater Streſs on his Forces than they deſerved, leaving *Modena* on his left, and joining *Renzo* in his Way, proceeded to *Reggio*, where he was received without Difficulty, and the next Day the Governor of the Citadel ſurrendered a little after the Cannon had began firing, alledging for his Excuſe that *Majatto* whom he had ſent for had refuſed to come to his Aſſiſtance, and that the Money ſent him by the Governor of *Modena*, had been ſeized near *Parma* where he was recruiting.

A. D. 1523. As ſoon as the Duke had got Poſſeſſon of *Reggio*, the Admiral recalled *Renzo da Ceri* which greatly leſſened the Duke's Forces, who however after laying ſome Days along the *Secchia* undertook the Siege of *Rubiera*, where the Count had placed old *Guido da Coviano* with Two Hundred Foot. The Duke had ſmall Hopes of Succeſs, for the Place tho', ſmall had ſtrong Fortifications, the Ditches being deep and wide, and the Walls were ſurrounded by Ramparts of Earth, yet the next Day, as ſoon as the Artillery began to play againſt a Part of the Wall contiguous to the Gate, the Governor, either becauſe he had ſo ſecretly agreed, or elſe intimidated becauſe his Men began to be tumultous, jumped down from the Walls and preſented himſelf to the Duke, to whom he made a tender of himſelf and of the Town. The Duke entered the Place, and had no ſooner planted the Cannon againſt the Caſtle than the Commander whoſe Name was *Tito Tagliaferro*, a *Parmeſan*, was ſo terrified, that notwithſtanding it was ſufficiently

ſufficiently provided with Men, Artillery and all Neceſſaries, he ſurrendered without ſtanding a ſingle Shot. The Duke then put his Army into Quarters in Hopes that, on account of a long Vacancy of the *Roman* See, the Troops in *Modena* would diſband, as alſo becauſe he had farther Expectations as will be after related. A. D. 1523.

In the mean Time *Bonivette*, who was encamped at *San Criſtofano* in a Place ſurrounded by Waters and Ditches between the *Teſin* and *Roman* Gates, deſpairing of making himſelf Maſter of *Milan*, after taking of *Monza* had ſent Monſ. *Bayarde* and *Federigo da Bozzole* with Three Hundred Lances and Eight Thouſand Foot to *Lodi*, where the Marquis of *Mantoua*, General of the Eccleſiaſtic and *Florentine* Forces, commanded, with Five Hundred Horſe and the ſame Number of Foot; but the Marquis fearing his Perſon was in Danger, retired to *Ponte Vico*, and *Lodi* thus abandoned received the *French*. *Federigo* then laid a Bridge on the *Adda*, and croſſing

A. D. 1523. croſſing with the ſame Forces, he went in Succour of the Caſtle of *Cremona*, where the famiſhed Garriſon not having any Knowledge of the Arrival of a *French* Army in *Italy*, the very ſame Day the Admiral was approaching *Milan*, had agreed to ſurrender, if not relieved by the 20th Day of *September*. *Federigo* advanced to the Caſtle without Oppoſition, and after ſupplying it with Victuals and all Neceſſaries reſolved to lay Siege to the Town, to which he was encouraged by the ſmallneſs of the Garriſon left there by *Proſpero*; but the Marquis of *Mantoua* out of Fear of what might happen, had ſent thither One Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horſe, and Four Hundred Foot. *Federigo* finding he could not enter *Cremona* on the Side of the Caſtle on account of the ſtrong Fortifications erected between the Caſtle and the Town, turned to the Right, in order to make an attack where the Wall was weakeſt. After opening a Breach he gave the Aſſault but was repulſed; then widening the Breach he entered on a ſecond Attack, but meeting

Cremona beſieged.

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ing with the ſame ill Succeſs, he retired to *San Martino* in order to wait for *Renzo da Ceri*, who was moved from the *Reggian* with Two Hundred Horſe and Two Thouſand Foot. On his Arrival they returned to the Walls which were battered with as great Succeſs as could be wiſhed, but being afterwards incommoded with vaſt Rains, and finding they could not, without great Hazard, obtain their Intent, they made no farther Attempt. *Mercurio* at the ſame Time, with the light Horſe of the *Venetians*, whoſe Troops were aſſembling at *Ponte Vico*, paſſing the *Oglio*, made Excurſions up to their very Entrenchments. After theſe vain Attempts finding themſelves ſtraightened in Proviſions, and *Renzo's* Men deſerting, becauſe they had received no other Money than what had been ſent their Leader, quitting *Cremona*, they went and laid Siege to *Sonzino*, but with the ſame ill Succeſs. They afterwards plundered *Carravaggio*, where they reſted ſome Days; which furniſhed a Cauſe or Pretence to the *Venetians* for not ſending

A. D. 1523.

Carravaggio put to the Sack.

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A. D. 1523. to *Milan* their Supplies according to Engagement, for they gave in Excuſe for their Slowneſs in collecting their Army, the Notion which prevailed amongſt the *German* Officers, that on account of their Separation from *France*, the *French* would not paſs that Year into *Italy*, and that they had promiſed to be in Readineſs only when the Troops in the *Cremoneſe* ſhould have repaſſed the River *Adda*.

WHILST Affairs continued in this Situation each party miſtruſting its Ability of putting a ſpeedy End to the War, neither would venture on any Enterpriſe that might endanger the whole. The Admiral gave himſelf little concern in carrying on the Siege of *Milan*, being perſuaded that the Enemy would either diſband for want of Money, or quit *Milan* for want of Victuals, for tho' that City was ſupplied with a great Quantity of Wheat, yet in ſo populous a Town the Mouths were innumerable, and as the Admiral had cut off the Waters to prevent the working of the Mills, they found great Difficulties

ficulties in grinding their Corn *. On these Considerations he recalled the Troops in the *Ghiaradadda*, and posted them between *Modena* and *Milan*, so as to prevent any Provisions coming by the Way of the Mountain of *Brionza*, having already taken Care to prevent their Access by the usual Way of *Lodi* and *Pavia*. But all this, as will appear, was not sufficient for his obtaining the desired Effect. A. D. 1523.

PROSPERO COLONNA labouring under a a grievous Infirmity, was no less uneasy in his Mind, under Expectation of the Vice-king, not brooking to be the Second in Command, wherefore desirous of exerting himself, he ordered that all Diligence might be used to cut off the Convoys of Provisions which came to the Enemy from the other Side of the *Tesino*, since by the Strength of their Entrenchments, it was not practicable to drive them away by Force of Arms: And

* The Want of Bread was so great that One Hundred Thousand of the Inhabitants had not a Morsel of Bread for Eight Days, whilst the new Mills were building.

A. D. 1523. And for this Purpoſe he propoſed that the Marquis of *Mantona* ſhould enter *Pavia*; which rendering the Bridge of the *French* unſecure, they laid another at *Torligo* Twenty-five Miles diſtant from *Pavia*. *Vitelli* alſo earneſtly ſollicited that his Regiment of *Florentine* Men at Arms which, at the Commencement of the War, had been ſent to *Genoa*, and afterwards in Conjunction with Three Thouſand Troops in the Pay of the *Genoeſe* had reduced, excepting *Aleſſandria*, all the Country on the other Side the *Po*, might paſs the River, and intercept thoſe Proviſions which came to the *French* Camp by Way of the *Lomellina*. But the Doge of *Genoa* would not conſent, becauſe he was himſelf in Fear of the Stratagems of *Fregoſo* who was in *Aleſſandria*, and becauſe the *Venetians*, whoſe Troops had paſſed the *Adda*, refuſed to croſs the *Oglio* whilſt that Body of *French* that had quitted *Carravaggio* continued near *Monza* for fear of endangering *Bergamo*. At *Proſpero*'s Deſire, Four Hundred Light Horſe and Five Hundred Foot were ſent to *Trezzo*, in

in order to oblige the *French* to quit that Neighbourhood, by cutting off their Proviſions. *A. D.* 1523.

WHILST both Parties were thus employed no other military Actions were performed than light Skirmiſhes, Plunderings, and Excurſions, moſtly to the Diſadvantage, and ſometimes to the conſiderable Loſs of the *French*, as for Inſtance, when *Gio. de' Medici* went out to eſcort the Proviſions which were coming from *Frezzo* to *Milan*, with Two Hundred Men at Arms, One Hundred Light Horſe, and One Thouſand Foot, meeting with Eighty *French* Men at Arms, moſtly belonging to *Bernardo Viſconti*, firſt ſeemed to purſue them, then artfully retiring drew them into an Ambuſh where he had placed Five Hundred Men with Fire Arms, who without much difficulty routed them, and killed or took the greateſt Part. In another Encounter likewiſe *Zucchero Borgognone* broke Sixty Men at Arms of the Grand Ecueyer's Regiment. The *Spaniards* alſo often attacked and deſtroyed a good Number of the *French*

Giov. de' Medici routs *Bernato Viſconti.*

A. D. 1523. *French* who guarded the Trenches where the Pioneers were at Work in cutting Trenches under Cover of the Ramparts, and *Pagolo Luzaſa* who was in *Pizzichitone* with Fifty Horſe, making Excurſions all over the Country, greatly annoyed thoſe who were in *Cremona*.

NEITHER had the Admiral any better Succeſs in his ſecret Negotiations; He had privately agreed with one *Morgante* of *Parma*, a chief Officer of *Giovanni de' Medici*'s Regiment, *Gianicolo de Lanci* and Four others, only he let into the Secret, that when he ſhould be appointed to guard the Baſtion which had a Wicket beyond the Out-works, he ſhould introduce the *French*. On the Night the Plot was to be executed, *Morgante* imagining he had Occaſion for more Confederates, diſcovered it to another of his Acquaintance, who ſeeming to approve of the Scheme, adviſed him to go and in *Proſpero*'s Name order the Centinels not to ſtir if they ſhould hear any Noiſe, that they might not

be prevented from moleſting the Perſon whom he ſhould ſend to the Enemy's Camp to inform them of his being in Readineſs for their Reception. The Admiral had ordered One Thouſand Foot that very Night to approach the Baſtion, that they might be prepared to advance as ſoon as the Signal was given and the whole Army to be under Arms. But whilſt *Morgante* was gone to give his Order, the other flew to *Giovanni de' Medici*, and diſcovered the whole Affair, and then ſeized on the Conſpirators who, according to military Juſtice, were executed, by paſſing thro' the Pikes. A. D. 1523.

BUT the Affairs of the *French* now in all Parts, ſeemed to decline, for the Fertility of the Country about *Milan*, together with the new Mills which the Beſieged had erected within, leſſened every Day, their Hopes of reducing the Town by Famine, and it was computed that in the many Skirmiſhes in the Neighbourhood of *Milan*, what with killed and diſabled they had loſt Fifteen Hun-

A. D. 1523. dred Horſe, and were become ſo fearful, that they durſt not ſtir out of their Entrenchments, unleſs when they were under a Neceſſity to ſend Eſcorts or procure Forage; and then they iſſued forth in great Bodies, but the Admiral made a Merit of this Diſgrace, and was heard to ſay that he did not conduct the War like the hot-headed *French* Commanders, but had learned from the *Italians* how to act with Maturity and Moderation, yet whenever his Horſe or Foot met the Enemy they ſhewed a greater Propenſity to run away than to fight.

THE Imperial Officers being thus freed from the Fear of the Enemy, and of ſtarving, and on the contrary in Hopes of rendering difficult the Proviſions of the *French*, were now under no other Uneaſineſſes than that of the Want of Money, without which they could hardly provide for the Suſtenance of thoſe in *Milan*, and it would be almoſt impoſſible to eſcort them out of the Town, if the Occaſions of the War required

required it. To obviate this Difficulty amongſt other Ways and Means, *Proſpero*, with the ſecret Conſent of the Vice-king and Duke of *Seſſa*, had ſoon after the Pope's Death began to treat with the Duke of *Ferrara*, (who had often refuſed the Offers made him by the Admiral for marching his Troops to aſſiſt the Siege of *Cremona* after he had taken *Reggio*) and he agreed with *Proſpero* that as ſoon as he ſhould be put in Poſſeſſion of *Modena* through his Means, to pay him immediately Thirty Thouſand Ducats, and Twenty Thouſand more in Two Months. The Affair ſeemed eaſy, for as ſoon as *Proſpero* ſhould ſend his Orders to Count *Guido Rangoni* who was in the Service of the League, and to the *Spaniſh* Foot to quit *Modena*, the Inhabitants thus abandoned would ſubmit to the Duke. *Proſpero* was induced to take this bold Reſolution not only with View to the public Good, but to gratify alſo his private Friendſhip with *Alfonſo d'Eſte*, and weaken the papal Grandeur, which was a common Deſire of all the *Roman* Barons, that when *Modena* and

A. D. 1523.

Proſpero's Negotiation with the Duke of *Ferrara*.

A. D. 1523. *Reggio* were ſeparated from the Church the Duke of *Milan* might, with greater Eaſe, get Poſſeſſion of *Parma* and *Piacenza*.

Diſcovered to *Guicciardini*.

THIS Negotiation, tho' carried on with great Secrecy, came to the Knowledge of Count *Rangoni* who communicated it to *Guicciardini*. He ſaw immediately that the only Way to ſave the Town was to perſuade the *Spaniſh* Commanders who having been uſed well, and receiving a large Salary, were content with their Station, to pretend that they were not under *Proſpero*'s Authority till they had joined his Army, and therefore would not depart from *Modena*, till they received an expreſs Order from the Duke of *Seſſa*, who had ſent them thither. The Governor was very ſenſible that this Treaty had not been carried on without the Knowledge of *Seſſa*, yet as that Duke was the Imperial Ambaſſador at *Rome*, he thought that when the College of Cardinals made their Remonſtrances he would not only be aſhamed to give ſuch Orders, but at their Requeſts would act quite the contrary.

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A. D. 1523.

The Governor's Project took Effect, and Things ſucceeded according to his Wiſhes, for Count *Guido* and the *Spaniards* on receiving *Proſpero*'s Orders to come to *Milan*, where their Preſence was neceſſary, the Count gave ſeveral Reaſons for not coming, as that he was neither a Subject of the Church nor a *Modeneſe*, and the *Spaniards* inſtructed by him and the Governor, made Anſwer, that they could not ſtir till they were commanded by the Duke of *Seſſa*. After the Governor had informed the Cardinals of what had paſſed they ſent for the Duke of *Seſſa* to appear in the Conclave, where, not being willing to render himſelf, and conſequently *Cæſar* ſuſpected, he would not deny but that he had ſent his Orders to the *Spaniſh* Officers not to depart from *Modena*. This Diſcovery, as it often happens in human Affairs, produced Effects quite contrary to what had been imagined, for when certain Letters of *Proſpero*, intercepted by the Governor, were produced in the College, by which the Progreſs of the whole Treaty was diſcovered, the Cardinals Adherents to *France*, by whoſe Oppoſition the

The Garriſon of *Modena* refuſe to obey *Proſpero*'s Orders.

A. D. 1523. Continuation of the Supplies of Money which by Means of the Cardinal *de' Medicis* had been begun to be ſent to *Modena* was obſtructed, now being of Opinion that the Succeſs of the Plot would have been contrary to the Intereſt of their King, ſollicited themſelves to have the Money ſent to that City; as did alſo Cardinal *Colonna*, that it might be thought he preferred the Advantage of the Apoſtolic See to any other Intereſt. Theſe Meaſures deferred the Execution of *Alfonſo d'Eſte*'s Deſigns, but did not prevent the Continuation of *French* Negotiations. They imagined it might be ſo managed, that the Vice-king who, with ſlow Marches, was coming from *Naples* to *Milan*, with Four Hundred Lances, and Two Thouſand Foot, in his Paſſage thro' *Modena*, might carry off the *Spaniards*.

By this Time in *Milan* there was no Want of Food, for the Admiral fearing the *Germans* in *Pavia* might deſtroy his Bridge on the *Teſino*, over which where brought all ſorts of Proviſions, detatched Three Thouſand Foot from the Army at

at *Monza* which was the ſmalleſt Body, and ſent them to guard the Bridge, then reinforcing his own with another Part of that Army, he diſtributed the reſt in *Marignano* and *Biagraſſa* near the Bridge whence the Imperialiſts, having Poſſeſſion of *Monza*, were plentifully ſupplied with all Neceſſaries. *A. D.* 1523.

THE *French* Army was very ſtrongly encamped, it conſiſted of Eight Hundred Light Horſe, Six Thouſand *Swiſs*, Two Thouſand *Italian* Foot, and Ten Thouſand between *French* and *Gaſcons*, and extended from the Abbey of *Charavalle* as far as the Road to *Pavia*, and from thence for the Space of a Cannon Shot towards *Milan*, they had at the Bridge of the *Teſino* One Thouſand *Germans*, and One Thouſand *Italians*, and the ſame Number at *Biagraſſa*, where *Renzo da Ceri* was placed. In *Novara* they had Two Hundred Lances, and Two Thouſand Foot between *Aleſſandria* and *Lodi*. Deſcription of the *French* Army.

A. D. 1523.

Imperial Forces in *Milan*.

In *Milan* there were Eight Hundred Lances Eight Hundred Light Horſe, Five Thouſand *Spaniards*, Six Thouſand *Germans*, and Four Thouſand *Italian* Foot, beſides the Multitude of armed Inhabitants, who in Heart and Hand were ready to encounter the *French*. The Marquis of *Mantoua* was in *Pavia* with Five Hundred Lances, Six Hundred Light Horſe, Two Thouſand *Spaniſh* Foot, and Three Thouſand *Italians*; *Vitelli* at *Caſtel Nuovo* in the *Tortoneſe* with Three Thouſand Foot, tho' a little after he retired to *Seravalle*, being apprehenſive that a Body of *French* who were gone towards *Aleſſandria* might intercept his Return to *Genoa*. The *Venetians* had Six Hundred Men at Arms, Five Hundred Light Horſe, and Five Thouſand Foot, but of theſe laſt One Thouſand were ſent to *Milan* at the Requeſt of *Proſpero*, who prided himſelf on having it known that he was aſſiſted by the *Venetians*, and a little after on ſome Suſpicion of a Plot, another Body of them were ſent to *Cremona*.

A. D. 1523.

French propoſe a Truce.

THE Admiral at laſt preſſedby the Difficulty in procuring Proviſions, the extream Coldneſs of the Seaſon, the deep Snows, and the Grumbling of the *Swiſs*, who proteſted they would bear no longer ſo many Inconveniencies, reſolved to decamp from *Milan*, but before he made known this Reſolution, at his Requeſt *Galeazzo Viſconti* aſked Leave to make a Viſit in *Milan* to Madamma *Chiara*, who was no leſs famous for her extraordinary Beauty than for having entirely captivated the Heart of *Proſpero Colonna*. As ſoon as *Galeazzo* entered *Milan* he made Propoſals for a Truce, which were readily hearkened to, and the next Day near the Fortifications of *Alarcone*, *Pagolo Vettori* the *Florentine* Commiſſary, and *Girolàmo Morone* had a Meeting with *Galeazzo Viſconti*, and the General of *Normandy* on the Part of the Admiral, who propoſed a Suſpenſion of Arms for all the following Month of *May*, and to quarter their Army in the neighbouring Towns and Villages, and would at leaſt have conſented to reduce all their Forces beyond the *Teſino*. But the

German

A. D. 1523. *German* Officers, vexed that their Hopes of Victory ſhould be interrupted by a Truce, refuſed to agree to any Terms without the Approbation of the Vice-king, wherefore the Admiral two Days after, before Break of Day ordered the Artillery to be carried to the Banks of the *Teſino*, which, as ſoon as it was light was followed by the whole Army, but in ſuch Order, as to appear ready to fight if they were attacked. When the Retreat was diſcovered in the Town, not only the common Soldiers, and Citizens cried out loudly to be conducted to purſue them, but alſo the chief Officers, and thoſe of the greater Authority made the ſame Inſtances to *Proſpero Colonna*, laying before him the Facility of the Victory, for they reckoned themſelves not inferior to the Enemy, and thought they ſhould fight with much more Courage; for a Retreat muſt of Neceſſity put a Damp on moſt of their Spirits, which indeed was confirmed by ſeveral *Italians* who had juſt then deſerted from them. They reminded him of the infinite Glory he would acquire, and how his Name would be perpetuated to the lateſt Poſterity.

They retreat from *Milan*.

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if he added to the Merit of his paſt Victories the Glory and Triumph which he had now in his Power to gain. But it was *Proſpero*'s ſtated Maxim to avoid as much as poſſible to put himſelf in the Power of Fortune, wherefore, as immovable as the moſt ſolid Fabric againſt all the Efforts of blowing Winds, he made Anſwer, that it did not become a wiſe General to regulate his Conduct by popular Clamours, or lead out his Men againſt an Army whoſe Preſervation depended on a deſperate Defence, that he had already conquered and acquired ſufficient Glory by obliging the Enemy to retire without Danger; or Effuſion of Blood. That Men ought to limit their Deſires, for any one might diſcern that, following their Council, if they miſcarried the Loſs would prove without Compariſon much greater than the Advantage if they came off with Succeſs. That by conducting himſelf with ſuch Principles he had always came off with Honour in whatever he undertook. That the Reproach of Raſhneſs is more injurious

A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. rious to Generals, than the Glory of a Victory is advantageous, for in the firſt Caſe the Blame falls ſolely and intirely on the General, whereas the Praiſe of Victory, at leaſt, according tothe Opinion of Mankind, is communicated amongſt many. That now when he was ſo near his End he would not follow new Counſels, and abandon thoſe which in the whole Courſe of his Life had procured him Glory, Profit, and Grandeur.

Negotiation concerning the Election of a new Pope.

THE *French* divided their Army in Two Bodies, the Admiral with the greateſt Part ſtopped at *Bragraſſa* and ordered the Remainder to *Roſa*, the firſt Place being diſtant Fourteen, the other Seven Miles from *Milan*. But a few Days after the Admiral was removed from *Milan*, a new Pope was created, after the Cardinals had been Fifty Days in the Conclave, which was opened with Thirty-ſix Cardinals, and Three others came in after. They waſted all this Time in making divers Conventions, being divided into Parties, not only on account of their dif-

different Attachments to *Cæſar* and the King of *France*, but alſo on account of the Grandeur of the Cardinal *de' Medici*, who, tho' oppoſed by all thoſe who were in the *French* Intereſt, and by ſome of *Cæſar*'s Adherents, yet had found Means to ſecure for himſelf the Votes of Sixteen Cardinals, who were determined to chuſe him, or no other without his Conſent. He had alſo the ſecret Promiſe of Five more which he procured by his own Intereſt, and was beſides particularly diſtinguiſhed by the Ambaſſador of *Cæſar* and all thoſe who depended on his Authority. Tho' he had almoſt the ſame Intereſt at the Death of Pope *Leo*, yet he now entered the Conclave with a more firm Reſolution, neither for Length of Time, or any other Accident to give up his Hopes, principally founded on the Neceſſity of a Concurrence of Two Thirds of the preſent Cardinals, in the Election of a Pontiff. Nor would he be removed from his Reſolution by the common Danger of *Italy*, or the State of the Church in particular. As the Progreſs of the War varied, each Party endeavoured to protract A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. the Election, in Hopes that whoever got the Victory would beſtow Favours on his Adherents. And the Election would have been carried on to a much greater Length if all thoſe who were averſe to Cardinal *de' Medici*, and who were moſtly the oldeſt of the College, had been as united in the Choice of any other as they were in oppoſing him, and ſetting aſide their private Views, had been only unanimous in excluding Cardinal *de' Medici*. Cardinal *Colonna* was a Man of a haſty and very proud Temper, and Cardinal *de' Medici*'s bitter Enemy, but being diſſatisfied with the Cardinals of his Party, becauſe he could not prevail on them to chuſe Cardinal *Jacovaccio* a *Roman* of his Faction, and who had a great Dependance on him, he went of his own Accord to Cardinal *de' Medici*, offering him all his Intereſt for his Election. *Medici* gave him inſtantly a Bond under his Hand by which he engaged to make him Chancellor, which Poſt he then occupied himſelf, and make him a Preſent of his moſt. ſumptous Palace, built by Cardinal *San Giorgio*, and given him by Pope *Leo*. *Colonna*, overjoyed

overjoyed at theſe Conceſſions, brought over Cardinal *Cornaro* and Two more; as ſoon as this Change was known ſeveral others, as uſually happens in Conclaves, carried away by Meanneſs of Spirit or Ambition, ſtrove not to be the laſt in offering their Service; by which means that very Night the Cardinal *de' Medici* was unanimouſly adored as Pontiff, and the next Morning the 19th of *November*, was elected, according to Form, with the uſual ſolemn Scrutiny, that Day Two Years on which he had entered triumphantly into *Milan*. It was believed that the vaſt Number of Benefices and eccleſiaſtical Poſts of which he was in Poſſeſſion facilitated his Election, for when the Cardinals came into the Conclave they unanimouſly ſigned a Convention, by which all the eccleſiaſtical Revenues of the Perſon elected, ſhould be equally divided amongſt the reſt of the College. He intended to retain the Name of *Julius*, but being told by ſome Cardinals that it had been obſerved, that thoſe who after their Election had not changed their Names, had died within the Year, he aſſumed the Name of *Clement*

A. D. 1523.

Cardinal *de' Medici* created Pope.

and takes the Name of *Clement* VII.

A. D. 1523. *Clement* VII. either becauſe the Feſtival of that Saint was near, or alluding to his having after his Election forgiven and taken into Favour the Cardinal of *Volterra* with all his Adherents, notwithſtanding that *Adrian*, when he was drawing near his End, had declared that Cardinal incapable of aſſiſting at the Conclave, and tho' after he was admitted by the College, he had obſtinately ſtood out to the very laſt againſt the Election of *Julius*.

It is certain that the new Pope was in the higheſt Reputation in all Parts, and the Delay made in his Election, greater than had been for a long time, ſeemed to be recompenſed by the vaſt Authority and Worth of the Perſon who was ſeated in the Chair, becauſe he united the Sovereign Power he had in *Florence*, to the extenſive Power of the Church, becauſe he had for ſo many Years under *Leo* exerciſed in a manner the whole Power of the Pontificate; becauſe he was reputed to be a Perſon of Gravity and firm to his Reſolutions, and becauſe ſeveral Actions which proceeded from *Leo*, being attributed

buted to him, every one pronounced him to be a Perſon full of Ambition, of a great and turbulent Spirit, paſſionately deſirous of Novelties, to which may be added that he was no ways addicted to Diverſions, and as it was known that he had applied himſelf ſeriouſly to Buſineſs, every one expected very grand and extraordinary Atchievements. His Election at once reſtored abſolute Security to the State of the Church, for the Duke of *Ferrara*, terrified at the Election of ſo reſolute a Perſon, and giving over all Hopes of obtaining *Modena* by the Coming of the Viceroy of *Naples*, and truſting ſtill leſs to the *French* Meſſengers, who by Means of *Teodoro Trivulzi* came to make him vaſt Offers if he would enter into their Alliance, after leaving ſufficient Garriſons in *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, returned to *Ferrara*. The Affairs in *Romagna* were alſo quieted, where *Giovanni da Saſſatella*, who, in the Life of *Adrian*, had been driven away by the *Ghibellines*, ſince his Death, at the Head of a good Number of *Guelfs*, was

A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. returned into that Country under the Pretext of diſtreſſing the oppoſite Faction, but in reality by the Encouragement of the *French*.

But as ſoon as the *French* Army was diſpoſed between *Biagraſſa* and *Roſa*, the Admiral, retaining only Four thouſand *Swiſs*, diſbanded the Troops of *Dauphiné* and the *Languedoc* Foot as uſeleſs, and ſent the heavy Artillery on the other Side the *Teſino*, determining to wait in his Camp for the Supplies that were getting ready in *France*, not being in the leaſt apprehenſive of being forced, and having Proviſions in Plenty. But not to be idle he ordered *Renzo*, with Seven Thouſand *Italians*, to beſiege *Arona*, a ſtrong Place on the Borders of the *Lago Maggiore*, in the Poſſeſſion of *Anchiſe Viſconti*; but *Proſpero Colonna* ſent a Succour of Twelve Hundred Foot to reinforce it. The Caſtle of *Arona* commands the Town, which, on that account, is of no Uſe to any one without the Caſtle. *Renzo* therefore laid Siege to the Caſtle, but after giving ſeveral Aſſaults to no Purpoſe, for almoſt a Month

Arona beſieged.

Month together, with the Loſs of many of his Men, he broke up the Siege, confirming the Opinion that had been ſome time ſince entertained of him by the *Italians*, that none of his Actions, ſince the Siege of *Crema*, had been anſwerable to his Defence of that Town. *A. D.* 1523.

PROSPERO was all this while drawing near his End, having been for Eight Months in a languiſhing Condition, not without ſome Suſpicion of Poiſon, or a Love Potion. He had once been jealous of the Arrival of the Viceroy, but now finding himſelf unable to carry on the Buſineſs of the War, was very ſollicitous for his Coming. The Viceroy at laſt arrived, but when he approached *Milan*, would not for ſeveral Days enter the Town, out of Reſpect and Regard to the Merits and Reputation of ſo famous a General; but when he heard he was at the laſt Extremity and delirious, he would not loſe the Satisfaction of having the Sight of ſo great a Man, and came to his Bedſide a few Hours before his Death; tho' ſome have aſſerted that he did not enter *Milan* before he ex- Death of *Proſpero Colonna*.

A. D. 1523. pired, which was on the laſt Day but one of the Year. He was no doubt reputed a famous General, and his Reputation and Authority were very much increaſed in his latter Days. By a long Experience he made himſelf a perfect Maſter of the military Art, yet he was not quick in embracing the Opportunities which were offered him from the Diſorders and Weakneſs of his Adverſaries; but by ſuch Proceedings he gave alſo little Opportunity to the Enemy for diſtreſſing him. He was naturally very ſlow in his Undertakings, and may deſervedly be called the Cunctator *. But the World is juſtly indebted to *Proſpero* for teaching how to carry on a War more effectually with Counſel than with the Sword, and the Art of defending States without running the Riſque of a Battle without Neceſſity. In our Days the Manner of making War has undergone ſeveral Variations; for, before the Expedition of *Charles* VIII. into *Italy*, the Strength of an

His Character.

Proſpero's new Way of making War.

The old Way.

* This Title of Cunctator, which ſignifies the Delayer, was given to *Fabius Maximus* when he obſtructed *Hannibal*'s Progreſs in *Italy* by avoiding an Action.

an Army conſiſted more of Horſe in heavy Armour than in Foot. The Inſtruments for battering Towns were extreamly inconvenient for Carriage, and unhandy when put to Uſe: Battles were often given, yet the Slaughter was not conſiderable, and little Blood was ſpilt. When any Town was beſieged, tho' never ſo ſmall or weak, it would hold out for ſeveral Days againſt a ſtrong Army, not ſo much thro' the Skill of the Beſieged as from the Unſkilfulneſs of the Beſiegers, which rendered it very difficult for any Prince to get Poſſeſſion of his Neighbour's State. But ſince the Arrival of *Charles* in *Italy* the Terror of Foreigners, the Ferocity of a differently diſciplined Infantry, and above all the Execution of the Artillery, have filled the Minds of the *Italians* with Terror, and convinced them that there was no Hopes of defending themſelves without keeping the Field; for the Men in Garriſons, quite ignorant how to defend the Towns, gave them up at the firſt Approach of the Enemy, and if any had the Courage to reſiſt, in a few Days they were not able to ſtand the

A. D. 1523.

A. D. 1523. Aſſault. Thus the Kingdom of *Naples* and the Dutchy of *Milan* were attacked and taken, as one may ſay, the ſame Day. Thus the *Venetians*, after the Loſs of one Battle, immediately abandoned all their *Terra Firma*. In the ſame manner the *French*, at the very Sight of the Enemy, deſerted the Dutchy of *Milan*. Mankind, terrified at the eaſy Loſs of their Towns by theſe deſtructive Inſtruments, applied all their Wits and Art to find out Methods of Defence, and with ſuch Succeſs that they have fortified even their ſmalleſt Towns with Ramparts, Ditches, Flanks, Outworks, and Baſtions, whence being aſſiſted by a numerous Artillery, which does more Execution in the Defence than in the Siege of Places, the Towns are rendered ſecure, it being a very hard matter to take a Town fortified in ſuch a Manner. The Recovery of *Otranto* from the *Turks* in our Forefathers Times, gave us perhaps the firſt Notions of ſuch Sort of Fortifications; for *Alfonſo* Duke of *Calabria*, on entering that Town, found that the *Ottomans* had made ſeveral Works unknown to the *Italians*,

Italians, but the Memory of them had been only retained, for they were never put in Practice. *Proſpero* by theſe Arts, much to his Honour, twice defended the Dutchy of *Milan*, he being the only or the chief Perſon who uſed them both defenſively and offenſively; for by cutting off his Enemy's Proviſions, and prolonging the War, he conſumed them with Wearineſs, Length of Time, Poverty and Diſorders. In this manner he both defended himſelf and conquered without fighting, and even without drawing a Sword, or breaking a ſingle Lance. His Example has been ſince followed, and many Wars, that had laſted for ſeveral Months, have been terminated more by Induſtry and good Management, and making a proper Uſe of all Advantages, than by Battles. A. D. 1523.

Such were the Tranſactions of the Year 1523 in *Italy*, and the ſame Year there were great Expectations from the Preparations that were making beyond the Mountains, which produced Effects not worthy of ſuch great Princes, for

A. D. 1523. *Cæſar* and the King of *England* had agreed with the Duke of *Bourbon*, that they would with mighty Armies make an Irruption, one into *Picardy*, the other into *Guyenne*; but the Motions of the King of *England* in *Picardy* were to little Purpoſe, and the Attempt of *Bourbon* in *Burgundy* ſoon came to nothing; for not being able to pay his *German* Foot, ſome of the Officers agreed with the King of *France*, and withdrew Part of their Troops, and *Bourbon* deſpairing of Succeſs in *France* went to *Milan*, where *Cæſar* not liking he ſhould go to *Spain*, leſt perhaps he ſhould perfect the Matrimony, which he did not deſire ſhould take Place, ſent him by *Buren* the Title of his Lieutenant General in *Italy*, deſiring him to continue there. Nor did *Cæſar*'s Affairs on the Side of *Spain* proceed according to his Wiſhes; for tho' ſollicitous for the War he was arrived at *Pampelona*, in order to enter *France* in Perſon, and had already ſent the Army beyond the *Pyrenean* Mountains, which had taken *Sauterre*, not far diſtant from *St. Jean du Pied de Port*, yet his Power not

Spaniards invade France.

not being equal to his Eagerneſs, for want of Money he could not ſubſiſt ſuch a Number of Forces as was neceſſary for ſo great an Undertaking; nor had he been able on the ſame account to aſſemble his Army, till towards the latter End of the Year; and the Coldneſs of the Seaſon with the Scarcity of Proviſions, that could not be eaſily conveyed at ſuch a Diſtance, were additional Difficulties, which at laſt obliged him to diſband this Army, which had been aſſembled againſt the Advice of almoſt all his Council. And *Federigo* of *Toledo*, Duke of *Alva*, a Nobleman of great Age and Authority, did not ſcruple ſaying in the Heat of the War, that *Charles* in many Things reſembled *Ferdinando*, his Grandfather by the Mother's Side, but in this Expedition he acted more like *Maximilian*, his Grandfather by the Father's Side.

A. D. 1523.

Spaniſh Army diſbanded.

We are now entering on the Year 1524, in the Beginning of which *Cæſar*'s Commanders, taking Advantage of the Diſtreſs of the *French*, hoped they ſhould be able

1524.

A. D. 1524. able to put an End to the War: For this Purpoſe they ſent for the Duke of *Urbino*, and *Pietro da Peſaro*, the *Venetian* Proveditor, to come to *Milan*, in order to conſult on the future Operations: When it was unanimouſly reſolved that as ſoon as the Six thouſand *Germans* which the Viceroy had ordered to be enliſted, were arrived at *Milan*, the Imperial and *Venetian* Army ſhould jointly approach the Enemy, and expel them from that State with Sword or Famine. As they were perſuaded they had a ſufficient Force to compaſs this Deſign, there remained no other Obſtacle than the Difficulty of raiſing Money; for as the Soldiery were greatly in Arrears, there was no Hopes of making them march out of *Milan*, or the other Towns, till they were paid; nor was it leſs neceſſary, while the Army kept the Field, to make Proviſion for the ordinary Courſe of Payments. To remove theſe Difficulties in part, the *Milaneſe*, being heartily tired of the War, raiſed Ninety Thouſand Ducats amongſt themſelves, and lent them chearfully to the Duke,

Scarcity of Money in the Imperial Army.

Duke, whoſe Punctuality had already been experienced, when he repaid them out of his Treaſury the Sums they had advanced when *Lautrech* lay before *Milan*. The Pope alſo at this Juncture gave a helping Hand; for, dreading by what had paſt, the Effects of a *French* Victory, unknown to the Meſſengers ſent by the King of *France*, to whom he pretended the contrary, he very privately gave *Cæſar*'s Ambaſſadors Thirty Thouſand Ducats, and inſiſted that the *Florentines*, of whom the Viceroy demanded a freſh Contribution, by Virtue of the Confederacy made in *Adrian*'s Time, ſhould pay Thirty Thouſand Ducats in full of all Demands. Not that the Pope had any Intention to ſhew for the future any Partiality to either of the contending Parties: On the contrary, his Impartiality was plainly ſeen; for when *Cæſar* and the King, on his Aſſumption to the Pontificate, ſent him, one *Buren*, and the other *San Maſſan*, to engage him in their Intereſt, he hearkened to neither, but reſolved, as ſoon as the preſent Diſturbances were compoſed, to proceed with that Moderation

A. D. 1524.

Clement is reſolved to ſtand neuter between the Emperor and the King of *France*.

A. D. 1524. deration in Differences between Chriſtian Princes as was proper for a *Roman* Pontiff, and, without ſhewing any particular Propenſity to either, uſe his utmoſt Endeavours to diſpoſe them to Peace. This Behaviour was at that Time agreeable to the King of *France*, who feared that *Clement* entertained the ſame ill Diſpoſition towards him now he was Pope, as he had when Cardinal; *Cæſar* on the contrary was diſpleaſed, thinking his paſt Friendſhip, and, ſince *Leo*'s Death, the Intereſt he had given him for his Election, ought to have induced him not to ſeparate from him; wherefore he took it very ill when it was ſignified to him, on the Part of the Pontiff, that tho' he had not diveſted himſelf of the Benevolence which he had hitherto entertained for him, yet ſince he had now laid aſide the private Perſon, and was become a common Father, he was in Duty bound for the future to diſpenſe common Duties.

But whilſt the Viceroy was getting himſelf in Readineſs to march againſt the Enemy, he ſent *Giovanni de' Medici* to beſiege

beſiege *Marignano*, which together with the Caſtle ſurrendered; and a few Days after the Marquis of *Peſcara*, who, not being diſpoſed to ſerve under *Proſpero Colonna*, did not come to the Army till that General was at the laſt Extremity, being informed that *Bayard* was poſted in *Rebecco* with Three Hundred Light Horſe, and a good Body of Foot, in conjunction with *Giovanni de' Medici*, he ſuddenly attacked them, and took moſt of their Men, with their Horſes, and diſperſed and put to Flight the reſt; then with all Speed he retired to *Milan*, that he might not give Time for thoſe in *Biagraſſa* to purſue him. His Induſtry and Valour were much cried up on this Occaſion, but much more his Speed; for *Rebecco* is but Two Miles diſtant from *Biagraſſa*, but is Seventeen from *Milan*, from whence he had ſet out.

A. D. 1524.

Marignano taken.

Marquis of *Peſcara* routs a Party at *Rebecco*.

THE State of the War was now reduced to this Point, that the Hopes of the *French* conſiſted in their Enemy's Want of Money, and thoſe of the Imperialiſts in their Adverſary's Want of Proviſions,

A. D. 1524. Proviſions, for they could not think of diſlodging them by Force from their very ſtrong Camp of *Biagraſſa*; yet both Parties expected Succours, theſe of *German* Foot, and the other of *Swiſs* and other Foot. The Admiral ſet Fire to the Town of *Roſa*, and withdrew the Garriſon to *Biagraſſa*, and to annoy the Enemy made Excurſions all over the Country, burning and deſtroying every Thing before him. But the *German* Foot being at laſt arrived the Imperial Army, conſiſting of Sixteen Hundred Men at Arms, Fifteen Hundred Light Horſe, Seven Thouſand *Spaniards*, Twelve Thouand *Germans*, and Fifteen Hundred *Italians*, with the Duke of *Milan*, the Duke of *Bourbon*, the Viceroy and the Marquis of *Peſcara* at their Head, after Four Thouſand Foot had been left to guard *Milan*, went and encamped at *Venaſco*, where a few Days after the Duke of *Urbino* joined them with Six Hundred Men at Arms, Six Hundred Light Horſe, and Six Thouſand *Venetian* Foot. The Caſtle of *Cremona*, in the mean Time, not being able to hold out any longer for Want of Food, and *Federigo da*

Imperial Army marches to *Venaſco*.

Caſtle of *Cremona* ſurrenders.

da Bozzole having in vain attempted to relieve it, ſurrendered to the Imperialiſts. After this the *Cæſarean* Army marched to *Caſera* Five Miles diſtant from *Biagraſſa*, where the Admiral, after diſtributing Two Hundred Lances and Five Thouſand Foot between *Lodi*, *Novara*, and *Aleſſandria*, had poſted himſelf with Eight Hundred Lances, Eight Thouſand *Swiſs*, which a few Days after were increaſed with Three Thouſand more, Four Thouſand *Italian*, and Two Thouſand *German* Foot, and having as yet ſufficient Quantity of Proviſions in the Army and neighbouring Towns for Two Months, it was impoſſible to attack him in his ſtrong Entrenchments without the utmoſt Hazard. Wherefore the Imperialiſts had very often attempted to paſs the *Teſino*, in order to take thoſe Towns which ſupplied the Enemy with Neceſſaries on that Side, and prevent what Succours might come from *France* from joining the Army, but were always fearful that ſuch a Step might endanger *Milan*, till at laſt, conſidering

A. D. 1524.

Deſcription of the *French* Army.

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A. D. 1524.

Deſcription of the *French* Army.

A. D. 1524. dering the Confidence they might repoſe in the People of that City, they thought a very large Garriſon was not neceſſary, and therefore came to a Reſolution of paſſing that River, and the Duke with *Giovanni de' Medici* returned to *Milan*, where the Garriſon now conſiſted of Six Thouſand Foot. On the Second Day of *March* the Army paſſed the *Teſino*, near *Pavia*, over Three Bridges, the main Body quartered at *Gambalo*, and the Remainder were diſtributed in the neighbouring Villages. On occaſion of this Paſſage the Admiral, to ſecure *Vigevano*, ſent thither immediately *Renzo da Ceri*, and Five Days after fearing he ſhould loſe that Town, and the reſt of the *Lomellina*, which if taken would leave him in a manner beſieged, decamped with his whole Army, leaving One Hundred Horſe and One Thouſand Foot at *Biagraſſa*. He placed his Van-guard before *Vigevano*, and the main Body at *Mortara*, Two Miles from *Gambalo*, where the Viceroy was poſted; he was very ſafe in this Situation, had Plenty of Proviſions, and a ſecure Communication with the *Monferrato*, *Vercelli*,

Vercelli, and *Novara*, and the Places being near many others, all Neceſſaries paſſed from Town to Town with as much Eaſe as if they were under a Convoy. A. D. 1524.

THE Admiral for two Days ſucceſſively offered Battle to the Enemy, who, tho' ſenſible of their ſuperior Numbers, and Valour of their Men, refuſed to fight, not being willing to put to Chance their almoſt certain Hopes of Victory, for by ſome intercepted Letters they were informed the Enemy began to want Money.

AFTER the Imperial Army had paſſed the *Teſino*, the Duke of *Urbino* with the *Venetian* Troops laid Siege to *Garlaſco*, a Town ſtrongly ſituated, and well fortified with Ditches and Ramparts, and garriſoned by Four Hundred *Italian* Foot, which lying on the other Side of the *Teſino*, between *Pavia* and *Trumello*, where he had deſigned to encamp, intercepted the Acceſs of Proviſions, not only to him, but to all the reſt of the Army. On his Arrival he raiſed a Bat-

A. D. 1524. tery, and gave, the ſame Day, the Aſſault, in which being repulſed, many of his Men, and ſome of thoſe of *Giovanni de' Medici*, paſſed the Ditches up to their Necks in Water, and made ſo vigorous an Attack, that they forced their Way into the Town with great Slaughter of the Enemy.

The Imperial Army moved afterwards to *San Giorgio* near *Pieve al Carro*, with an Intent of laying Siege to *Sartirano*, ſituated on the Side of the *Po*, a ſtrong Town which lay convenient for preventing Proviſions going to the *French*. The Care of this Place was committed to *Ugo Pepoli*, and *Giovanni Birago*; it had in Garriſon ſome Horſe and Six Hundred Foot; but *Giovanni d' Urbino*, arriving with ſome Artillery and Two Thouſand *Spaniards*, took firſt the Town and then the Fort, putting the common Soldiers to the Sword, and making the Officers Priſoners. The *French* were on their March to ſuccour *Sartirano*, but were prevented by the Speed of the Enemy, and on hearing on the Road what

what had happened, they ſtopped with their whole Army at *Monza*. Neither had the *French* better Succeſs in other Parts of the Dutchy; for the Garriſon of *Milan* forced the Town of *San Giorgio*, that lay beyond *Monza*, from whence thoſe of *Biagraſſa* were ſupplied with Proviſions, to ſurrender. *Vitelli* recovered *Stradella*, where the Inhabitants had ſent for the *French* quartered in *Lodi*, on account of the ill Uſage they received from the *German* Garriſon. *Pagolo Luzzaſco* meeting a ſtrong Body of *French* Horſe put them to Flight; and *Federigo da Bozzole* having ſet out from *Lodi* to make an Attempt on *Pizzichitone* returned with Shame inſtead of Victory, being repulſed after many of his Men had been killed and many wounded. The only Advantage they obtained was the intercepting of Fourteen Thouſand Ducats ſent to the Army by *Cæſar*, which were ſeized in an Excurſion between *Piacenza* and *Tortona*.

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In the Midſt of theſe Difficulties, two Things kept up the Admiral's Spirits, one his Hopes of a Diverſion, the other of a ſpeedy Succour; for the King had ſent, by the Mountain of *Monginevra*, Four Hundred Lances, which were to be joined by Ten Thouſand *Swiſs*, and *Renzo da Ceri* was conducting Five Thouſand new enliſted *Griſons*, by the Way of *Val di Saſſina* into the Territory of *Bergamo*, whence they were to proceed to join *Federigo da Bozzole* who had with him a good Number of *Italian* Foot. The Admiral expected that the Imperialiſts on their Arrival would be obliged to repaſs the *Teſino*, for the Security of *Milan*. The Duke of *Milan* ſent *Giovvnni de' Medici* againſt thoſe Forces, with Fifty Men at Arms, Three Hundred Light Horſe, and Three Thouſand Foot, who joining Three Hundred Men at Arms, Three Hundred Light Horſe, and Four Thouſand Foot of the *Venetians*, approached the Enemy who was at *Cravina*, a Country Seat between the Rivers *Adda* and *Brembo*, Eight

Eight Miles diſtant from *Bergamo*, and with Part of his Men made Excurſions to their very Camp. But the *Swiſs*, the Third Day after their Arrival, complaining that in *Cravina* they had neither found Money nor Horſe, nor another Body of Foot, as they had been promiſed by *Renzo*, returned into their own Country. A. D. 1524.

AFTER the *Swiſs* had broke up, *Giov. de' Medici* took *Caravaggio*, and then paſſing the *Adda* with the Artillery deſtroyed the Bridge of the *French* at *Bufaloro* on the *Teſino*. *Biagraſſa* was now the only Place remaining in Poſſeſſion of the *French* between *Milan* and the *Teſino*, it was well ſtored with Proviſions, and had a Garriſon of One Thouſand Foot under *Girolamo Caracciolo* a *Neapolitan*. This Town being ſituated on the great Canal, was of great Hindrance to the Proviſions which were uſually ſent that Way to *Milan*. The Duke took with him to this Siege *Giovanni de' Medici*, and was accompanied by all the *Milaneſe* Youth as well as Soldiery, and

A. D. 1524. having battered the Walls from Sunriſe till Noon, the Town was taken that very Day, to the great Honour of *Giov. de' Medici*, who on this Occaſion gave Marks not only of a ſuperior Valour, but acted with as much Prudence and Authority as could be expected from any great General. *Caracciolo* was taken Priſoner, many of the Garriſon were killed in the Action, and *Medici* ordered ſeveral who had deſerted from him to be hanged. As ſoon as the Town was taken thoſe in the Caſtle capitulated, and ſurrendered on a Promiſe of Safety for their Perſons. This Victory was joyful News for the Inhabitants of *Milan*, but their Misfortune, without Compariſon, exceeded their Joy. For the Plague that had begun in *Biagraſſa*, by means of Goods carried away in the Plunder was tranſported to *Milan*, and a peſtilential Contagion being ſpread, it made ſuch a Havock, that in *Milan* only Fifty Thouſand Perſons were carried off.

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THE Whole of the War was now centered on the other Side the *Teſino*, where the Admiral after the Loſs of *Sartirano*, on a new Approach of the Imperialiſts, abandoned *Mortara*, and in Two Marches arrived at *Novara* with his Army greatly diminiſhed, for many of his Foot and of his Lances alſo had filed off and were returned to *France*, ſo that he had no other Meaſures to take than to gain Time, till he could be joined by Eight Thouſand *Swiſs*, who were arrived in the Neighbourhood of *Jurea*. On the other Hand the Imperialiſts, intent on preventing this Succour, and reducing the Enemy into Difficulties by cutting off their Proviſions, poſſeſſed themſelves of the Villages round *Novara*, putting to the Sword the *French* who had been left to guard them; and after placing a Garriſon in *Vercelli* to prevent the *Swiſs* from entering that Town, poſted themſelves at *Biandra*, a Place between *Vercelli* and *Novara*, where their Camp was ſurrounded by Ditches, Trees and Waters. At laſt the Admiral being informed that the

A. D. 1524. *Swiſs* were moved from *Jurea*, and had halted at the River *Sleſia*, which they had not been able to to paſs on account of the Height of the Waters, and being deſirous to join them, in order, as it was thought, to make a ſecure Retreat, quitted *Novara*, and went and encamped on the ſame River; where being in Want of Proviſions, and his Men daily deſerting, he ordered a Bridge to be laid between *Romagnana* and *Gattinara*, whilſt the Enemy from *Biandra* had marched to *Briona*, and from thence formed their Camp within two Miles of *Romagnana*. The *French* thus ſtrengthened paſſed the River the Day following, and if the Enemy had narrowly watched their Motions, it was thought they might have obtained that Day a compleat Victory. But their Generals differed in their Counſels, ſome being deſirous to fight, others to let them depart unmoleſted. Nor indeed did military Affairs in the Imperial Army ſeem to be conducted with proper Care and Attention. The Marquis of *Peſcara* was the ſole Perſon who, for a conſtant Steadineſs in all his Actions, ſeemed worthy of being entruſted

entruſted with the ſupreme Power; but the other Commanders, envious of his Merit and Glory, ſought rather to obſcure his Fame by deſpiſing and contradicting his Counſels, than to augment his Credit by concurring with him. It was late in the Day when the News of the Departure of the *French* reached the Imperial Camp; but as ſoon as it was known many Light Horſe, and many Foot in a diſorderly manner, without Colours, waded the River and followed them, and coming up to their Rear, began to ſkirmiſh; the *French* fighting and marching forwards ſuſtained them for a long Time, yet at laſt they left behind Seven Pieces of Artillery and a very great Quantity of Ammunition and Proviſions, beſides Part of the Baggage of the Horſe and Foot, and had many of their Men killed in fighting. They made a Feint as if they intended to lodge at *Gattinara*, a Mile diſtant from *Romagnana*, and at the ſame Time ſecretly ſent forward their Baggage and Artillery. But as ſoon as the Enemy, imagining they had taken up their Quarters at *Gattinara*, had begun to retire, they

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A. D. 1524. marched on Six Miles farther to *Raviſingo* which lies towards *Jurea*. The Imperialiſts lodged quietly the ſame Night on the River, but paſſed it as ſoon as the Moon began to ſhine, though not followed by the *Venetians*, who being entered into the Territory of the Duke of *Savoy*, thought they had already exceeded the Obligation of their Confederacy, by which they were only engaged to defend the Dutchy of *Milan*. The *French* proceeded with a ſlow March, and in very good Order, and having placed the *Swiſs* in the Rear, they repulſed the firſt Horſe and Foot that overtook and attacked them in a diſorderly manner Two Miles beyond *Raviſingo*. On the Arrival of the Marquis of *Peſcara* the Fight was renewed, but not in ſuch a Manner as to ſtop the March of the *French*, who in this laſt Skirmiſh loſt *Giovanni Gabaneo*, and Monſ. *de Bayard*, who having received a Muſquet Shot was made Priſoner, and died ſoon after of his Wound. The Marquis, tho' by this time he had been joined by a good Number of his Men, did not think it proper to continue the Purſuit without the

the Aſſiſtance of the whole Army and the Artillery; and thus both *French* and *Swiſs* without farther Moleſtation returned to their own Habitations, after leaving at *Bauri*, beyound *Jurea*, Fifteen Pieces of Artillery to the Care of Three Hundred *Swiſs*, and one of the Lords of that Country; but this did not ſecure them, for the Imperial Generals on Notice given ſent and ſeized them. The conquering Army was afterwards divided into ſeveral Bodies. The Duke of *Urbino* was ordered to *Lodi*, the Marquis of *Peſcara* to *Aleſſandria*; thoſe two Cities only remaining in Poſſeſſion of the *French*, for *Novara*, on the Approach of the Duke of *Milan* and *Giovanni de' Medici*, had ſurrendered. The Viceroy undertook to march againſt *Rotellino*, who with Four Hundred Lances had paſſed the Mountains; but he, on hearing of the Admiral's Retreat, returned immediately into *France*. Nor did *Boiſſi* and *Giulio da Sanſeverino*, to whoſe Care the Defence of *Aleſſandria* was committed, make any Reſiſtance: And *Federigo*, after obtaining a few Days time to certify himſelf of the Admiral's Departure, gave up

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A. D. 1524. up *Lodi*, on Condition of having Liberty to tranſport his *Italian* Foot into *France*, as had been permitted to thoſe in *Aleſſandria*, and theſe Troops, which in both Cities amounted to about Five Thouſand Men, were afterwards of ſignal Service to the King of *France*.

THUS ended the War againſt the Dutchy of *Milan*, under the Direction of the Admiral; by which the Power of the King of *France* receiving no Diminution, and the Roots of Evils not being extirpated, but only covered, new Calamities were expected to ariſe; for tho' *Italy* was freed from its preſent Diſaſters, it was not free from Jealouſies of their being renewed. *Cæſar* however, at the Perſuaſion of the Duke of *Bourbon*, and invited by the Hopes that his Authority would be of very great Moment, attempted to transfer the Seat of the War into *France*, in concert with the King of *England*.

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In the Beginning of this Year he laid Siege to *Fonterabia*, a very ſmall Town on the Frontiers of *Spain* and *France*; and tho' it was plentifully provided with military Stores, Victuals and Men, who had ſufficient Notice to repair the old and raiſe new Fortifications, yet for want of Experience they made them with ſo little Skill, that finding themſelves expoſed to the Fire of the Enemy, they were ſoon obliged to capitulate, and ſurrendered on Condition of Safety for their Perſons.

The Pope ſollicits a Peace.

After the Recovery of *Fonterabia*, *Cæſar* formed greater Projects, and therefore paid little Regard to the Perſuaſions and Authority of the Pope, who in the Beginning of this Year had ſent to him and to the Kings of *England* and *France*, to ſollicit them to enter into a Treaty of Peace, or at leaſt agree to a Suſpenſion of Arms, but with little Hopes of Succeſs. The King of *France*, not expecting to obtain a Peace anſwerable to his Wiſhes, was deſirous of a Two Years Truce; whilſt *Cæſar*,

A. D. 1524. *Cæſar*, deſpiſing a Truce, which would only give Time to the King to be better prepared for a new War, wanted Peace and any Sort of Convention made by the Pope was diſagreeable to the King of *England*, from a Deſire he had entertained of being conſtituted the ſole Mediator, to which he was perſuaded by the ambitious Counſels of the Cardinal of *York*. This Man, tho' of a very low Extraction and deſpicable Blood, found means to gain ſuch an Aſcendant over that Prince, as to make it evidently appear to every one that the King's Orders, without his Approbation, were of no Significancy; and on the contrary, whatever Orders he iſſued, even without the King's Knowledge, were punctually executed. But the King and the Cardinal at this Juncture diſſembled with *Cæſar*, and ſeemed ardently deſirous of making War againſt *France*, to which Kingdom *Henry* pretended, for various Reaſons, to have a Right, grounding his firſt Claim from the Time of *Edward* III. King of *England*. This *Edward*, after the Death of *Charles* IV. King of *France*, ſurnamed the

Cardinal *Wolſey*.

Pretenſions of the *Engliſh* Sovereigns to the Kingdom of *France*.

the *Fair*, who in 1328 died without Iſſue Male, being born of a Siſter of *Charles*, made Inſtances to be declared King of *France*, as the neareſt Male akin to the deceaſed King. But he was excluded in a general Parliament of *France*, which decreed that, according to the Salic Law, which was a very antient Law of that Kingdom, not only Females but all Deſcendants of the female Line were excluded from the Succeſſion. But *Edward*, ſoon after taking upon him the Title of King of *France*, entered that Kingdom with a powerful Army, and obtained ſeveral Victories both over *Philip de Valois*, who by general Conſent had been declared Succeſſor to *Charles the Fair*, and over *John* his Son, whom he took in a Battle, and carried Priſoner into *England*. After ſome Time he made a Peace with *John*, who yielding to him ſeveral Provinces and States in the Kingdom of *France*, *Edward* renounced the Royal Title of that Kingdom. But the Articles of this Peace not being long complied with, ſeveral Wars and laſting Truces enſued, till *Henry* V. of *England*, entering

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A. D. 1524. ing into an Alliance with *Philip* Duke of *Burgundy*, who was fallen out with the Crown of *France* on account of the Murder of his Father Duke *John*, was ſo ſucceſsful againſt *Charles* the VI. a Lunatic, that he made himſelf Maſter of almoſt the whole Kingdom, with *Paris* its Capital, where meeting with the King and Queen, he married their Daughter *Catherine*, prevailing on the diſtracted Sovereign to agree that, notwithſtanding his Son *Charles* was living, the Kingdom after his own Death ſhould be transferred to *Catherine* and her Children. By Virtue of this invalid and unreaſonable Title, after *Henry*'s Death, his Son *Henry* VI. was ſolemnly crowned King of *France* and *England* in *Paris*. But *Charles*, after his Father's Death called *Charles* VII. taking Advantage of the bloody Wars which were afterwards kindled in *England* amongſt the Princes of the Royal Blood, expelled the *Engliſh* out of all their Conqueſts in *France*, excepting *Calais*, and ſent them on the other Side of the Ocean: Yet the Kings of *England* have continued to retain the Title of King

of

of *France*. Theſe Reaſons were ſufficient to excite *Henry* VIII. to a War, who was more ſecure than any other of his Predeceſſors in his Kingdom. For the Kings of the Houſe of *York*, which gave Name to one of the Factions, having depreſſed thoſe of the Houſe of *Lancaſter*, the Name of the other, the *Lancaſtrians*, after the Extinction of the Male Iſſue of that Family, exalted to the Throne *Henry* of *Richmond*, as the neareſt in Blood of that Race, who after the Death and Overthrow of the Kings his Adverſaries, that he might reign with the greater Security and Authority, married a Daughter of *Edward* the laſt King but one of the Houſe of *York* *. Wherefore it appeared that on *Henry* born of that Matrimony were transferred all the Rights of both Families, who bore for their Enſigns the Red and White Roſe. *Henry* however was not ſo much induced to take up Arms in hopes of conquering the Kingdom of *France*, which he knew

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* The Author, by calling *Edward* the laſt King but one of the *York* Line, ſeems to have overlooked *Edward* V.

A. D. 1524. would be attended with innumerable Difficulties, as by the Cardinal of *York*'s Sollicitations, who, foreſeeing the many Troubles and Inconveniencies which muſt neceſſarily ariſe in the Courſe of a War, ambitiouſly coveted and expected that the King his Maſter would be conſtituted Umpire of all Differences. And, as he knew his Authority in ſettling the Articles of Peace would have the greateſt Weight, he pleaſed himſelf with the Thoughts of making his Name glorious throughout the Univerſe, and intended at the ſame time to eſtabliſh his Intereſt with the King of *France*, to whom he had ſecretly inclined: And this was the true Reaſon why his Engagements at this Juncture were not ſo ſtrong as they ought to have been, had he really intended to come heartily into a War. But theſe were ſufficient to confirm *Cæſar* in his Reſolution to take up Arms, and a ſtill greater Inducement were the Hopes he had placed on the vaſt Intereſt and Authority of the Duke of *Bourbon* in the Kingdom of *France*, which he expected would raiſe conſiderable

derable Commotions in that Country. Wherefore, tho' many, laying before him the Want of Money, and the uncertain Faith of his Allies, counſelled him to ſhake off all Thoughts of a War attended with ſo many Difficulties, and to conſent that the Pope might treat for a Suſpenſion of Arms, he entered into a Confederacy with the King of *England*, and the Duke of *Bourbon*, on theſe Conditions: That the Duke ſhould march out of *Italy* into *France* with Part of the Army which was in *Italy*: As ſoon as he had paſſed the *Alps*, the King of *England* ſhould pay him One Hundred Thouſand Ducats towards the firſt Month's Expences of the War, and ſhould be afterwards at Liberty either to continue his monthly Contributions, or to paſs with a powerful Army into *France*, and open the Campaign the firſt Day of *July*, and continue his Operations till the End of *December*, in which Caſe the States of *Flanders* ſhould ſupply him with Three Thouſand Horſe, One Thouſand Foot, and a ſufficient Train of Artillery and Ammunition: That if they

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Confederacy between *Cæſar*, the King of *England*, and Duke of *Bourbon*.

A. D. 1524. proved ſucceſsful the Duke of *Bourbon* ſhould be reſtored to his Eſtate, which had been ſeized by the King, and put in Poſſeſſion of *Provence*, which he claimed by Virtue of a Ceſſion made by the Duke of *Lorrain*, after the Death of *Charles* VIII. to *Anne* Dutcheſs of *Bourbon*; and it was to be created into a Kingdom in his Favour: That the Duke ſhould acknowledge *Henry* for King of *France*, and pay him Homage, the Treaty otherwiſe to be void and null: That *Bourbon* ſhould not enter into any Negotiation with the King of *France* without the Conſent of both Parties. That *Cæſar* ſhould at the ſame time attack *France* from the Frontiers of *Spain*: That the Ambaſſadors of *Charles* and *Henry* ſhould uſe their beſt Endeavours to induce the *Italian* Powers to contribute Money towards an Expedition which would ſecure them for ever from a *French* War. But in this Point they failed of Succeſs; for the Pope not only refuſed to make any Contribution, but expreſsly condemned the whole Undertaking, foretelling *Cæſar* that he would not

only be disappointed in all his Expectations in *France*, but also be the Cause of bringing a new War into *Italy*, much more dangerous than the first. *A. D.* 1524.

Bourbon's Expedition into *Provence.*

In Pursuance of this Scheme the War was resolved on, notwithstanding the Duke of *Bourbon* absolutely refused to acknowledge the King of *England* for King of *France*. The Duke proposed going directly to *Lyons*, which was near his patrimonial Estate; but it was thought more proper to march into *Provence*, from whence he might with greater Conveniency be supplied from *Spain*, and be benefited by the Fleet which *Cæsar* was fitting out at his own Charge at *Genoa*.

The Circumstances attending this Expedition were, that *Bourbon*, accompanied by the Marquis of *Pescara*, who, disdaining to serve under the Duke, got himself declared the Emperor's Lieutenant General, came to *Nice*, but with a much less Force than was intended. They had Five Hundred Men at Arms, Eight Hundred

A. D. 1524. Light Horſe, Four Thouſand *Spaniſh* Foot, Three Thouſand *Italians*, and Five Thouſand *Germans*; but the Three Hundred Men at Arms, and Five Thouſand more *Germans* deſigned for this Expedition, for Want of Money, were not raiſed; and the Viceroy, unable to inliſt a freſh Body of Foot, as had been reſolved in the firſt Council, in order to oppoſe *Michel' Agnolo*, Marquis of *Saluzzo*, who was marched out of his own State, and poſted on the Mountains with One Thouſand Men, was obliged to keep with him his Men at Arms for the Defence of the Country. To this muſt be added that *Cæſar*'s Fleet, one of the chief Hopes on which the Undertaking depended, through the Negligence or Treachery of the Commander Don *Ugo di Moncada*, a Pupil of *Valentino*, and a Man of no Morals or Principles, was found to be much inferior to the *French* Fleet, which had ſailed from *Marſeilles*, and was come to an Anchor in the Port of *Villa Franca*.

The Imperialiſt however entered *Provence*, where *Paliſſe*, *la Foellette*, *Renzo da Ceri*, and *Federigo da Bozzole*, the King's Generals,

Generals, not having a ſufficient Force to oppoſe them, had diſtributed themſelves in the Towns. Part of the Imperialiſts marched along the Coaſt, and, after taking the Tower which commands the Port of *Toulon*, joined the Army with Two Pieces of Cannon. *Aix*, the Capital of *Provence*, both for her Dignity and for being the Seat of the Parliament, ſurrendered, as did alſo ſeveral other Towns of that Country. After the Taking of *Aix*, *Bourbon* adviſed to paſs the *Rhone*, and, removing farther from the Sea, endeavour to enter into the Heart of *France*, before the Country was better provided for their Reception: For the Lances, who had ſuffered greatly in *Italy*, and were now but indifferently paid, the Royal Treaſure being exhauſted, little expecting that their Enemies would follow them out of *Lombardy* into *France*, were in ſuch Diſorder that they could not eaſily be re-eſtabliſhed; and the King diſtruſting, as uſual, the Valour of his *French* Infantry, could not take the Field before the Arrival of the *Swiſs* and *Germans*; and

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Aix ſurrenders.

A. D. 1524. *Bourbon* in the mean time was in hopes that by paſſing the *Rhone* he might make ſome important Progreſs. But the Marquis of *Peſcara* and the reſt of the *Spaniſh* Commanders would not agree to ſuch a Propoſal; they were for getting Poſſeſſion of *Marſeilles*, which they knew was *Cæſar*'s Intention, becauſe lying on the Sea, the Fleets from *Spain* might conveniently from thence annoy the *French* Coaſt, and the Troops make their Paſſage that Way into *Italy*. As *Bourbon* could not contradict them, Siege was laid to *Marſeilles*. *Renzo da Ceri* had entered that Town with the *Italian* Forces he had brought with him from *Lodi* and *Aleſſandria*, and the Beſiegers were Forty Days before the Place to little Purpoſe; for tho' they battered the Walls in ſeveral Places, and attempted to make Mines, yet they found too many Difficulties to ſtruggle with, ſuch as the Thickneſs of the Walls of an antient Structure, the Valour of the Beſieged, and the natural Inclination of the Inhabitants, as much devoted to the *French* as bitter Enemies to the *Spaniards*, ever ſince

Marſeilles beſieged.

ſince old *Alfonſo* King of *Aragon*, in his Return from *Naples* to *Spain*, by Surpriſe put their Town to the Sack; and they were now in high Spirits on account of the Succours they expected not only by Sea but alſo by Land. For the King was come to *Avignon*, a Town on the *Rhone*, belonging to the Church, intent on aſſembling a powerful Army. To theſe Difficulties muſt be added the Want of Money in the Army; they had loſt beſides all Hopes that the King, by being attacked in other Parts of his Kingdom, would be diſabled from moving his whole Force to one ſingle Part: For tho' the King of *England* had ſent *Richard Pacey* to *Bourbon*, yet he refuſed the ſecond Monthly Payment of the Hundred Thouſand Ducats, and gave no Marks of any Deſign of invading *Picardy*; on the contrary he admitted *Giovanni Giovacchino*, of *Spetie*, who was ſent to him by the King of *France*; and the Cardinal of *York* giving at the ſame Time croſs Anſwers to the Imperial Miniſters, *Cæſar* began to entertain no ſmall Jealouſy of the King's Intentions. A. D. 1524.

Neither

A. D. 1524. Neither from the Side of *Spain* did the Succours anſwer *Cæſar*'s Deſires, for the CORTES of *Caſtile*, the Name given to the Aſſembly of the Deputies of the whole Kingdom, had refuſed to grant him the Supply of Four Hundred Thouſand Ducats, with which they were uſed to ſupply their Kings on Occaſions of Importance, which prevented his ſending Money to the Army in *Provence*; and his Preparations for attacking *France* from his Frontiers were weak and inſignificant. All theſe Accidents ſo diſheartened the Beſiegers, that deſpairing of obtaining *Marſeilles*, and fearing great Danger from the King's Approach, they broke up the Siege the ſame Day that the King, after aſſembling Six Thouſand *Swiſs*, was ſetting out from *Avignon* with his Army. As ſoon as the Siege was raiſed, the Imperialiſts turned their Faces towards *Italy*, marching with all the Speed imaginable, as ſenſible of the Riſque they ſhovld run if overtaken by the Whole or any Part of the King's Army in an Enemy's Country.

Siege of *Marſeilles* raiſed.

FRANCIS

A. D. 1524.

FRANCIS now thought he had a very fair Opportunity for recovering the Dutchy of *Milan*, both in regard to his own powerful Army, and the weak Condition of the Enemy, and becauſe he hoped that, by taking the direct Road, he might get into *Italy* ſooner than thoſe who were marching from *Marſeilles*. Being therefore determined not to let ſlip the Occaſion which Fortune had thrown in his Way, he thus addreſſed his Army: "I am determined without Delay to go in Perſon into *Italy*, and ſhall therefore not only not hearken to, but alſo take it very ill of any one who ſhould preſume to adviſe the contrary. Let every one punctually obey the Orders which ſhall be given, and attend to perform the Duties of his Office. God the Lover of Juſtice, in order to chaſtiſe the Inſolence and Raſhneſs of my Enemies, has at laſt opened a Way for my recovering what had been unjuſtly raviſhed from me." His Conſtancy in this Reſolution, and his Speed in its Execution kept equal Pace with his Words; for he immediately moved with his Army conſiſting of

Francis I. declares his Intentions of going into *Italy*.

Two

A. D. 1524. Two Thouſand Lances, and Twenty Thouſand Foot, avoiding a Meeting with his Mother, who was coming from *Avignon*, to perſuade him not to paſs the Mountains, but to leave the Management of the War to his Generals. He ordered *Renzo da Ceri* to embark on the Fleet with his Troops that were in *Marſeilles*, then to put a Stop to all Treaties, or diſtruſting the Pope, he forbad the Archbiſhop of *Capoua*, who was ſent Ambaſſador to him, and was afterwards to paſs to *Cæſar*, to proceed any farther; ſignifying to him that he might reſide at *Avignon* with his Mother, and execute his Commiſſion by Letters, or elſe return to the Pope. He was in the mean while with all Speed following the Enemy, who, deſpiſing the Moleſtations given them by the Country People, and proceeding in very good Order along the Sea Shore, were arrived at *Monaco*, where burſting their Cannon, and loading the Mules with the Pieces for the more eaſy Conveyance, they advanced to *Finale*, at which Place, hearing of the King's Motions, they redoubled their Speed to arrive in Time for the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, for

for the Troops they had left were not ſufficient to make a Reſiſtance. A. D. 1524.

BOTH Armies proceeding in this Manner towards *Italy*, it happened that the ſame Day the King came to *Vercelli*, the Marquis of *Peſcara*, with the Horſe and *Spaniſh* Foot, entered *Alba*, the Duke of *Bourbon* with the *German* Foot being a Day's March behind; the Duke, hardly allowing himſelf Time to breathe, the Day following from *Alba* arrived at *Voghiera*, which was a March of Forty Miles, in order to enter *Pavia* the next Day. He there joined the Viceroy, who with great Speed was come from *Aleſſandria*, where he had left Two Thouſand Foot in Garriſon, juſt at the Time that the King's Army began to arrive on the Banks of the *Teſino*. At a Council at *Pavia*, at which *Girolamo Morone* aſſiſted, it was at firſt reſolved to leave a ſufficient Garriſon in *Pavia*, and then to make a Stand, as had been practiſed before, at *Milan*; and *Morone* was ordered thither to provide all Neceſſaries, and the Duke, who had been ſent for to come to *Pavia*, was to follow him

Arrives in *Italy*.

A. D. 1524. him, *Antonio de Leva* being left in *Pavia* with Three Hundred Men at Arms, and Five Thouſand Foot, all *Germans*, excepting a few *Italians*. They accordingly ſet out for *Milan*; but that Town, having been all the Summer ſorely afflicted with the Plague, had no Reſemblance of its former Luſtre; for vaſt Numbers of the Citizens having periſhed, and of thoſe who had eſcaped ſo dire a Calamity many being gone away, there was no more to be ſeen that Plenty of Proviſions, and it was very difficult to raiſe Money; and as no Care had been taken to keep up the Fortifications, they lay in Ruins; yet, in the Midſt of all theſe Misfortunes, the People were as ready as before to undergo the ſame Labour and Danger. But *Morone*, being convinced that to bring the Army to *Milan* would rather prove the Deſtruction of the Soldiery than the Defence of the City, took another Reſolution, and, in the Midſt of a Multitude of Citizens, made the following Speech:

Plague in *Milan*.

We

A. D. 1524.

"We may repeat this Day, with no leſs Anguiſh of Mind, the ſame Words that were pronounced by our Saviour in his Agony 'The Spirit indeed is ready, but the Fleſh is weak.' You are in the ſame Diſpoſition as ever to live under the Government of your Duke *Franceſco Sforza*, and his Heart is equally oppreſſed for the Miſeries and Dangers of his beloved People; he is willing and ready to lay down his Life for your Safety, and you are as much deſirous to expoſe your Perſons for his Support as you have done on former Occaſions. But your Strength is no ways equal to your good Will, for the City is almoſt void of Inhabitants, we are ſtraitened for Proviſions and Want of Money, and your Fortifications are in ſo bad a Condition, that it is impoſſible to prevent the Enemy's Entrance. It is Death to the Duke to be obliged to deſert you, but it would be worſe than Death, if, undertaking your Defence, he ſhould prove the Cauſe of your utter Deſtruction, which would infallibly be the Event. In ſuch dangerous Caſes that Perſon is reckoned prudent, who

Morone's Speech to the *Milaneſe*.

A. D. 1524. who chuſes the leſſer Evil, and does not at once with one deſperate Reſolution deprive himſelf of all Hope. It is on this Principle that the Duke adviſes you to ſubmit to the preſent Neceſſity, and obey the King of *France*, till the Return of better Times, which we have very good Reaſon to expect very ſoon. The Duke at preſent will take Care of himſelf, but afterwards your Concerns will be his chief Attention. *Cæſar*'s Power is very great, his good Fortune not to be deſcribed, the Cauſe is very juſt, our Enemies the ſame we have ſo often conquered. God will be pleaſed with your Loyalty to the Duke, and with the Duke's Attention to his Country, and we ought to aſſure ourſelves that it is for ſome good End to permit us at this Inſtant to labour under ſuch Calamities, and be confident that very ſoon he will aſſiſt us in obtaining ſo compleat a Victory over our proud Enemies, as will enable us to retrieve all our Loſſes during the long Peace it will procure us." As ſoon as he had finiſhed this Speech, after furniſhing the Caſtle with Proviſions, he quitted the Town.

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THE Duke, ignorant of what had paſſed, was coming towards *Milan*, and had no ſooner got out of *Pavia* than he met *Ferrando Caſtriotta* with the Artillery, who informed him that Part of the Enemy had paſſed the *Teſino*, and that meeting with *Zucchero Borgognone* on that River, with his Light Horſe, they had put him to Flight; the Duke, fearing therefore he ſhould fall in with the *French* on the Road, returned to *Pavia*.

Ferrando Caſtriotto Captain of the Artillery.

THOUGH the Duke and *Morone* had acted with Sincerity in this Affair, yet the Imperial Commanders, who were with the Army at *Binaſco*, ſuſpected that they had made ſome private Agreement with the King of *France*, and therefore ſent *Alarcone* with Two Hundred Lances to *Milan*, whom they deſigned to follow, or not, according to the Advices he ſhould give them. On his Arrival the *Milaneſe*, who were already treating with ſome Exiles ſent thither by the King, taking Courage, cried *Cæſar* and *Franceſco Sforza!* But *Alarcone* finding it was not practica-

A. D. 1524. ble to defend the Town, and having Notice that the Van of the *French* was approaching, quitted the Place, and thro' the *Roman* Gate made towards *Lodi*, whither the whole Imperial Army was marching at the ſame Time that the Enemy were entering *Milan* thro' the Gates of the *Teſino* and of *Vercelli:* And if, inſtead of making for that City, they had followed and attacked the Imperialiſts, who were tired with their long Marches, and had loſt a great Number of Arms and Horſes, it is the general Belief that they might have diſperſed them with Eaſe; nay, if, even after approaching *Milan*, they had immediately turned towards *Lodi*, the Imperial Commanders would not have ventured to continue there; and perhaps, if they had then croſſed the *Adda* with the ſame Speed, they might in all Likelihood, with the ſame Eaſe, have put the Remainder of the Army into great Confuſion.

The *French* enter *Milan*.

But the King, either that he thought it to be a Matter of the higheſt Concern to make himſelf ſure of *Milan*, from whence

whence he always received the principal Oppoſition, or that he was not aware of the Opportunity, or from ſome other Reaſon, not only approached *Milan*, which he neither entered himſelf, nor permitted his Army to enter, but halted there till he had put therein a proper Garriſon, and given Orders for the Siege of the Caſtle, which was defended by 700 *Spaniards*. It muſt however be ſaid to his great Praiſe, that out of his great Goodneſs, and merciful Temper, he gave Orders that none of the *Milaneſe* ſhould be moleſted. After ſettling what he thought requiſite at *Milan*, he marched his Army to *Pavia*, thinking it was dangerous to leave behind a Town full of Soldiers. The King's Army was at this Time, reckoning thoſe left in *Milan*, computed to conſiſt of Two Thouſand Lances, Eight Thouſand *Germans*, Six Thouſand *Swiſs*, Six Thouſand Volunteers, and Four Thouſand *Italians*, which laſt grew afterwards conſiderably more numerous.

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The King orders the Caſtle of *Milan* to be beſieged.

And marches to *Pavia*.

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THE Marquis of *Peſcara* was at this Time at *Lodi* with Two Thouſand Foot, and the Viceroy, after leaving Garriſons in *Aleſſandria*, *Como* and *Trezzo*, was gone to *Sonzino*, with *Franceſco Sforza*, and *Charles de Bourbon*. It was joyful News to the Imperialiſts, amidſt ſo many Difficulties, to hear the King was gone to *Pavia*. This raiſed their drooping Spirits, and giving them Hopes of being able to put themſelves in a better Condition, provided that Town held out for ſome Time, without which they had no Proſpect of retrieving their Affairs, they inſtantly ſent into *Germany* to inliſt Six Thouſand Foot, having in their Hands for their Salary, and other neceſſary Charges, Fifty Thouſand Ducats, which *Cæſar* had lodged in *Genoa* for the Uſe of the War in *Provence*. Yet nothing ſo much embaraſſed their Counſels as the Want of Money, nor could they hope to raiſe any in the Dutchy, nor expected from *Charles*, in his penurious Condition, any thing more than his Orders to mortgage, as far as he could, the Revenues of the Kingdom of *Naples*.

Marquis of *Peſcara* at *Lodi*.

Little

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Little or no Supply either of Men or Money was expected from their old Allies, for both the Pope and *Florentines*, being deſired to contribute Money, had given general Anſwers. The Pope, after the Departure of the Admiral, being fully determined to ſtand neuter in the War between *Cæſar* and the King of *France*, would not renew the Alliance made by his Predeceſſor, nor enter into any new Confederacy with any Prince: And at the very Time that he made Profeſſion of Friendſhip to *Charles* and the King of *England*, he had ſecretly aſſured the King of *France* that he ſhould not oppoſe him whenever he attacked the Dutchy of *Milan:* And the *Venetians* being required by the Viceroy to ſend to the Army the Troops they had engaged for in the Articles of the League, tho' they did not abſolutely refuſe, yet gave very cool Anſwers, with an Intention to regulate their Counſels according to the Turn of Affairs, either becauſe ſome of them called to Mind their antient Confederacy with *France*, or becauſe they believed that the King of *France* being in

Venetians do not care to join the Imperialiſts.

A. D. 1524. *Italy* with ſo powerful an Army, and his Enemy in ſo weak a Condition, he muſt of courſe be victorious; or that they more than ever ſuſpected the ambitious Views of *Cæſar*. For to the Surpriſe, and with the Complaints, in a manner, of all *Italy*, he had not yet given to *Franceſco Sforza* the Inveſtiture of the Dutchy of *Milan*. They were beſides held in Suſpenſe by the Pope's Authority, whoſe Counſels and Example had a great Weight with them at this Juncture.

Pavia beſieged. BUT the King of *France*, having made his Approach to *Pavia*, on the upper Side, between the *Teſino* and the High Road that leads to *Milan*, and poſted the Vanguard in the Suburb of *Sant' Antonio*, on the other Side the *Teſino*, on the Road to *Genoa*, took up his own Quarters in the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, a Mile from the Walls of the Town. After two Days firing from two Batteries, with his Army in Battle Array he began the Aſſault; but obſerving that the Town was well fortified within the Walls, that the Enemy made a gallant Defence, and on the

the contrary that his own Men gave manifeſt Tokens of Fear, after many of them had been killed, he ordered to ſound the Retreat; and finding how difficult it would prove to take a Town defended by ſo numerous and warlike a Garriſon by Storm, he determined to make a regular Siege, by cutting of Trenches, and erecting Platforms, with a vaſt Number of Pioneers employed in working on the Flanks, that the Soldiers might with leſs Danger make their Approaches. To this tedious and difficult Work he added that of making Mines, being determined to gain his Point, tho' he ſhould advance but Inch by Inch; and at laſt, under great Doubts from the Bravery and Numbers of the Beſieged, and taking Advice of many able Engineers, perfectly acquainted with the Courſe of the River, which two Miles above *Pavia* divides itſelf into two Branches, and then a Mile below it, before entering the *Po*, unites again, he reſolved to turn that Branch which paſſes by the Side of *Pavia* into the other leſſer Branch, called *Gravalone*, in hopes it would facilitate the Taking A. D. 1524.

A. D. 1524. of it on that Side, where the Wall, on account of the Security it received from the Depth of the Water, had no Fortification. In this Work, which was carried on with an incredible Number of Hands, at a vaſt Expence, and not without Apprehenſion of frequent Sallies from the Beſieged, he waſted many Days, ſometimes the Violence of the Waters, very much ſwelled by heavy Rains, ruining the Banks, which were caſt up in the Channel where the River divides itſelf, in order to force it into the leſſer Stream, and ſometimes he expected to overcome the Violence of the River by Dint of Men and Money; but at laſt Experience convinced him of what is moſt commonly the Caſe that the Rapidity of Rivers has greater Power than all the Labour of Workmen, and the Induſtry of expert Engineers. The King therefore deprived of this Hope, and of taking the Town by Force, or by Arts of Engineers, was obliged to content himſelf with carrying on a formal Siege, by the Length of which he imagined to reduce the Garriſon to a Neceſſity of ſurrendering.

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BUT whilſt Affairs were proceeding in the Manner related, the Pope, as ſoon as he heard that the King had got Poſſeſſion of *Milan*, much concerned at ſo proſperous a Beginning, and therefore deſirous to ſecure his own Affairs, ſent to him *Gian Matteo Giberto*, Biſhop of *Verona*, his Datary, a Perſon he could intirely confide in, and who he knew was not unacceptable to the King. He was commiſſioned to call firſt at *Sonzino*, to exhort the Viceroy and other Commanders to enter into ſome Terms of Agreement, and acquaint them that he was proceeding on the ſame Errand to the *French* Camp: But the Imperial Generals, grown ſanguine at the ſtout Reſiſtance made at *Pavia*, fiercely anſwered that they would give Ear to no Compoſition which ſhould leave the King of *France* in Poſſeſſion of a Foot of Land in the *Milaneſe*. He found no better, and perhaps a harder Diſpoſition in the King of *France*, who, elated with the Power of his Army, and by his being in a Condition not only to ſubſiſt but alſo increaſe

The Pope ſends the Biſhop of *Verona* to the King.

who refuſes to comply with his Deſire.

A. D. 1524. creaſe it, anſwered the Biſhop that it was chiefly on thoſe Grounds he had undertaken to paſs into *Italy*, and not, as it might be thought, with a View only of getting thither before the Enemy, tho' in this he had in a great meaſure ſucceeded: And now he made no Doubt of taking *Pavia*, the Walls of which he was briſkly battering, having made ſuch Works as he hoped could not be reſiſted by the Enemy for their Want of Powder, which was comprehended by their ſlow Firing; they had alſo a Scarcity of Bread, and he did not deſpair of turning the *Teſino*: That he was far even from thinking that the ſole Recovery of *Milan* and *Genoa* were ſufficient Rewards for his great Trouble, and immenſe Expences, and therefore had as much in View the attacking the Kingdom of *Naples*. The Biſhop then entered on the chief Buſineſs for which he had been ſent, which was ſoon brought to a Concluſion; for the Pope engaged that neither he nor the *Florentines* ſhould give any Aſſiſtance either open or ſecret againſt the King, who took both the Pope and *Florentines* into his

his Protection by a Deed, in which he particularly inſerted the Authority of the Family *de' Medici* in *Florence*, and it was agreed that this Convention ſhould not be divulged till his Holineſs thought proper. But tho' this Agreement came not to the Knowlege of the Imperialiſts, yet their Jealouſy of the Pope's Intentions increaſed: And in order to make a full Diſcovery of his Mind, they ſent to him *Marino*, Abbot of *Nagera*, who was Commiſſary of their Camp, with Propoſals that might work both upon his Hopes and Fears; for on one Hand they made him vaſt Offers, and on the other they repreſented that, as *Cæſar* and the King of *France* were in the Height of their Contention, *Cæſar* could not but regard as Enemies whoever at this Juncture ſhould ſtand neuter. But *Clement* replied, that nothing could be more unbecoming a *Roman* Pontiff than to make himſelf a Party in Quarrels amongſt Chriſtian Princes: The Office of a Paſtor was to be neuter, by which Means he ſhould with greater Authority become a Mediator between them, for which

A. D. 1524.

A. D. 1524. which End he was already treating with *Cæſar* by means of the Archbiſhop of *Capua*, who after the Acquiſition of *Milan*, with a Paſs from the King's Mother, paſſed thro' *Lions* into *Spain*, where after excuſing, with the ſame Reaſons, the Pope's Refuſal to renew the League which *Cæſar* had vehemently preſſed as ſoon as he heard of the King's March towards *Italy*, he earneſtly exhorted him that either with a Truce or Peace he would lay down his Arms. *Cæſar* ſurrounded by ſo many Difficulties was willing to come into an Agreement, for he conſidered that he could not raiſe Money in *Spain* for the *Italian* Affairs, that the King of *France* ſeemed to carry all before him, and he ſuſpected that the King of *England* had made ſome ſecret Agreement with his Enemy, becauſe that King not only refuſed to let the Fifty Thouſand Ducats which he had remitted to *Rome*, for the War in *Provence*, be ſent to the Army in *Lombardy*, but, what gave a greater Suſpicion, demanded of *Cæſar*, in a Time of ſo great Diſtreſs, a Reſtitution of Money lent, and Payment of all the Sums

Cæſar ſuſpects the King of *England*'s Sincerity.

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Sums for which he was engaged. For *Cæsar*, so long ago as when he went into *Spain*, being very desirous of an Alliance with the King of *England*, in order to remove any Obstacle that might keep him in Suspense, engaged to pay him the same yearly Pension which was allowed him by the King of *France*, and Twenty Thousand Ducats more for the Pensions *Francis* paid to the Cardinal of *York* and other *English* Ministers, and also the Thirty Thousand Ducats which were allotted to Queen *Blanche*, who had been married to King *Lewis*, of all which Sums nothing had hitherto been paid. To all these inward Afflictions must be added, that *Cæsar*, at that Time, laboured under a bodily Infirmity, for he took so much to Heart the Miscarriage at *Marseilles*, that it threw him into a Quartan Ague; yet, either because he was of so high a Spirit, that no Difficulties could prevail on him to stoop to an Enemy, or confiding in the Valour of his Officers in case of a Battle, or promising himself that he must needs be an ex-

traordinary

A. D. 1524. traordinary Favourite of Fortune for the future as well as in Times paſt, he anſwered that it was below his Dignity to come into any Convention whilſt the King of *France* moleſted with his Army the *Milaneſe*.

THE King, in the mean Time, was come to a Reſolution of invading the Kingdom of *Naples*, in hopes that the Viceroy, alarmed at the Danger, for no Garriſons had been kept in the Towns, would either draw off his Forces from that Dutchy to defend that Kingdom, or would at leaſt agree to lay down his Arms on diſadvantageous Conditions, which was what he began almoſt to wiſh when he found ſo many Difficulties in the Siege of *Pavia*.

Duke of *Albany* ſent for the Kingdom of *Naples*.

HE appointed *John Stuart*, Duke of *Albany*, of the Blood Royal of *Scotland*, for his Commander in Chief in this Expedition, with a Detachment from the Army of Two Hundred Lances, Six Hundred Light Horſe, and Four Thouſand Foot, one Half of which were *Italians*,

Italians, Four Hundred *Swiſs*, and the reſt *Germans*; and ordered *Renzo da Ceri*, in order to join him, to land at *Livorno* the Foot deſtined for the Fleet, which, being retarded by the Difficulty in providing Neceſſaries for its Equipment, was ſtill at Anchor in the Port of *Villa Franca*; and that *Renzo* and others of the *Orſini* ſhould enliſt Four Thouſand Men in the Territory of *Rome*. He notified this Reſolution to the Pontiff by *Alberto* Count of *Carpi*, his Ambaſſador, ſolliciting Leave to levy Men in *Rome*, and for his Army to paſs thro' the Eccleſiaſtic State. *A. D.* 1524.

The Pope was very uneaſy at ſuch a Requeſt, and could not bear to think that the King of *France* ſhould make himſelf Maſter both of the Dutchy of *Milan* and of the Kingdom of *Naples*; but not daring to give a flat Denial, he exhorted him to lay aſide this Undertaking for the preſent, that he might not put him under a Neceſſity of refuſing him what he could not conſent to for juſt Cauſes, demonſtrating to him, with ſolid Reaſonings, that this Point

A. D. 1524. Point was contrary to his own Intereſt; for if the Deſire of recovering the Dutchy of *Milan* had ſtirred him up ſo many Enemies, what could he expect if he was alſo to aſpire to the Kingdom of *Naples?* Who would wonder if the *Venetians* ſhould, at ſuch a Provocation, join the Emperor, even with a greater Force, than they were engaged to by Treaty? He begged of him to conſider that if by any Accident his Progreſs ſhould be obſtructed in *Lombardy*, with what Diſcredit he would enter *Naples*; and how his Miſcarriage in any one of theſe States would inevitably be the Cauſe of his Overthrow in the other. And, laſtly, that he ought to remember how he had commended him for betaking himſelf to the Duty of a Pontiff, and therefore it would be abſurd to oblige him now to act the contrary Part.

But all he alledged was to no Purpoſe, for the Duke of *Albany*, without waiting for an Anſwer, as if he were ſure of the Pope's Conceſſion, had paſſed the *Po* at the Paſſage of *Stellata*, in the *Milaneſe*,

Milaneſe, but after Five Days he returned; for the King, on the News that the *Germans* had begun to arrive in the Enemy's Camp, and that the Duke of *Bourbon* was gone himſelf into *Germany* to raiſe more Men, thought it proper to keep his whole Army together, till it was increaſed with a new Supply of *Swiſs* and *Griſons*, whom he had ſent to inliſt. A. D. 1524.

In the mean time the military Operations were in a manner at a ſtand; the King indeed continued the Siege of *Pavia*, working at the Trenches and Batteries without ceaſing, whilſt the Imperialiſts lay quiet, waiting the Return of *Bourbon*, except that the Marquis of *Peſcara*, who, for his Foreſight and Reſolution, had the greateſt Sway in their Councils, and to whom, without Diſpute, was committed the Execution of all their Reſolutions, ſet out from *Lodi* one Night with Two Hundred Horſe and Two Thouſand Foot, and unexpectedly entering the Town of *Melzi*, negligently guarded by *Girolamo* and *Gianfermo de' Trivulzi*, with Two Hundred Horſe, made them both Pri-

Marquis of *Peſcara* ſurpriſes a Body of *French* at *Melzi*.

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Griſons and Swiſs join the French Army.

By this time the *Griſons* and *Swiſs* joined the Royal Army, at whoſe Coming the Duke of *Albany* croſſed again the *Po* at *Stradella*, in the *Piacentine*, the Pope not being able to diſſuade the King from his Enterpriſe on *Naples*, and, for Fear perhaps of giving him Cauſe of Jealouſy, he was no longer eager in preſſing him againſt it, but thought it proper however to inform the Imperialiſts of the Convention he had made with his Majeſty, and, at the ſame time, to offer anew his Mediation for a Peace, which he had Reaſon to think the Parties would now more willingly hearken to, on account of the Difficulties in the Siege of *Pavia*, and the Danger of the Kingdom of *Naples*. For this Purpoſe he ſent *Pagolo Vettori*, the Captain of his Gallies, to the Viceroy, to acquaint him how it had not been in his Power, tho' he had earneſtly endeavoured it, to diſſuade the King of *France* from invading the Kingdom of *Naples*;

The Pope ſends Pagolo Vettori to the Viceroy.

Naples, nor could he, without drawing the War on his own Dominions, which he was not in a Condition to ſuſtain, refuſe a Paſſage to the *French* Army; on the contrary, he was under a Neceſſity, for his own Safety, to enter into new Conventions with the King; but he might reſt ſecure that he ſhould not agree to any Article prejudicial to *Cæſar*, who he was certain could not take a better Step, in his preſent Condition, than to enter into a Treaty of Peace, which, that it might be negotiated before greater Diſorders aroſe, he intreated the Viceroy to conſent to a Ceſſation of Arms, and to depoſit, ſince the King would not otherwiſe agree, into neutral Hands what he and the Duke of *Milan* were in Poſſeſſion of in the *Milaneſe*. When this ſhould be effected, ſome proper Expedient might be found out for making an honourable Peace, in which it was intended intirely to ſeparate the Dutchy of *Milan* from the Crown of *France*, the Emperor, in Conſideration of a proper Sum of Money, giving the Inveſtiture of it to a Second Son of the King; that A. D. 1524.

A. D. 1524. the Duke of *Milan* and Duke of *Bourbon* ſhould be honourably provided for, and that the Pope, *Venetians* and *Florentines* ſhould engage to join the Emperor againſt *France*, if the King made any Infringement of what ſhould be ſtipulated. The Imperial Commanders were ſenſible of their great Difficulties and Dangers, in being obliged, with ſuch a Scarcity of Money, to ſuſtain at the ſame time the War in *Lombardy*, and take Care of the Kingdom of *Naples*, whilſt it was manifeſt they ſhould receive no Subſidies from the Pope and *Florentines*, and whilſt they were already certain they ſhould be treated in the ſame manner by the *Venetians*, who, tho' by enliſting Men they endeavoured to make them believe that they intended to ſtand to the League, yet deferred with various Excuſes its Execution. Wherefore the Viceroy, not being averſe from an Agreement, was inclined, for the Security of the Kingdom of *Naples*, to retire thither with his Army. But the Marquis of *Peſcara*'s Opinion prevailed in the Council, who boldly as well as prudently made it appear that, deſpiſing

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Marquis of *Pescara* prevails on the Imperialists not to quit *Lombardy*.

deſpiſing all other Dangers, it was neceſſary to carry on and continue the War in *Lombardy*, becauſe their Whole depended on a Victory in that Country: That it was not deſigned to attack the Kingdom of *Naples* with ſuch Forces, nor could they get thither with the ſuppoſed Expedition, for they would meet with many fortified Towns, defended by thoſe whoſe All depended on their Defence, and therefore would hold out at leaſt for many Months, by which time an End, in all Likelihood, would be put to the War in the *Milaneſe*; and, if with Victory, who could doubt but they ſhould immediately free the Kingdom of *Naples* from the *French*, tho' *Cæſar* kept Poſſeſſion but of one ſingle Tower? By remaining in *Lombardy* they might poſſibly conquer both at *Milan* and *Naples*, but by going to *Naples*, *Milan* would be certainly loſt, without leſſening the Danger of *Naples*, which would immediately become the Seat of the War. And what muſt be our Hopes in returning thither as conquered? Whereas the *French*, entering in a triumphant Manner, would preſently have in their Fa-

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vour the Cry of the People, who always, from their voluble Nature, Hatred and Fear, are every Day ready to meet the Fortune of the Conqueror; whence the Kingdom of *Naples* would no more defend itſelf than the Dutchy of *Milan*. Nor has indeed the King of *France* any other View in dividing his Army, whilſt he is ſtill doubtful of his Succeſs in *Lombardy*, and beginning a new War whilſt the firſt is depending, than that he expects that, out of ſo great a Concern for the Kingdom of *Naples*, we ſhould leave him in Prey the Dutchy of *Milan*. Shall we therefore be directed by the Enemy's Counſels, and at their Pleaſure march our Army, ſo often victorious? What elſe can it mean than that, to our eternal Diſgrace, we are willing to yield up to the Threats of the Conquered that Glory which we have acquired by fighting ſo often againſt them?

THE Viceroy at laſt ſubmitted, and ſent the Duke of *Trajetto* to *Naples* with Orders that, after collecting all the Money that could be got, *Aſcanio Colonna* and the

the Barons ſhould attend to the Defence of that Kingdom; and, tho' he had given a civil Anſwer to the Pope's Meſſenger, he now wrote to *Rome* in a very angry Stile, refuſing to hearken to any Accommodation whatſoever. Hence the Pope pretending to be driven by Neceſſity, becauſe the Duke of *Albany* daily advanced, declared, not as a Thing before tranſacted, that he had made an Agreement with the King of *France*, only by a ſimple Engagement not to moleſt one the other; and by a Brief he notified the ſame to *Cæſar*'s Agents, in which he gave his Reaſons, which conſiſted particularly in the Neceſſity which had induced him. This Brief was delivered to *Cæſar* by *Giovanni Corſi*, the *Florentine* Ambaſſdor, with ſuch ſoftening Speeches as the Subject required. But *Charles*, who hitherto ſeemed to perſuade himſelf that the Pope would not ſo much as think of abandoning him in his preſent Diſtreſs, anſwered in great Heat, that neither Hatred nor Ambition, nor particular Views had induced him at firſt to enter into a War with the King of *France*, but

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A. D. 1524. only the Sollicitations and Authority of Pope *Leo*, at the Inſtigation, as he ſaid, of the preſent Pope, at that Time Cardinal *de' Medici*, who repreſented it to him as very dangerous to the public Welfare, that the King of *France* ſhould have any Footing in *Italy:* That the ſaid Cardinal had been the Author of the Confederacy which was made for that Purpoſe before *Adrian*'s Death; he therefore took it extreamly ill that the Perſon, who, above all others, ought to have ſtood by him in Time of Danger, ſhould be the firſt to abandon him in the Difficulties in which he had himſelf involved him, and make a Change ſo hurtful to him without any Neceſſity. For to what could ſuch a Step be attributed, but to a groundleſs Fear, whilſt *Pavia* defended itſelf? He then obſerved how much he had taken his Intereſt at Heart ſince *Leo*'s Death, eſpecially in two Conclaves, and how he beſtirred himſelf in favour of his Election to the Pontificate, on a Suppoſition that, thro' his Means. the Liberty and Welfare of *Italy* would be eſtabliſhed. Nor could he

he perſuade himſelf that his Holineſs could ever forget the faithleſs Treatment he had received from the King of *France*, or that he would not conſider what he had Reaſon to hope or fear from a *French* Victory. He concluded, that, neither on the Pope's unjuſt and unexpected Reſolution, nor for any other Accident, he ſhould be wanting to himſelf; nor would he have it thought that, for Want of Money, he might change his Sentiments; for he would ſooner run the Riſque of loſing all his Kingdoms and his Life, and that he was ſo determined to put in Execution what he had propoſed, that he prayed to God it might not endanger his eternal Salvation. *A. D.* 1524.

To theſe Complaints the *Florentine* Miniſter replied, that the Pope, after his Election to the ſupreme Dignity, was no longer bound to act as Cardinal *de' Medici*, but as *Roman* Pontiff, whoſe Office it was to make it his Buſineſs to compoſe Quarrels between Chriſtians, which he thought ſo neceſſary a Duty that he had often writ to his Majeſty on that Subject,

A. D. 1524 ject, and twice ſent to him the Archbiſhop of *Capua* to acquaint him of his juſt Reſolution of being neuter. He had communicated theſe Sentiments to him when the Admiral left *Italy*, there being no Juncture in which he could treat with greater Honour to himſelf; but all the Anſwer he could draw from your Majeſty was, that nothing could be done without the Conſent of the King of *England*. He deſired *Cæſar* to recollect how much the Pope diſſuaded the Irruption into *Provence*, becauſe it wholly broke off all Hopes of Peace; and how, divining at what after happened, he had foretold that the Neceſſity laid on the King of *France* for collecting an Army might be the Cauſe of greater and more dangerous Combuſtions in *Italy*: That he had employed the Biſhop of *Verona* to perſuade the King, after he was in Poſſeſſion of *Milan*, and the Viceroy to come into ſome Terms of Agreement; but that he had not found in either any Inclination to Peace. That he had ſince, with many cogent Reaſons, and in an abſolute Manner, refuſed to grant a Paſs for the *French*

French Troops through the eccleſiaſtic State in their Way to the Kingdom of *Naples*. But the King not only paid no Regard to his Speeches, but ſent Troops into the *Piacentine*, without waiting for his Anſwer; which had at laſt induced him to ſend *Pagolo Vettori* to the Viceroy to exhort him to a Ceſſation of Arms, on ſuch Terms as the Times would allow of, and to inform him of the Neceſſity he was under of ſecuring himſelf from imminent Danger, eſpecially ſince the *Venetians* ſtood in Suſpenſe, and the King of *England* was unwilling to concur in the Defence of the Dutchy of *Milan*, unleſs *Cæſar*, in Conjunction with him, would commence a War in *France*. But when he found that the Viceroy rejected all Propoſals, and *French* Troops ſtill advanced, he was obliged to make himſelf ſure of the King, and take his Word that he ſhould not be moleſted, on no other Obligation than not to act againſt him. But *Cæſar* complained that the Conditions offered to the Viceroy had been unreaſonable, for it was required that he ſhould depoſit what he was in Poſ-

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ſeſſion

A. D. 1524. ſeſſion of, without any Mention being made that the King of *France* was to do the ſame; and concluded, that tho' the Marquis of *Peſcara*, in counſelling him to come to ſome Agreement, had repreſented the Camp full of Diſorders, and his Affairs in a dangerous Situation, yet he ſhould not think of ſuing for Peace, but, depending on the Valour of his Soldiers, hoped he ſhould obtain a Victory whenever the two Armies met.

Cæſar refuſes to make a Truce.

THE Siege of *Pavia* continued all this While, tho' with ſome Intermiſſion in the Firing of the Artillery, for want of Ammunition. To remedy this Inconveniency, the King was content that the Duke of *Ferrara*, whom he had lately received into his Protection, on the Obligation of paying down Seventy Thouſand Ducats, ſhould account for Twenty Thouſand of them in Ammunition, which he ſent through the *Parmeſan* and *Piacentine*, the Countrymen, by the Pope's Order, furniſhing Waggons and Oxen for the Carriage; for which heavy Complaints were made by the Viceroy, as if ſuch a Step

Duke of *Ferrara* taken into the King's Protection and ſends Ammunition to the Army.

Step had been expreſsly taken with an Intent to ſerve the King of *France*. The King, for the ſafe Convoy of thoſe Stores, had ſent Two Hundred Horſe and Fifteen Hundred Foot, under *Giovanni de' Medici*, who, from the Beginning of the War, under a Pretence that the Viceroy looked upon him with an evil Eye, and did not allow him Money ſufficient for marching his Men, had quitted the Imperial Service, and entered that of *France*. This Eſcort was thought ſufficient for ſecuring the Ammunition, becauſe the Duke of *Albany* was at Hand, having juſt then paſſed the *Po*. But the Viceroy and the Marquis of *Peſcara*, in order to intercept this Supply, laid a Bridge near *Cremona*, and paſſed the *Po* with Six Hundred Men at Arms, and Eight Thouſand Foot, and came the firſt Day to *Monticelli*; but, on hearing that the King had ſent after them *Thomas de Foix* with Part of the Army, they ſpeedily repaſſed the River.

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As ſoon as the Viceroy was retired, the Duke of *Albany* continued his March through the Country of *Reggio*, and over the

Duke of *Albany*'s ſlow March towards *Naples*.

A. D. 1524. the *Appennine* Mountains, by the *Carfagnana*; but he proceeded ſo very ſlow, that he confirmed the Belief that the King's Deſign in that Expedition was more to frighten the *Germans* into a Peace, or to induce them to abandon the Affairs of *Lombardy*, than out of Hopes of making any Progreſs. *Renzo da Ceri* joined the Duke, near *Lucca*, with Three Thouſand Foot, that were come on Board the Fleet, which, in its Paſſage, took *Savona* and *Varagine*, by Compoſition, and afterwards, returning on the weſtern *Riviera* of *Genoa*, kept that City in Awe.

1525. Now follows the Year 1525, in the Beginning of which Don *Ugo di Moncada*, ſetting Sail from *Genoa* with the *Spaniſh* Fleet, made a Deſcent with Three Thouſand Men at *Varagine*, which had a ſmall Garriſon of *Frenchmen*: But the *French* Fleet coming to its Relief, under the Marquis of *Saluzzo*, the Enemy's Squadron, deſtitute of Foot, retired, and the *French* landing, attacked the *Spaniards*, and, after killing a great Number, broke them, and took Don *Ugo* Priſoner.

In

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In the Beginning of this Year the Duke of *Albany* conſtrained the *Luccheſe* to pay him Twelve Thouſand Ducats, and to lend him ſome Artillery; then advancing thro' the *Florentine* Dominion, where he was treated as a Friend, he halted at *Siena*, at the Pope's Deſire, who, not being able to redreſs his Grievances by Authority or Force, was reſolved to try how far he could prevail with Art and Induſtry.

Contribution of the *Luccheſe*.

Clement was no ways uneaſy at the King's getting Poſſeſſion of the Dutchy of *Milan*, becauſe he imagined that whilſt *Charles* and *Francis* had both a Footting in *Italy*, the Apoſtolic See, and his Pontificate would be ſecure from the Power of both; and for this very Reaſon he could not be pleaſed at the King's making himſelf Maſter of the Kingdom of *Naples*, dreading that a Prince, already ſo powerful, ſhould be Maſter at the ſame time of that Kingdom and the Dutchy of *Milan*. Wherefore, ſeeking Occaſion to defer the March of the Duke of *Albany*,

Clement contrives to make him ſtay at *Siena*.

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bany, he ſollicited the King that in his Paſſage he would put the Government of *Siena* on a new Footing; for that City being ſituated between *Rome* and *Florence*, he was deſirous to have it under the Direction of his Friends, as it had been, thro' his means, a few Months before. For Cardinal *Petrucci* dying in the Pontificate of *Adrian*, *Franceſco* his Nephew, aſpiring to his Succeſſion in the Government, was oppoſed, on account of his arrogant Behaviour, by the Magiſtracy *de' Nove*, tho' they were of the ſame Party. They applied to the Duke of *Seſſa*, *Cæſar*'s Ambaſſador, and to Cardinal *de' Medici*, to alter the Conſtitution of their City, either by reſtoring it to its priſtine Liberty, or inveſting *Fabio*, the Son of *Ridolfo Petrucci*, with that Authority, tho' he had not long before ſtolen away from *Naples*. After this Affair had been long deliberated, on *Clement's* Aſſumption to the Pontificate, by his and *Cæſar*'s Approbation, *Fabio* was at laſt reſtored to his Father's Place; but not having the Authority his Father had enjoyed, the City in general inclined to Liberty, the Magiſtracy *de' Nove* not heartily uniting with him,

Government of *Siena*.

nor

nor well agreeing amongſt themſelves, the Weakneſs that attends the Power of a ſingle Perſon, when it is not founded on the Love of the Citizens, nor managed totally, and in all Reſpects different from the Manner of a Tyrant, was the Cauſe that, notwithſtanding the Place was guarded with his own People, on a popular Tumult, excited one Day by his Adverſaries, without the Help of foreign Soldiers, he was eaſily drove out of the City. Wherefore the Pope, who could not confide in the Multitude, nor in the other Faction, was deſirous to replace the Authority in the Hands of the Magiſtracy *de' Nove*, that he might afterwards have it in his Power to place at the Helm either *Fabio* or any other amongſt them whom he ſhould think fit. When a Perſon is once ſuſpected, all his Actions are miſconſtrued; ſo this Step of the Pontiff increaſed the Notion of the Imperialiſts, that the Capitulation between *Clement* and the King contained other Obligations and Matters which would produce Effects of much greater Importance than a Neutrality. *A. D.* 1525.

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THE Duke's Stay in the Neighbourhood of *Siena* was the Cauſe that the *Seneſe*, to free themſelves from the Moleſtations of the Army, conferred a very ample Authority on thoſe Citizens in whom the Pope could confide for ſettling the Form of Government. After this was accompliſhed, the Duke receiving ſome Artillery, and a certain Sum of Money from the *Seneſe*, proceeded forwards, but with his uſual Slowneſs. From *Monte Fiaſcone* he repaired to *Rome*, to have a Conference with his Holineſs; then croſſing the *Tiber* at *Fiano*, he quartered his Men in the Towns of the *Orſini*, where they were aſſembling new Troops, raiſed in *Rome* by the Pope's Permiſſion, who gave the ſame Liberty to the *Colonnas*, who were gathering Soldiers for the Defence of the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had their head Quarters at *Marino*. But the People in general had but an indifferent Opinion of the Duke of *Albany*'s Expedition, both on account of his tardy Motions, and for his Want of Money.

THE

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THE Eyes, Ears, and Thoughts of the Public were now wholly employed on the Affairs of *Lombardy*, which ſeeming to be drawing to an End, by reaſon of different Incidents, excited ſometimes the Hopes, and ſometimes the Fears of each Party. In *Pavia* the Beſieged were in great Want of Money, and Ammunition for their Artillery. Their Wine began to fail, and all other Proviſions, Bread excepted. The *German* Foot, inſolent enough of themſelves, demanded their Pay at the Inſtigation of their Officers, in a ſort of a riotous Manner, which gave a Suſpicion that they had ſecretly agreed with the King of *France*. On the other hand the Viceroy, on the Approach of the Duke of *Bourbon*, who was bringing with him from *Germany* Five Hundred *Burgundian* Horſe, and Six Thouſand *German* Foot, which had been enliſted with Money of the King of the *Romans*, was gone to *Lodi*, where the whole Army was to rendezvous, and, as was thought, would not be inferior to that of the *French*; but there was

Want of Neceſſaries in *Pavia*.

Duke of *Bourbon* brings Troops from *Germany*.

A. D. 1525. no Money, nor Means of procuring any, for marching or ſubſiſting the Army. They quite deſpaired of getting Money from the Pope or *Florentines*, as alſo from the *Venetians*, who, after ſo many Delays and Excuſes, had declared at laſt to the Protonotary *Caracciolo*, the Emperor's Ambaſſador, that they ſhould regulate their Proceedings by thoſe of the Pope, by whoſe Means, it was thought, they had with all Secreſy agreed with the King of *France* to ſtand neuter. They certainly preſſed his Holineſs to bring into *Italy* Ten Thouſand *Swiſs*, offering to contribute Half the Expence, that they might not be under any Conſternation at the Victory of either Party. The Pope approved of the Scheme, but for Want of Money, and on account of the Pope's natural Indolence, it was executed ſo ſlowly, a long Time was conſumed before he ſent into *Switzerland* the Biſhop of *Veruli*, to diſpoſe the *Helvetic* Body to grant his Requeſt.

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THE Difficulties in *Pavia* were, in ſome meaſure, removed by the Vigilance and Induſtry of the Viceroy and other Commanders; for ſome Merchants being ſent to the *French* Camp to ſell Wine, *Antonio da Leva*, at the Sign agreed upon, ſent a Party that Way with Orders to begin ſkirmiſhing; which creating a Noiſe, the Merchants, in the Confuſion, ſtaved a large Butt of Wine, and taking out a ſmall Pot, which was concealed in it, containing Three Thouſand Ducats, ran with it into *Pavia*. The Receipt of this ſmall Sum made the *Germans* ſenſible how difficult it was to ſupply them with Money, and made them more patient; and the Death of their Leader now happening, ſo opportunely that it was believed he was poiſoned by *Antonio da Leva*, removed the main Fomenter of the Tumults.

A Contrivance to ſend Money into *Pavia*,

IN the mean time the Marquis of *Peſcara* laid Siege to *Caſciano*, guarded by Fifty Horſe, and Four Hundred *Italian* Foot, which he obliged to ſurrender at

A. D. 1525. Diſcretion. But *Bourbon* being now arrived with the *German* Foot, nothing elſe retarded the Generals, anxious for the Danger of *Pavia*, but the extream Want of Money; for they not only had not a Sufficiency to pay the Army, but laboured under great Difficulties how to raiſe what was neceſſary for moving the Ammunition and Artillery. In ſo great a Diſtreſs, by flattering the Soldiery with the Honour and Riches they would acquire by gaining a Victory, reminding them of their Profits in former Battles, and raiſing their natural Indignation againſt the *Freneh*, they prevailed on the *Spaniſh* Foot to promiſe that they would ſerve for a Month without demanding any Money, and the *Germans* to be ſatisfied with what would barely ſuffice for purchaſing neceſſary Food. But the greateſt Difficulty was how to content the Men at Arms and Light Horſe, that were quartered in the Villages of the *Ghiaraddadda* and *Cremoneſe*. They had not received for a long Time any Pay, and repreſented that it was impoſſible for them to follow the Army without Money

Marquis of *Peſcara* prevails on the Foot to wait for their Pay.

Money to provide for themſelves and their Horſes. They complained that their Service was leſs valued than that of the Foot, amongſt whom, at times, ſome Money had been diſtributed, but none to them for a long time paſt; yet they were not inferior to them either in Courage or Fidelity, but much their Superiors in Birth and paſt Merits. *A. D.* 1525.

THE Marquis of *Peſcara* allayed this Uneaſineſs by going to their Quarters, and ſometimes excuſing Matters, ſometimes comforting, and ſometimes reproving them, repreſented to them in a winning Manner, that the more they were illuſtrious for their Virtue and Courage, the more they ought to ſtrive not to be outdone in their Fidelity and Love to *Cæſar*, whoſe Glory and Honour were not only at Stake at this Juncture, but alſo all his Dominions in *Italy*: That if they ſincerely deſired his Grandeur, and earneſtly wiſhed him well, they could never have a better Opportunity of manifeſting their Sentiments; and, ſince they had ſo often expoſed their Lives for his Service, with what Shame muſt they be branded, if, by an unheard

A. D. 1525. of Reſolution, they ſhould refuſe to ſerve for the Want of a few dirty Pence. The Perſuaſions and Authority of the

and upon the Horſe Marquis had ſuch Effect, that they agreed to ſerve a Month, and be contented with a very ſmall Portion of their Pay.

THE Army then being aſſembled, and computed to contain Seven Hundred Men at Arms, the ſame Number of Light Horſe, One Thouſand *Italian* Foot, and above Sixteen Thouſand between *Spaniards* and *Germans*, they ſet out from *Lodi* the 25th Day of *January*, and arrived the ſame Evening at *Marignano*, as if they intended to go to *Milan*, in hopes that either the King, in Fear of loſing that City, might break up the Siege of *Pavia*, or that the *French* Soldiery would abandon *Milan*; but after they had paſſed the River *Lambro*, near *Vidigolfo*, they directed their March to *Pavia*.

THE King paid for Thirteen Hundred Lances, Ten Thouſand *Swiſs*, Four Thouſand *Germans*, Five Thouſand *French*,

French, and Seven Thouſand *Italians*; but by the Negligence of the Miniſters, and Frauds of the Officers, the Number of the Foot was much leſs. *Teodoro da Trivulzi* guarded *Milan* with Three Hundred Lances, Six Thouſand Foot between *Griſons* and *Valleſe*, and Three Thouſand *French*; but as ſoon as the Imperial Army moved towards *Pavia*, the King, ordering but Two Thouſand Foot to be left in *Milan*, recalled the reſt to ſtrengthen his Army. On the Enemy's March the King held a Council of War, in which *Tremouille*, *Paliſſe*, *Thomas de Foix*, and ſeveral other general Officers, perſuaded the King to break up the Siege of *Pavia*, and poſt his Army either at the Monaſtery of the *Carthuſians*, or at *Binaſco*, which were ſtrong Situation (as there are ſeveral in that Country, rendered ſo by the Canals cut for overflowing the Meadows) demonſtrating that by this means they might ſoon obtain a Victory without Blood or Danger, becauſe the Imperial Army, being deſtitute of Money, could not keep together many Days, but would be obliged to break up,

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The King holds a Council,

is perſuaded to raiſe the Siege of *Pavia*.

A. D. 1525. up, or quarter diſperſed in different Towns. That the *Germans* in *Pavia*, leſt they ſhould be charged with making their Want of Pay an Excuſe for covering their Cowardice, had, for ſeveral Months, bore patiently that Inconvenience, but would, as ſoon as the Siege ſhould be raiſed, demand Payment; and as their Commanders had neither Money nor any apparent Hopes, with which they might, tho' vainly, feed them, they would excite ſome dangerous Tumult: That nothing elſe kept the Enemy together, but the Hopes of coming to an immediate Engagement, which being put out of their Power, and the War protracted, they would be brought into Difficulties and Confuſion. They laid before his Majeſty the Danger of being ſituated between a Town garriſoned with Five Thouſand Foot of a moſt warlike Nation, and an Army marching to its Succour, powerful for its Number, and for the Valour and Experience of its Leaders and Soldiers, elated with their former Victories, and placing their Hopes in a Battle: That no Infamy attended a Retreat made by Prudence,

Prudence, and not out of Fear; when made to avoid leaving to the Power of Chance what is certain, and when the ſpeedy End put to the War ſhall demonſtrate to the whole World the Reaſonableneſs of this Counſel: And no Victory could certainly be more advantageous, honourable or glorious, than that which is gained without Loſs or Bloodſhed: That the chief Praiſe in the Art of War conſiſted more in a General's not expoſing his Army to unneceſſary Dangers, and in rendering vain the Artifices and Deſigns of the Enemy, than in fighting bloody Battles. The ſame Counſel was given to the King by the Pope, to whom the Marquis of *Peſcara*, under Apprehenſions from ſo great a Poverty in the Camp, had before ſignified that the Difficulties which *Cæſar*'s Army laboured under were ſuch that he almoſt deſpaired of Succeſs. But the King, whoſe Reſolutions were intirely governed by the Counſels of the Admiral, laying a greater Streſs on vain Rumours, and on every ſlight and variable Accident, than on Events of Moment and Importance, thought it would be a great Reflection on his Honour, that an

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A. D. 1525. an Army, in which he was preſent in Perſon, ſhould retire with a Show of Fear at the Approach of an Enemy. He let himſelf alſo be worked upon by a Suggeſtion, than which nothing can be more imprudent in a General, that he was in a manner bound to act in Conformity to ſome idle Words he had dropped, becauſe he had often publickly declared, and ſignified all over *Italy*, that he would ſooner chuſe Death than retire from before *Pavia* without taking it. He truſted in the Eaſineſs of fortifying his Camp in ſuch a Manner, as it ſhould not be penetrated by any ſudden Aſſault. He hoped that, on account of the Want of Money, every little Delay would diſorder the Enemy, who having no Means to purchaſe Proviſions, and neceſſitated to plunder the Country for Subſiſtence, would not be able to keep their Camp. He hoped alſo to obſtruct the Conveyance of Proviſions to their Camp, as the greateſt Part he knew muſt come from *Cremona*, becauſe he had taken anew into his Service *Giovan Lodovico Pallavicino*, with a View that

that he might either ſeize on *Cremona*, in which was a ſmall Garriſon, or at leaſt ſecure all the Avenues by which Proviſions might come from that City. Theſe Reaſons confirmed the King in his obſtinate perſevering in the Siege of *Pavia*, and to prevent the Entrance of Succours into that Town he altered the Diſpoſition of his Army. The King himſelf was at firſt quartered on the Side of *Borgorato*, at the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, ſituated half a Mile beyond *Pavia*, beyond the Road that leads from *Pavia* to *Milan*, and on the River *Teſino*, near the Place where it had been attempted to divide the Waters. *Paliſſe* with the Van and *Swiſs* lay at the *Ronche* in the Suburbs, near the Abbey of *Santa Juſtina*, and had erected Fortifications at the Churches of *San Piero*, *Sant' Apollonia*, and *San Girolamo*; and *Giovanni de' Medici* was poſted with his Horſe and Foot at the Church of *San Salvadore*. But, on Advice of the March of the Enemy from *Lodi*, the King removed his Quarters to the Park, at the Palace of *Mirabello*, on this Side *Pavia*,

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A. D. 1525. *Pavia*, leaving the *Griſons* at *San Lanfranco*, but without altering the Poſition of his Van. At laſt he changed once more his Quarters, and lodged at the Monaſteries of *San Pagolo*, and *San Jacopo*, convenient Places, on Eminences overlooking the Country, very near *Pavia*, but a little out of the Park. Monſ. *D'Alençon* was removed with the Rear to *Mirabello*, and for Conveniency of ſuccouring one another Part of the Park Wall was broke down. The Camp extended downwards as far as the *Teſino*, and upwards to the Road that leads to *Milan*. By this Diſpoſition *Pavia* was ſurrounded, and as the *French* had the Command of the Rivers *Gravalone* and *Teſino*, and of the *Torretta* which lies over againſt *Darſina*, the Imperialiſts could not get into *Pavia* without croſſing the *Teſino*, or making their Way through the Park. The whole Care of managing the Army lay on the Admiral, the King waſting the greateſt Part of his Time either in Idleneſs or in vain Pleaſures, without finding Leiſure for Buſineſs or ſerious Thoughts, holding in Contempt all other Commanders,

ders, conſulting only with the Admiral, and hearkening alſo to *Anne de Montmorency*, and *Philip Chabot*, Lord of *Brione*, great Favourites, but of little Experience in military Affairs. Nor did the Numbers in the King's Army anſwer common Report, nor even what the King imagined himſelf. For one Part of the Cavalry was with the Duke of *Albany*, another was left with *Teodoro Trivulzio* in Garriſon at *Milan*, and many having their Quarters ſituated in the neighbouring Towns and Villages, there never were conſtantly in the Camp above Eight Hundred Lances at a time. And as to the Foot, tho', thro' the Frauds of the Captains, and Negligence of the royal Miniſters, his Majeſty paid for an unreaſonable Number, yet they were far ſhort of what was imagined by the Public. The *Italian* Officers, more than the reſt, were concerned in the Cheat; for, tho' they received large Sums for great Bodies of Men, they had but ſmall Numbers to pay. The ſame was the Caſe with the *French* Foot; and Two Thouſand *Valleſe* quartered at *San Salvadore*, between *San Lanfranco*

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A. D. 1525. *franco* and *Pavia*, had been ſuddenly attacked by the Beſieged, and diſperſed.

In this Situation of Affairs the Imperial Generals, as ſoon as they had paſſed the *Lambro*, approached the Caſtle of *Sant' Angelo*, which being ſituated between *Lodi* and *Pavia*, if not in their Poſſeſſion, would give great Impediment to the Conveyance of Proviſions from *Lodi* to the Army. *Pirro*, Brother of *Federigo da Bozzole*, guarded this Place with Two Hundred Horſe, and Eight Hundred Foot, and the King a few Days before, unwilling to expoſe the Garriſon to Danger, had ſent this *Federigo*, with *Jacques Chabanes*, to view the Strength of the Caſtle, who reported that the Garriſon was ſufficient for its Defence. But Experience proved their Miſtake, for as ſoon as *Ferdinando Davalo* approached the Town with the *Spaniſh* Foot, and had ruined the Defences with the Artillery, the Beſieged terrified retired to the Fort, and a few Hours after agreed that *Pirro*, *Emilio Cavriana*, and Three Sons of *Febus da Gonzaga*, ſhould remain

remain Priſoners, and the reſt, giving up their Arms and Horſes, might depart on their Parole of not ſerving againſt *Cæſar* for one Month. *A. D.* 1525.

THE King had ſent for Two Thouſand *Italian* Foot of thoſe from *Marſeilles*, which were in *Savona*. Theſe Troops being arrived in the Territory of *Aleſſandria*, near the River *Urbe*, *Gaſparo Maino*, who was in Garriſon in *Aleſſandria* with Seventeen Hundred Foot, ſallying forth with a few of them, fell upon the *Italians*, and finding them weary with their Journey and unguarded, becauſe they had no Suſpicion of being attacked, broke them with Eaſe, and they fled to *Caſtellaccio*, where ſoon after they ſurrendered with Seventeen Colours. Nor had *Lodovico Pallavicino* better Succeſs in his Expedition: That Officer entered *Caſal Maggiore* with Four Hundred Horſe, and Two Thouſand Foot; and the Town having no Walls he made ſome Fortifications, and ſoon after taking Poſſeſſion of *San Giovanni in Croce*, he began from that Place to make Excurſions all over the Country,

A. D. 1525. making it his particular Buſineſs to cut off Proviſions. Wherefore *Franceſco Sforza*, who was at *Cremona*, with great Difficulty, got together Fourteen Hundred Foot, which, with a few Horſe of *Ridolfo da Camerino*, and thoſe of his own Guards, he ſent, under *Aleſſandro Bentivoglio*, towards *Caſal Maggiore*. When they approached that Place, *Pallavicino*, on the 19th of *February*, truſting to his Superiority in Numbers, without waiting for *Franceſco Rangone*, who was expected with a Supply both of Horſe and Foot, ſallied forth and attacked *Bentivoglio*; but whilſt he was rallying his Men, who were retiring, he was thrown from his Horſe, made a Priſoner, and all his Troops were broken and diſperſed.

To theſe Misfortunes was added an Accident of great Importance to the *French*: For *Gian Jacopo de' Medici*, of *Milan*, Governor of *Mus*, where he had been once committed by the Duke of *Milan* for the Murder of *Monſignorino Viſconti*, having, in the Night Time, laid an Ambuſh near the Fort of *Chiavenna*, ſituated

ſituated on an Eminence at the Head of the Lake, at ſome Diſtance from the Houſes of the Town, ſeized on the Governor as he had been walking out to take the Air, and carrying him immediately before the Gate of the Fort, and threatening to kill him, prevailed on his Wife to deliver up the Fort; then ſuddenly, at the Head of Three Hundred Men which he had placed in another Ambuſh, entered thro' the Fort into the Town, and took it. This Accident gave ſuch Umbrage to the Leagues of the *Griſons*, that a few Days before the Battle they recalled the Six Thouſand *Griſons* that were in the King's Army. A. D. 1525.

About this Time the Chevalier *Caſale* came to the Imperial Camp, ſent thither by the King of *England*, with mighty Promiſes; for that King began to grow envious of the Proſperity of the King of *France*, and, being alſo provoked that the *French* had taken ſome *Engliſh* Ships in the *Scottiſh* Seas, threatened to make War in *France*, and

A. D. 1524. was deſirous of ſupporting the Imperial Army; and for that Purpoſe had commiſſioned *Pacey*, who was at *Trento*, to go to *Venice*, and inſiſt, in his Name, on that Senate's Performance of the Articles of the League, to which he thought he might the more eaſily induce them, becauſe *Cæſar* had put the Inveſtiture of *Franceſco Sforza* in the Hands of the Viceroy, with Orders to diſpoſe of it according to the Occurrences of Affairs. King *Henry* alſo commiſſioned his Ambaſſador at *Rome* to ſollicit the Pope to favour *Cæſar*'s Cauſe, from which he excuſed himſelf on account of the late Convention he had made with *France* for his own Security, without engaging to act offenſively againſt *Cæſar*. He complained alſo that, after the Return of the Army from *Provence*, Twenty Days had paſſed before he could be informed of their Deſigns, and whether they had a Mind to defend or abandon the State of *Milan*.

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BUT now the Treaties and Negotiation of Princes, and the Diligence and Sollicitude of Ambaſſadors were become of little Importance; for the Armies now approaching, the Reſult of the whole War, and of the Difficulties and Dangers which had been undergone for ſo many Months, were reduced to the Fortune of a few Hours. For the Imperial Army, after the Acquiſition of *Sant' Angelo*, ſtill advancing, encamped the 1ſt Day of *February* at *Viſtarino*, and the next Day at *Lardirago*, and *Sant' Aleſſo*, beyond the little River *Lolona*, Four Miles from *Pavia*, and Three from the *French* Camp. On the 3d of *February* they came and encamped in *Prati*, towards the Gate of *Santa Juſtina*, extending themſelves between *Prati*, *Trelevero*, and *la Motta*, and in a Wood near *San Lazzaro*, which Poſts were Two Miles and a Half diſtant from *Pavia*, and a Mile from the Van of the *French*, and Half a Mile from the Ramparts and Ditches of their Camp, and were ſo near that the Artillery on both

A. D. 1525. Sides did conſiderable Execution. The Imperialiſts had taken Poſſeſſion of *Belgiojoſo*, and all the Towns in the Country behind them except *San Colombano*, which continued in the Hands of the *French*, tho' blocked up ſo cloſely that none could ſtir out. They had found great Quantities of Proviſions in *Sant' Angelo* and *Belgiojoſo*, and, that they might be more plentifully ſupplied, they endeavoured to get the Command of the *Teſino*, as they had already of the *Po*, by which they obſtructed the Convoys to the *French* Camp. *Santa Croce* was in their Poſſeſſion, but they did not chuſe to quarter Men in the Charter-Houſe, which had been abandoned by the King, when he removed to *Mirabello*, leſt the Proviſions which muſt have been conveyed thither might be in Danger. The *French* were in Poſſeſſion of *San Lazzaro*, but the Enemy's Fire obliged them to quit it.

BETWEEN both Camps was a running Stream called *Vernacula*, which has its Riſe in the Park, and, paſſing between

San

San Lazzaro and *San Piero in Verge*, fall into the *Teſino*. The Imperialiſts intent on paſſing this Brook, as a Matter of great Importance, that they might advance with the leſs Difficulty, met with a ſtout Defence from the *French*, who were aſſiſted by the Depth of the Channel, and the Height of the Banks, which, with the Care that every Particular took to fortify his own Quarter, rendered the Paſſage very difficult. The King's Quarters in Front, in his Rear, and on the left Flank, had thick Ramparts, ſurrounded with Ditches, and ſtrengthened with Redoubts, the right Flank being defended by the Wall of the Park, which was reputed very ſtrong. The like Fortifications ſurrounded the Camp of the Imperialiſts, who were in Poſſeſſion of all the Territory of *San Lazzaro*, towards *Belgiojoſo*, down to the *Po*, and by that Situation had Plenty of Proviſions. The Ramparts of the two Camps were but Forty Paces aſunder, and their Redoubts at ſo little a Diſtance, that they were within Muſquet-ſhot. A. D. 1525.

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THIS was the Diſpoſition of both Armies on the 8th Day of *February*; both Sides were continually ſkirmiſhing, but each kept themſelves in their ſtrong Camp, not chuſing to fight to Diſadvantage. The Imperialiſts imagined they had already done great Matters, by approaching ſo near *Pavia* as to be enabled, in caſe of a Battle, to have the Aſſiſtance of the Garriſon. In *Pavia* there was great Want of Powder, wherefore the Imperialiſts ſent Fifty Men on Horſeback, each carrying behind him a Bag of Powder: Theſe, in the Night-time, entering the *Milan* Road, waited there till the Imperialiſts gave an Alarm to the *French* Camp, and then conveyed themſelves ſafely into *Pavia*, from whence *Antonio da Leva* made frequent Sallies, infeſting the Enemy by different Ways. One Day he attacked and broke the Garriſons of *Borgorato*, and *San Lanfranco*, and carried off Three Pieces of Artillery, and ſeveral Waggons of Ammunition.

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In this State of Affairs one cannot well expreſs the Vigilance, Induſtry and Fatigues both of Body and Mind of the Marquis of *Peſcara*, who Day and Night never ceaſed to annoy the Enemy by Skirmiſhes, Alarms, and caſting up new Works, always advancing by Trenches Ditches, and Redoubts. The Imperialiſts were at Work on a Platform upon the Canal, and the *French* greatly annoying the Workmen with Two Pieces of Artillery planted at *San Lazzaro*, they pointed their Artillery that Way, and ruining the Place conſtrained them to abandon it. The *French* ſuffered much from the Artillery of the ſaid Platform, and likewiſe from another erected at *Pavia*; and the *Spaniards* fortified themſelves in ſuch a manner with Redoubts and Ramparts, and were ſo well diſpoſed, that they annoyed very much the *French* Camp, without receiving much Hurt themſelves. The *French* therefore changed the Poſition of their Artillery, in order to take the *Spaniards* in Flank, whilſt they were vigor-

A. D. 1525. vigorouſly continuing their Works, in order to gain Ground Inch by Inch. This Poſition neceſſarily occaſioned frequent Skirmiſhes, in which the *French* were almoſt conſtantly worſted. All this while neither of the Parties intermitted their Operations, on account of the Negotiation of a Truce, of which the Pope's Nuncios in both Armies were continually treating: Nor would the King give any Attention to his intimate Friends, or to the Pope, who often counſelled him, in order to avoid ſo great a Danger, to decamp with his Army from *Pavia*, becauſe, on account of the Enemy's Want of Money, he would neceſſarily obtain a Victory in a very ſhort Time, and without Blood.

On the 17th Day of *February* the Garriſon ſallied out and attacked the Regiment of *Giovanni de' Medici*, who gallantly repulſed them, and returning afterwards to ſhew the Admiral the Spot of Ground where the Action happened, whilſt he was pointing out the Particulars, by a Volley of Shot fired from

from a Houſe, he received a Wound in the Heel, which broke the Bone, to the King's great Concern, and it was neceſſary to have him carried to *Piacenza*. On account of this Accident the Skirmiſhes were not ſo frequent and vigorous, and the Fierceneſs of the *French* in their Aſſaults was immediately allayed; whilſt thoſe in *Pavia* made every Day bolder Sallies, and having burnt the Abbey of *San Lanfranco*, were become too hard for the *French*, who ſeemed very much diſpirited. The Marquis of *Peſcara* on the 20th, before Day, with Three Thouſand *Spaniſh* Foot, attacked the Enemy's Redoubts, and mounting the Ramparts, killed above Five Hundred Foot, and brought off Three Pieces of Cannon. A. D. 1525.

At laſt the Imperial Generals, being ſenſible they could no longer remain in that Situation for Want of Money, and conſidering that, if they retired, not only *Pavia* would be loſt, but that there remained no Hopes of defending the other Places they poſſeſſed in the Dutchy

A. D. 1525. chy of *Milan*, full alſo of Confidence of obtaining a Victory thro' the Valour of their Soldiers, and relying on the Multitude of Diſorders in the *French* Army, many of the Enemy's Foot being gone off, and the Number remaining not anſwering by far to thoſe paid for, on the Night before the 25th of *February*, a Day dedicated, according to Chriſtian Rites, to the Apoſtle *Matthias*, and *Cæſar*'s Birth-Day, took a Reſolution to march to *Mirabello*, where ſome Companies of the Enemy's Horſe and Foot were poſted, with an Intent, if the *French* did not move, to raiſe the Siege of *Pavia*, and if they moved to try the Fortune of a Battle. With this View, on the Beginning of the Night, to fatigue the Enemy, they often beat to Arms, making a Feint of attacking them on the Side of the *Po*, at the *Teſino*, and at *San Lazzaro*. At Midnight an Order was iſſued for all the Soldiers to put on a White Shirt over their Arms, as a Sign to diſtinguiſh themſelves from the *French*. The Horſe formed themſelves into Two Squadrons, and

and the Foot into Four Bodies; the first of which was compoſed of Six Thouſand *Germans*, *Spaniards* and *Italians* in equal Proportions under the Marquis *del Guaſto*; the ſecond conſiſted only of *Spaniards*, under the Marquis of *Peſcara*; the third and fourth were *Germans*, commanded by the Viceroy and the Duke of *Bourbon*. Arriving at the Park Wall ſome Hours before Day, by the united Help of Bricklayers and Soldiers, they threw down Sixty Braces of the Wall. The firſt Body then marched to *Mirabello*, and the reſt towards the *French* Camp. But the King, on Notice that the Enemy had entered the Park, imagining they were proceeding to *Mirabello*, marched out of his Entrenchments in order to fight in the open Field on even Ground, chuſing rather to fight there on account of the Superiority of his Horſe. At the ſame time he ordered his Artillery to be pointed towards the Enemy, which taking them in Flank did ſome Damage to the Rear. The Imperialiſts in the mean time attacked the King's Squa-

A. D. 1525.

dron,

A. D. 1525. dron, which uſed to be commonly the main Battle, but by the March of the Squadrons was become the Van, where the King, fighting very gallantly, ſuſtained the Shock of the Enemy, who however, with their Fire Arms obliged thoſe about him to give Way, till the *Swiſs* arriving, and the Cavalry charging them in Flank, the *Spaniards* were repulſed. But the Viceroy, called by the Marquis of *Peſcara* to his Aſſiſtance, and coming up with the *German* Foot, the *Swiſs* were eaſily broken with great Slaughter, their Valour no way correſponding that Day with the Courage they had ſhown in former Battles. The King in the mean time, having been with a great Number of his Men at Arms in the Midſt of the Battle, and endeavoured to ſtop the Flight of his Men, after a long Combat, his Horſe killed under him, himſelf wounded, tho' but ſlightly, in the Face, and in the Hand, and fallen to the Ground, was taken by ſome Soldiers, who did not know him. But when the Viceroy came up he diſcovered himſelf to him, who, after kiſſing

kiſſing his Hand with profound Reverence, received him Priſoner in the Name of the Emperor. By this Time *Guaſto* with the firſt Squadron had broke the *French* Horſe poſted at *Mirabello*, and *Leva*, who, as ſome ſay, had, for this Purpoſe, demoliſhed ſo much of the Wall of *Pavia*, that One Hundred and Fifty Horſe might ſally out abreaſt, attacked the Enemy's Rear, in ſuch a manner that the whole Army betook themſelves to Flight, but were all intercepted and plundered, except the Rear of the Horſe under *Alençon*, which retired intire at the Beginning of the Fight. A. D. 1525.

It was a received Opinion that the *French*, between killed and drowned in their Flight in the *Teſino*, loſt above Eight Thouſand Men, and about Twenty of the firſt Rank of the *French* Nobility, amongſt whom were the Admiral, *Jacques Chabanes*, *Paliſſe*, *Tremouille*, the Grand Ecuyer, *Aubigny*, *Boyſy*, and *L'Eſcud*, who expired of his Wounds ſoon after he was taken.

Amongſt

A. D. 1525. Amongſt the Priſoners were the King of *Navarre*, the Baſtard of *Savoy*, *Montmorency*, *St. Paul*, *Brion*, *de l'Aval*, *Chandiou*, *Imbercourt*, *Galeazzo Viſconti*, *Federigo da Bozzole*, *Bernabo Viſconti*, and an infinite Number of Gentlemen, and almoſt all the General Officers which were not killed. *Girolamo Leandro*, the Pope's Nuncio, was alſo taken, but releaſed by Order of the Viceroy. Of the Priſoners *St. Paul*, and *Federigo da Bozzole* were committed to the Caſtle of *Pavia*, but ſoon after, by corrupting the *Spaniſh* Guards, found Means to make their Eſcape.

Of the Imperialiſts were killed about Seven Hundred, but no general Officer except *Ferrando Caſtriota*, Marquis of *Sant' Angelo:* The Plunder was ſo great, that no Soldiers in *Italy* were ever richer. The Marquis of *Peſcara* received Two Wounds, one of them with a Muſquet, and *Antonio da Leva* was ſlightly wounded in his Leg. Of ſo great an Army *Alençon* only, with Four Hundred Lances which he commanded

manded in the Rear, ſaved themſelves without fighting, being neither attacked, nor purſued; but leaving behind them their Carriages, they rode with full Speed into *Piedmont*. As ſoon as the News of this Victory reached *Milan*, *Teodoro Trivulzi*, who was left there with Four Hundred Lances, departed thence towards *Muſocco*, and was followed by all the Soldiers, in ſcattered Bodies; by which means, the ſame Day the Battle was fought, the whole Dutchy of *Milan* was freed from the *French*. The Day after the Victory the King was conducted to the Caſtle of *Pizzichitone*, becauſe the Duke, for his own Security, would by no means conſent that he ſhould be conducted to the Caſtle of *Milan*, and, except his Liberty, for that was guarded with the utmoſt Care, he was, in all other Reſpects, treated and honoured as a King. A. D. 1525.

The End of the Fifteenth Book.

Franceſco Guicciardini's
HISTORY
OF
The WARS in ITALY.

BOOK XVI.

THE CONTENTS.

The Victory of Charles *alarms the* Italians. *Tumult in* Siena. Francis, *refuſing to ſign the Articles offered him, is carried Priſoner into* Spain. *The Duke of* Milan *and others conſpire againſt* Cæſar. *The Marquis of* Peſcara *diſcovers the Plot, and gets Poſſeſſion of Part of the Dutchy of* Milan. *Conditions and Ceremony with which the King of* France *is ſet at Liberty.*

A. D. 1525. THE *French* Army being thus not only overthrown by the Imperialiſts, in the Battle fought in the Park of *Pavia,* but the moſt Chriſtian

Chriſtian King made Priſoner, and the greateſt Part of the Officers and the *French* Nobility killed or taken near their King, the *Swiſs*, who had hitherto made War in *Italy* with ſo great a Reputation, having behaved ſo baſely, the Reſidue of the Army, after loſing their Camp, making no Stop till they arrived at the Foot of the Mountains, and, what mightily added to the Reputation of the Conquerors, the *Cæſarean* Generals having acquired ſo memorable a Victory with ſo little Blood on their Side, it is not to be expreſſed what an Aſtoniſhment ſo great an Event excited in all the Potentates of *Italy*, who, finding themſelves in a manner wholly diſarmed, were ſtruck with the greateſt Terror at the Thoughts of *Cæſar*'s having ſo very powerful an Army in the Field, without an Enemy to oppoſe him. Nor were their Fears ſo much allayed by what many reported of *Cæſar*'s good Diſpoſition and Inclination to Peace, without any Deſire of uſurping the States of others, as they were increaſed on the Conſide-

A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. ration of the Danger that, moved either by Ambition, a Paſſion natural to all Princes, or by that Inſolence which commonly attends Victories, and beſides inſtigated by the forward Zeal of thoſe who had the Management of his Affairs in *Italy*, or, laſtly, ſtimulated by his Council and whole Court, he would not neglect ſo fair an Opportunity, of itſelf ſufficient to warm the coldeſt Diſpoſition, to turn his whole Thoughts on making himſelf Lord of all *Italy*; eſpecially as they were not ignorant how eaſy it was for any great Prince, and much more for a *Roman* Emperor, to juſtify their Undertakings under Pretences which might have the Appearance of Reaſon and Honour. This Fear did not only ſeize on thoſe Potentates that were of leſſer Force and Authority, but even the Pope and the *Venetians* ſeemed to be more alarmed than the reſt. The laſt, not only from a Conſciouſneſs of having, without any juſt Cauſe, failed in fulfilling the Articles of their Confederacy, but much more on the Remembrance of the antient Animoſities,

ſities, and frequent Provocations paſſed between them and the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and of the vexatious Wars in which they had but a few Years before been engaged with *Maximilian*, when the Name and Memory of the almoſt dormant Pretenſions of the Rights of the Empire to their Dominions on the *Terra Firma* were ſtrongly revived; and becauſe they were alſo ſenſible that whoever aimed at eſtabliſhing his Grandeur in *Italy* muſt of neceſſity apply himſelf to depreſs the too exorbitant Power of their Republic. The Pope had Reaſon for Apprehenſions becauſe, ſetting aſide the Majeſty of the Pontificate, which had ſuffered frequent Eclipſes from the Greatneſs of the Emperors, even in thoſe antient Times when a greater Reverence was paid by the World to the Apoſtolic See, he was in every other Reſpect expoſed to Injuries; for he was diſarmed, without Money, and the Eccleſiaſtic State, in which there are but few fortified Towns, was in a very weak Condition, the People neither united nor ſteady in their Affections to

A. D 1525.

A. D. 1525. their Prince, but, on the contrary, almoſt the whole Dominion of the Church divided into the two Factions of *Guelfs* and *Ghibellines*, the latter, from an inveterate and almoſt natural Impreſſion, inclined to the Imperial Authority, and the City of *Rome*, above all others, weak, and infected with theſe Seeds of Contention.

To this muſt be added *Clement*'s Sollicitude for the Affairs of *Florence*, which depending on him, and concerning his own Grandeur, as well as the antient Splendor of his Family, he had their Intereſts perhaps as much at Heart, as thoſe of the Church. Nor was it leſs eaſy to make Alterations in that State than in the others; for the City of *Florence*, after the Expulſion of the *Medici* in the Paſſage of King *Charles*, having, under the Name of Liberty, taſted the Sweets of popular Government for the Space of Eighteen Years, was become diſſatisfied at the Return of that Family, and few of the Citizens were heartily pleaſed at their Power. The Pope was alſo extreamly

treamly apprehenſive that to ſuch inviting Opportunities would be added a ſtrong Inclination to fall upon that State. But there were Grounds beſides to fear that this Inclination would not abate, not ſo much becauſe the leſs powerful is never wholly ſecure from the Ambition of the more potent, as from an Apprehenſion that on ſeveral accounts his Name was at that Time become odious to *Cæſar*. He reaſoned within himſelf, that tho', during the Reign of *Leo*, and after his own Promotion to the Cardinalſhip, he had taken a World of Pains for advancing the Grandeur of *Cæſar*, and that tho' *Leo* and himſelf, with exceſſive Coſt and Danger, had opened the Way to ſo great a Power in *Italy*, and that after his own Aſſumption to the Pontificate he had furniſhed Money to his Generals whilſt the Admiral was in *Italy*, and procured a Contribution from the *Florentines*, and had not recalled from the Army the Troops of the Church and of that Republic, yet, either on conſidering that it belonged to his Office to act

A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. as a Father and common Paſtor between Chriſtian Princes, and to be rather a Peacemaker than a Fomenter of Wars, or beginning, tho' late, to be alarmed at ſo much Grandeur, he had betimes retired from following his Fortune, and therefore would not be perſuaded to renew the Confederacy made for the Defence of *Italy* by his Predeceſſor. And when the Year before *Cæſar*'s Army with the Duke of *Bourbon* had entered *Provence*, he had not conſented to aſſiſt it with Money, which tho' it had given no juſt Cauſe for Complaint to the Imperial Miniſters, his Holineſs not being bound by the League of *Adrian* to act in Concert againſt the *French* in the Wars of *Italy*, yet this Manner of Proceeding laid a Foundation for their thinking that he no longer heartily concurred in *Cæſar*'s Intereſt, and, on the contrary, greatly leſſened the Opinion which they had hitherto entertained of his Faithfulneſs; acting like Men who, led only by Paſſion or Neceſſity, reſented it as an Injury, if others did not lend the ſame Aſſiſtance towards carrying on their

their particular Enterpriſes, concerted with a View to ſeize on *France*, as they had before done to Undertakings of univerſal Concern, ſet on foot with a Pretence of ſecuring *Italy* from the *French* Power. But theſe Complaints and Diſſatisfactions begun and diſcovered themſelves, when the King of *France* marched on his Expedition againſt *Milan*; for tho' the Pope, as he afterwards wrote in his querulous Brief to *Cæſar*, had privately ſupplied the *French* with a Sum of Money in their Retreat from *Marſeilles*, yet he had never afterwards held any confidential Correſpondence with them: But as ſoon as the King had taken *Milan*, ſeeing his Affairs in ſo proſperous a Condition, he had indeed entered with him into Articles, tho' he excuſed it to *Cæſar* by alledging that his Generals, at that Juncture, not having, for Twenty Days together, let him into any of their Deſigns, deſpairing of the Defence of that State, and under Apprehenſions alſo for *Naples*, and the Duke of *Albany* puſhing forwards with his Troops towards *Tuſcany*, he had been obliged

A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. obliged to think of Meaſures for his own Security. The Regard however to his own Danger had not ſo much influenced him as not to make him agree on Conditions tending as much to *Cæſar*'s Intereſt as his own, and not to deſpiſe the immenſe Offers made him by the King of *France* to intice him into a Confederacy with him.

But his Excuſes had not been ſufficient to quiet the Minds of *Cæſar* and his Miniſters, who were under great Concern, not ſo much becauſe they ſaw themſelves wholly deprived of any Hopes of future Subſidies from him, as becauſe they doubted that the Capitulation contained ſomething more than an Obligation to a bare Neutrality, becauſe they thought that on all Occaſions he had ſpoken too favourably of the *French* Enterpriſe, and were alſo apprehenſive that he had drawn in the *Venetians* to follow his Example, the Truth of which was afterwards confirmed by Letters and Briefs found in the King's Tent after the Battle. In the

the laſt Place theſe Jealouſies and Diſ- A. D. 1525.
ſatisfactions were greatly increaſed, when the Pope permitted the Ammunition, furniſhed by the Duke of *Ferrara* to the *French* King at the Siege of *Pavia*, to paſs through his Dominions, and to be forwarded by the Aſſiſtance of his Subjects, but much more at the March of the Duke of *Albany* on the Enterpriſe againſt the Kingdom of *Naples*; for he was not only treated as a Friend through all the Eccleſiaſtic and *Florentine* States, but alſo ſtopped many Days about *Siena*, in order to reform, at the Requeſt of the Pontiff, the Government of that City. And tho' this Stay protracted the March of the Duke to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and had been procured by *Clement* principally for that Purpoſe, becauſe he would have been very uneaſy to ſee the ſame Perſon Lord of *Naples* and *Milan*, yet the Imperialiſts had put ſuch a Conſtruction on this Step, as to infer that the Convention between him and the King of *France* contained ſomething more than a ſimple Engagement not to act offen-

A. D. 1525. offenſively againſt each other. On theſe Conſiderations the Pope had juſt Reaſon to fear, not only, like all the reſt of the *Italian* Powers, that, when proper Time and Occaſion offered, he ſhould be attacked by the Imperialiſts, but that the State of the Church, or that of the *Florentines*, would be immediately invaded without waiting for a fairer Opportunity. And this Fear was increaſed when the Duke of *Albany*, on advice of the King's Misfortune, having retired, for his Security, from *Monte Rotondo* towards *Bracciano*, and ordered thither One Hundred and Fifty of his Horſe from *Rome* (which the Pope, on receiving Intelligence that the Duke of *Seſſa* and the Imperialiſts were preparing to fall upon them, cauſed to be eſcorted thither by his own Guards) it happened that Four Hundred Horſe and Twelve Hundred Foot of the Troops of the *Orſini*, in their March from *Sermoneta*, being purſued by *Giulio Colonna* with a good Body of Horſe and Foot, were routed by him at the Abbey of the *Three Fountains*, and flying

flying into *Rome* for Shelter thro' the Gates of *San Pagolo* and *San Sebaſtiano*, the *Colonnas* entered with them, and in *Campo di Fiore*, and other Parts of the Town put ſome of them to the Sword, which cauſing a great Tumult the whole City roſe up in Arms, to the great Terror of the Pontiff, which was ſucceeded by no leſs Indignation at the little Reverence and Reſpect paid to his Authority. *A. D.* 1525.

BUT in the Midſt of all theſe Doubts and extream Anxiety of Mind, his Holineſs was ſeaſonably relieved by Encouragements and Offers from the *Venetians*, who, being equally affected with the ſame Terror, endeavoured, with the moſt earneſt Inſtances, to perſuade him to join with them in ſending immediately for Ten Thouſand *Swiſs* into *Italy*, and enliſt a large Body of *Italians* to make a Reſiſtance againſt ſo great a Danger; promiſing at the ſame time, according to their Cuſtom, to do, for their Part, much more than they intended to perform. They repreſented

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to

A. D. 1525. to the Pontiff that the *German* Foot who aſſiſted at the Defence of *Pavia* had not for ſeveral Months received their Pay, and finding after the Victory the ſame Difficulties in their Payments had made a Mutiny, and ſeizing on the Artillery had fortified themſelves in *Pavia:* That on the ſame account all the reſt of *Cæſar*'s Army were become tumultuous, and would grow ſo more and more every Day, the Commanders not being able to pay them: That on theſe Grounds, if his Holineſs joined with their Republic in making a powerful Armament, if they mutually put their Dominions in a State of Defence, and improved the Opportunity, the Imperialiſts, involved in thoſe Difficulties, and under a Neceſſity of conſtantly keeping a large Body of Forces as a Guard on their Royal Priſoner, would fall into Diſorders of themſelves. Beſides, it was not to be doubted but that the Princeſs Regent, in whom the whole Power of the *French* Government reſided, ardently deſirous of ſuch a Conjunction, would,

would, at their Requeſt, not only order the Duke of *Albany* immediately to haſten to their Aſſiſtance with his own Troops, and the Four Hundred Lances of the Rear, who had retired from the Battle, and ſaved themſelves, but would, with the Concurrence of the whole *French* Nation, contribute large Sums of Money for the Safety of *Italy*, as knowing that on this Liberality depended, in a great meaſure, the Hopes of recovering her Son: That this Reſolution was certainly the beſt if taken ſpeedily, but Delay might enable *Cæſar* to remedy the Diſorders in his Army, and ſo much the more as any Potentate who did not reſolve to put himſelf in Arms would be under a Neceſſity of compounding with, and furniſhing him with Money, and conſequently be himſelf the Inſtrument of freeing him from all his Difficulties, and eſtabliſhing himſelf in a State of perpetual Subjection. They alſo gave him Hopes that their Example would be followed by the Duke of *Ferrara*, who, both on account of his antient Dependencies on the A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. the *French*, and the Aſſiſtance he had given the King in that War, was not without very great Apprehenſions: And his Conjunction appeared of no ſmall Importance, on account of the great Conveniency of his State in the Wars of *Lombardy*, and becauſe the City of *Ferrara* was very ſtrong, and extreamly well ſtored with Ammunition and Artillery, and, as it was reported, very rich in Money.

Neither the Hopes of coming off victorious in ſo difficult an Enterpriſe, nor the Conſideration of Danger at a conſiderable Diſtance, for which Time often produces Remedies unthought of, would have inclined *Clement* to give Ear to theſe Arguments, if the Fears of a preſent Attack had not induced him to chuſe rather to expoſe himſelf to a leſs certain Danger, than to a Danger which appeared greater and more preſent. The Negotiations therefore were ſo long carried on between them, till there remained nothing to do but only to draw up the Articles in Writing,

Writing, it was expected every Hour that a Convention would be ſettled; ſo that the Pope, looking upon the Treaty as concluded, poſted away *Girolamo Ghinuccio* of *Siena*, Auditor of the Apoſtolic Chamber, to the King of *England*, to uſe all his Dexterity for perſuading him to oppoſe the exorbitant Greatneſs of *Cæſar*, when opportunely arrived the Archbiſhop of *Capua*, his antient Secretary and Counſellor, who had for many Years been of great Authority with him. *A. D.* 1525.

THIS Prelate, as ſoon as he had heard of the Victory of the Imperialiſts, had ſet out for the Camp, to wait on Don *Carlo di Lanoia*, Viceroy of *Naples*, and having informed himſelf of his Intentions, immediately rode Poſt to the Pontiff, carrying with him certain Hopes of an Agreement. For the Viceroy and the other Generals had at that Time two Things that employed their Thoughts; one was, to provide Money for ſatisfying the Army, at which they were in very great Confuſion, for

A. D. 1525. Want of Money to pay the Soldiers; the other was, to conduct the Perſon of the King of *France* to a Place where the Difficulty of guarding him would not keep them in continual Uneaſineſs; and theſe two Points being well ſettled they imagined that Affairs would be in ſuch a Situation as to put it in their Power always to accompliſh their Deſigns. Wherefore they deſired an Accommodation with the Pope, propoſing to draw out of him a large Sum of Money; and to diſpoſe him to a more ready Compliance by putting him in a Conſternation, and to eaſe the Dutchy of *Milan*, which was much exhauſted, of the Burden of quartering Soldiers, they had ſent Four Hundred Men at Arms and Eight Thouſand *Germans* to take up their Quarters in the *Piacentine*, not as Enemies, but ſometimes pretending that the Dutchy of *Milan* could not maintain ſo great a Number of Troops, and ſometimes threatening to make them paſs into the Territory of *Rome*, in order to find out the Duke of *Albany*, if the Troops levied by

by the *Orſini* were not diſbanded. But theſe Pains were needleſs; for as ſoon as the Pope was ſatisfied that it lay in his own Power to avoid the preſent Dangers, he laid aſide all other Thoughts, and applied himſelf with all his Mind to find Means for an Agreement. Wherefore as ſoon as he had heard the Archbiſhop he ſent to ſtop the Auditor of the Chamber on the Road, and to remove all Occaſions that might obſtruct an Accommodation, he procured that the Duke of *Albany* ſhould diſband all his Forces, except the Cavalry and Ultramontane Foot, and appointed him Quarters at *Corneto*, receiving a Promiſe of the *Cæſarean* Miniſters that they would alſo diſband their Troops which were about *Rome*, and put a Stop to *Aſcanio Colonna*, and other Troops that were coming from the Kingdom of *Naples*; and he interpoſed alſo his Mediation that the *Colonnas*, who had begun to moleſt the Territories of the *Orſini*, ſhould deſiſt from Hoſtilities. A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525.

THE Pontiff was deſirous, and uſed all his Endeavours that the *Venetians* might be included in the Convention of which he was treating with the Viceroy: But the Difficulty lay in their refuſing to pay the Money demanded of them by the Viceroy, for he required as much Money as they would have ſpent in the War to which they were to contribute, and that, for the future, they ſhould contribute their Share not in Men but Money. He made alſo the ſame Demand of all thoſe who were comprehended in the Confederacy contracted with *Adrian*. But this Obſtinacy of the *Venetians* was of Service to the Pontiff, by giving Suſpicion to the Viceroy that they were projecting new Movements.

WHILE theſe Affairs were under Negotiation, with the ſureſt Proſpect of bringing them to a Concluſion, the *Florentines*, by order of the Pontiff, ſent the Marquis of *Peſcara* Twenty-five Thouſand Ducats for the Uſe of the Army, having firſt received a Promiſe from *Giovan Bartolo-*

meo

meo da Gattinara, deputed by the Viceroy to manage the Treaty at his Court, that this Sum ſhould be reckoned as Part of a larger Sum which they were to pay by Virtue of the new Capitulation. But, a very few Days before this Treaty was concluded, the Duke of *Albany*, who had waited for the Fleet to carry him back into *France*, the ſame being arrived at *Porto di Santo Stefano*, and the Gallies ſent to fetch him off, embarked on board theſe and the Pope's Gallies lent him by Conſent of the Viceroy, tho' no Paſs had been granted either to the Fleet or to the Gallies. With the Duke embarked *Renzo da Ceri*, with the Artillery received from *Siena* and *Lucca*, and Four Hundred Horſe, and One Thouſand *German* Foot, but with a few *Italians*, the reſt of the Troops being diſbanded, and the Remainder of the Horſes, partly ſold off, and partly left behind. From the whole Progreſs of this Expedition it was eaſy to comprehend that the Duke of *Albany* was ſent either with a View to oblige the Imperialiſts, out of Apprehenſions A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. henſions for the Kingdom of *Naples*, to quit the Dutchy of *Milan* in order to ſuccour it, or that the ſame Fears ſhould induce them to an Accommodation: And theſe were the Reaſons of the Duke's ſlow Proceedings, the King wanting Forces to ſend him with a powerful Army.

But at laſt, on the firſt Day of *April*, a Confederacy, in which the *Venetians* were left out, was concluded at *Rome*, between the Pontiff and the Viceroy of *Naples*, as *Cæſar*'s Lieutenant General in *Italy*, for whom acted as his Plenipotentiary *Giovanni Bartolomeo da Gattinara*, Grandſon to *Cæſar*'s Great Chancellor, comprehending the Pontiff himſelf and the *Florentines* on one Side, and *Cæſar* on the other. The Subſtance of the moſt important Articles was: That between the Pope and *Cæſar* there ſhould be a perpetual Friendſhip and Confederacy, by which each Party ſhall be obliged to defend with a certain Number of Troops the Dutchy of *Milan*, at that Time poſſeſſed, under the Protection

tion of *Cæſar*, by *Franceſco Sforza*, who was nominated as Principal in this Capitulation; and that the Emperor ſhould take under his Protection the whole State of the Church, and that which was in the Poſſeſſion of the *Florentines*, and particularly the Houſe of the *Medici*, with the Authority and Prerogative which it enjoys in that City; paying him on that account at preſent One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, as an Equivalent for what they ought to have contributed in the laſt War, by Virtue of the League made with *Adrian*, which was pretended not to expire with his Death, it being ſpecified in the Articles that it ſhould ſubſiſt for one Year after the Death of any one of the Confederates: That the *Cæſarean* Generals ſhould recall their Troops from the Eccleſiaſtic State, and not ſend others to take up their Quarters in the ſame without the Pontiff's Conſent. The *Venetians* were allowed the Term of Twenty Days for entering into their Confederacy on honourable Conditions, which were to be declared by the Pope and *Cæſar*: That the Viceroy ſhould be A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. bound to procure *Cæſar*'s Ratification of all theſe Articles to be returned within Four Months. And the Deputies of the Viceroy obliged themſelves by a ſeparate Article, confirmed by an Oath, that, if *Cæſar* ſhould not ratify this Capitulation within the Term above mentioned, the Viceroy ſhould repay the One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, the League however, till the Failure of ſuch Repayment, to remain inviolable. To this Convention were added Three Articles, not connected to the Capitulation but drawn in a ſeparate Writing, and confirmed alſo by Oath, containing, that, in Matters relating to Benefices in the Kingdom of *Naples*, it ſhould be permitted the Pontiff to exerciſe that Authority and Juriſdiction which were ordered by the Inveſtitures of the Kingdom: That the Dutchy of *Milan*, for the future, ſhould take its Salt from the Salt-pits of *Cervia*, at the ſame Price, and under the ſame Regulations as had been formerly agreed on between *Leo* and the preſent King of *France*, and confirmed by the Capitulation

lation made by the ſame *Leo*, in the Year 1521, with the Emperor: That the Viceroy ſhould be obliged to operate in ſuch a Manner that the Duke of *Ferrara* ſhould immediately reſtore to the Church *Reggio*, *Rubiera*, and the other Towns which he had taken during the Vacancy of the *Roman* See by the Death of *Adrian* * : That in Conſideration hereof the Pontiff, as ſoon as he ſhould be put into intire Poſſeſſion of thoſe Towns, ſhould pay unto *Cæſar* One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, and, whenever he ſhould be required by him, abſolve the Duke from thoſe Cenſures and Privations which he had incurred, tho' not however from the Penalty of One Hundred Thouſand Ducats in which he was engaged in caſe he contravened the Covenant made with *Adrian*: Provided however, that, as ſoon as the Pope had recovered Poſſeſſion, it ſhould be ſubmitted to Examination whether theſe

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* In this Affair the Viceroy was guilty of a notorious Piece of Fraud and Double-dealing, for at the ſame time he agreed with the Duke, and received Money of him, that theſe Towns ſhould not be reſtored to the Pontiff.

A. D. 1525. theſe Towns, with *Modena*, belonged to the Empire; if to the Empire they ſhould be held in Fee from *Cæſar*; but if they appertained to the Church, the Apoſtolic See was to remain in free Poſſeſſion.

THIS Step of the Pope was variouſly interpreted by the Public according to the Difference of Paſſions and Judgments; the Multitude eſpecially, who are uſually better pleaſed with ſpecious than mature Counſels, and often take thoſe for generous who make a wrong Eſtimate of Things, and alſo all thoſe who make a Profeſſion of deſiring the Liberty of *Italy*, blamed him as if, out of Meanneſs of Spirit, he had neglected the Opportunity of uniting the *Italians* againſt *Cæſar*, and had aſſiſted with his own Money the Imperial Army to free themſelves from all their Difficulties and Diſorders. But moſt of the wiſer Sort of People were of a very different Opinion; for they conſidered that a Reſolution to make Reſiſtance, with new-raiſed Troops, againſt a very numerous

numerous and victorious Army, was by no means prudent: That the Arrival of the *Swiſs* could not but take up a long Time, whence it might eaſily happen for an Opportunity to be loſt were they never ſo ready to haſten their Coming, of which, however, conſidering their Nature, and the Blow they had ſo lately received, there was no Certainty. Nor could any Thing better be expected from the Kingdom of *France*, where ſo great an Overthrow had left neither Courage nor Counſel, and where was no ready Proviſion of Money, or Men at Arms, of whom thoſe few who had ſaved themſelves in the Day of Battle, having loſt their Baggage, wanted Time and Money to put themſelves in new Equipages. This Union * therefore had no other probable Foundation than the Hopes that the hoſtile Army would not be able to put themſelves in Motion for Want of their Pay. But tho' this ſhould be the Caſe, they

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* Of the States of *Italy* againſt *Cæſar*, the Neglect of which is above imputed to the Pope.

A. D. 1525. they would not by that Means be deprived of the Dutchy of *Milan*, which, as long as it was governed under *Cæſar*'s Direction, would always give the Pope very juſt Reaſons for Apprehenſions. But this Hope was alſo very uncertain; for it was to be feared that the *Cæſarean* Generals by their Authority and Policy, and by propoſing the Pillage of ſome rich City of the Church, or of *Tuſcany*, might diſpoſe the Soldiers to march, as we find already that a Part of the *Germans*, only for the Sake of better Quarters, have paſſed the River *Po*, and ſpread themſelves over the Territories of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, ſo that, if they had been reſolved to have paſſed forwards, there could have been no Remedy but what would have come too late; and a Reſolution of ſuch Importance, in ſo imminent a Danger, muſt have been founded only on the Hopes of Diſorders among the Enemy, from which it finally depended on their own Will to diſentangle themſelves. The Counſel of *Clement* therefore, with reſpect to the current Times, was prudent

dent and well conſidered; but it would perhaps have been more commendable, if he had uſed the ſame Prudence in all the Articles of the Capitulation, and had turned his Thoughts rather on healing the Wounds of *Italy*, than on opening and exaſperating ſome of the moſt virulent Kind, in Imitation of thoſe knowing Phyſicians, who, when the Remedies adminiſtered to cure the Indiſpoſition of the other Members increaſe the Diſorders of the Head or Heart, laying aſide all Care of ſlighter Evils, which well wait Time, attend with all Diligence to that which is of moſt Importance, and moſt neceſceſſary to the Health of the Patient. For the better underſtanding of this Point it is neceſſary to go pretty far back, and repeat Part of thoſe Things already, tho' in a ſcattering Manner, related, and reduce them to one Plan and View. A. D. 1525.

THE Houſe of *Eſte*, beſides having for a very long Time, under the Title of Vicars of the Church, held the Government

A. D. 1525. vernment of *Ferrara*, were a long while in Poſſeſſion of *Reggio* and *Modena* by the Inveſtitures of the Emperors, there being no Queſtion at that Time but that theſe Two Cities were under the Imperial Juriſdiction, and poſſeſſed them in Peace, till *Julius* II. the Reviver of the almoſt antiquated Rights of the Apoſtolic See, and the Author of much Miſchief under a pious Title, in order totally to reduce *Ferrara* under the Dominion of the Church, made War upon Duke *Alfonſo*. In this War, having met with an Opportunity of wreſting from the Duke *Modena*, he kept it at firſt for himſelf, as a Place which, together with other Towns as far as the River *Po*, appertained to the Apoſtolic See, as being Part of the Exarchate of *Ravenna*; but a little after, being under Fear of the *French*, he gave it up to the Emperor *Maximilian*. Nor did this put a Stop to the War againſt *Alfonſo*; for *Julius*, not long after, took from him alſo *Reggio*, and it was believed that, if he had lived longer, he would have alſo taken *Ferrara*, being

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a moſt bitter Enemy to *Alfonſo*, as well out of a pious Intention, with which he cloaked his Ambition of recovering to the Church whatever was ſaid to have at any Time belonged to it, as from Indignation, becauſe the Duke had preferred the Friendſhip of the *French* to that of his Holineſs; and perhaps alſo from an implacable Hatred which he bore to the Memory and Reliques of *Alexander* VI. his Predeceſſor, whoſe Daughter *Lucretia* was married to *Alfonſo*, and had ſeveral Children the Fruits of that Matrimony. *Julius* dying left to his Succeſſors not only the Inheritance of *Reggio*, but the ſame Ambition of recovering *Ferrara*, to which they were ſtimulated by the glorious Memory which he ſeemed to have left of himſelf to Poſterity. Wherefore this Ambition was more prevalent in his Succeſſor *Leo*, than his Regard to the Greatneſs of the Houſe of the *Medici* in *Florence*, to which it appeared more conducive that the Power of the Church ſhould be diminiſhed, than by an Addition of *Ferrara* to make

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A. D. 1525. make it more formidable to all its Neighbours. On the contrary *Leo* having purchaſed *Modena* bent all his Thoughts on making himſelf Maſter of *Ferrara*, but more by Plots and Treachery than by open Force, which was become too difficult, becauſe *Alfonſo* ſeeing himſelf in ſuch great Danger had employed himſelf in making his City very ſtrong, had caſt a great Number of Cannon, and provided vaſt Magazines of warlike Stores, and, as it was believed, very large Sums of Money. And *Leo*'s Enmity was perhaps greater, but managed with more Secrecy, than that of *Julius*; for, beſides a Multitude of Plots by which he ſeveral Times attempted to take the Place by Surpriſe or by Fraud, he brought thoſe Princes with whom he contracted Alliances under an Obligation that at leaſt they would give no Obſtruction to this Enterpriſe. Nor did he only continue this Deſign in the Lifetime of his Brother *Giuliano*, and of his Nephew *Lorenzo*, for whoſe Exaltation it was believed that he had entertained this ambitious Deſire, but was no

no leſs eager in purſuing it after their Deaths. And this Deſire was ſo ardent in him, that many are perſuaded that he was hurried on his laſt rather precipitous than prudent Reſolution of joining with *Cæſar* againſt the King of *France*, in a great meaſure, by the ſame Paſſion; ſo that *Alfonſo*, to ſatisfy the King of *France*, his only Foundation and Hope, was neceſſitated to enter on a War in the *Modeneſe*, while the Army of *Leo* and *Cæſar* laid Siege to *Parma*. And the Duke, meeting with ill Succeſs in this War, would ſoon have been reduced to very great Straits, had not *Leo*, about this Time, been taken off by a ſudden Death, in the Courſe of his Victories; a Death certainly no leſs ſeaſonable for *Alfonſo* than that of *Julius*. A. D. 1525.

Nor am I ſatisfied that his Succeſſor *Adrian* was not poſſeſſed of the ſame covetous Deſire, tho', being new and unexperienced in the Affairs of *Italy*, he had, in the firſt Month after his Arrival at *Rome*, abſolved the Duke from

A. D. 1525. Cenſures, granted him the Inveſtiture anew, and permitted him to enjoy all that he had ſeized during the Vacations of the Church, and had given him Hopes of reſtoring to him *Modena* and *Reggio*; but afterwards, upon better Information, he grew every Day more averſe to ſuch Reſtoration. But by the Creation of *Clement* the Duke came under very great Apprehenſions that old Times were returning: And indeed juſtly; for this Pope, had Things ſucceeded proſperouſly with him, would have been in the ſame Diſpoſition with *Julius* and *Leo*. But not meeting as yet an Opportunity to attempt *Ferrara*, he was intent on recovering *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, as more feaſable, and the more juſtifiable becauſe they had been ſo lately in the Poſſeſſion of the Church, and on that account would reflect no ſmall Diſhonour on him if they were not recovered. Hence aroſe that Sollicitude in him, which diſcovered itſelf many other Ways before, and laſtly in the Convention with the Viceroy, when he ſhewed himſelf more mindful of that Affair than

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than was desired by many, who knowing the Dangers impending on all from the Greatness of *Cæsar*, and that no Preservative against it was more effectual than a hearty, sincere, and ready Union of *Italy*, and that they had Reason to expect every Day either Occasion or a Necessity of taking up Arms, were of Opinion that it would have been better for the Pontiff not to exasperate the Duke of *Ferrara*, and force him to throw himself into the Arms of the Emperor, considering that he was a Prince whose Friendship, on account of his Riches, the Convenience of his Situation, and his other Conditions, was at that Juncture highly to be valued, and that he ought rather to have embraced a Reconciliation with him, and done his utmost for extirpating his Fears and Hatred, supposing however that doing a Kindness to one who is persuaded that he has received so many Injuries, is sufficient to cancel in ill-disposed and rancorous Minds the Memory of Offences, especially when the Favour is bestowed at a Time when it

A. D. 1525. appears to proceed rather from Neceſſity than good Will.

THE Capitulation being concluded, the Pontiff, not to be wanting in the ſuitable Offices due to ſo great a Prince, with the Viceroy's Permiſſion, ſent the Biſhop of *Piſtoja* to viſit and comfort the King of *France*. The King, after ſome general Diſcourſe in the Preſence of General *Alarcone*, and intreatng that the Pontiff would uſe his good Offices with *Cæſar* in his Behalf, aſked the Biſhop, in a low Voice, what was become of the Duke of *Albany*; and receiving for Anſwer that Part of his Troops was broken, and that he himſelf, with the reſt, had paſſed into *France*, he was extreamly concerned.

Several of the States of *Italy* capitulate with the Viceroy.

AT this Time the *Luccheſe* agreed with the Viceroy to pay Ten Thouſand Ducats, for which he received them under *Cæſar*'s Protection. The *Seneſe* alſo made an Agreement to pay Fifteen Thouſand Ducats, without obliging the Viceroy to favour one Form of Government

Government more than another: For on one Side thoſe of the *Monte de' Nove*, who, at the Inſtances of the Pontiff, by means of the Duke of *Albany*, had reſumed, tho' not as yet conſolidated, their Authority; and on the other hand thoſe who, for their Profeſſion of aſpiring after Liberty, were commonly called *Libertines*, and much animated, by the Battle of *Pavia*, to make Head againſt the Government introduced by the Forces of the King of *France*, had each Party ſent their Agents to the Viceroy to render him propitious to their Deſigns; but, obtaining from him no certain Reſolution concerning their Form of Government, had all readily joined in ſolliciting a Compoſition. This being made, and the Men, ſent by the Viceroy to receive the Money, being arrived, while the Money was telling, and in their Preſence, *Girolamo Severini*, a *Seneſe* Citizen, who had been ſome time with the Viceroy, aſſaſſinated *Aleſſandro Bichi*, the Head of the new Government, and the Perſon in whom the Pope had deſigned that, for the preſent,

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Bichi aſſaſſinated.

A. D. 1525. Change of Government in *Siena*.

preſent, the whole Authority ſhould center. On this Occaſion others of the Citizens concerned with *Severini* in the Conſpiracy taking up Arms, in Conjunction with the Populace, who were diſcontented under the Apprehenſions that the Government had reverted to a Tyranny, expelled the Chiefs of the *Monte de' Nove*, and new modelled the Government, putting it in the Hands of the People, who were Enemies to the Pontiff, and Adherents to *Cæſar*. Theſe Proceedings were not, as it is thought, without the Knowledge of the Viceroy, or at leaſt his higheſt Approbation of what had been done, conſidering of what mighty Convenience it was for *Cæſar*'s Affairs to have at his Devotion that potent City, which has the Advantage of Sea-ports and a fertile Territory, is near the Kingdom of *Naples*, and is ſituated between *Rome* and *Florence*, tho' the Viceroy and the Duke of *Seſſa* had given Hopes to the Pontiff that no Alteration ſhould be made in a Government introduced with his Favour.

MANY

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MANY others of the *Italian* Powers followed the Inclination of the abovementioned, and the Fortune of the Conqueror; among whom the Marquis of *Monferrato* compounded for Fifteen Thouſand Ducats, and the Duke of *Ferrara*, who could not ſo readily ſettle his Affairs on account of the Relation which they had to the Capitulation made with the Pontiff, and becauſe it was neceſſary firſt to be aſſured of *Cæſar*'s Intentions, was content to lend the Viceroy Fifty Thouſand Ducats, with a Promiſe of Repayment unleſs they otherwiſe agreed. With this Money, and One Hundred Thouſand Ducats promiſed them by the State of *Milan*, and the Sums for which the *Genoeſe* and *Luccheſe* ſtood engaged, together with the Money remitted by *Cæſar* to *Genoa* for the Support of the War, but which did not arrive till after the Victory, the Generals employed themſelves, as faſt as it came, in paying the Arrears due to the Army, ſending back from

A. D. 1525. Time to Time, as they were paid, the *Germans* into their own Country.

As no Signs therefore appeared that they intended for the preſent to follow the Courſe of their Victory againſt any one, but that, on the contrary, the Viceroy had ratified the Capitulation made with the Pontiff, and was at the ſame time treating of making a new Appointment with the *Venetians*, which he eagerly deſired, the Eyes of all People were turned upon *Cæſar*, to behold in what Manner he would receive the joyful News of the Victory, and to what End he would direct his Thoughts. In that Prince, as far as could be comprehended by outward Demonſtrations, appeared Marks of a Mind full of Moderation, qualified eaſily to reſiſt the Proſperity of Fortune *, and ſuch as could hardly be believed in a Prince ſo powful, young, and one who had never ſeen any

* He ordered a Proceſſion and Supplications for three Days, that this great Succeſs might turn out to the Welfare and Advantage of all Chriſtendom. *Giovio.*

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any other than happy Succeſs. For on Advice of ſo great a Victory, which he received on the Tenth Day of *March*, together with a Letter from the King of *France*, written with his own Hand in a ſupplicant Manner, and more with the Spirit of a Priſoner than of a King, he immediately went to Church to render Thanks to God, with all Solemnity, for ſo great Succeſs; and the next Morning, with Marks of the higheſt Devotion, received the Sacrament of the Euchariſt, and went in Proceſſion to the Church of our Lady, without *Madrid*, where he reſided at that Time with his Court. Nor did he conſent, as is cuſtomary with others, that there ſhould be any Demonſtrations of rejoicing by Balls or Bonefires, or in any other Manner, ſaying, that it was proper to make Rejoicings for Victories obtained over Infidels, and not for ſuch as are gotten over Chriſtians. And without ſhewing, either in his Words or Geſtures, any Sign of immoderate Gladneſs, or of being puffed up in Mind, he anſwered the Congratulations of Ambaſſadors

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baſſadors and of the Grandees who were near his Perſon, that he was pleaſed with the Victory, becauſe the Aſſiſtance of God, manifeſtly vouchſafed to him on that Occaſion, appeared to him as a Sign that he was, tho' unworthy, in his Favour; and becauſe he hoped that now he ſhould have an Opportunity of giving Peace to Chriſtendom, and of preparing War againſt the Infidels, and ſhould alſo be the better enabled to be kind to his Friends, and to pardon his Enemies; adding that, tho' that Victory might juſtly be accounted all his own, ſince none of his Friends had aſſiſted him in obtaining it, yet he was willing that it ſhould be common to all. To this Purpoſe, after he had given Audience to the *Venetian* Ambaſſador, who juſtified the Steps taken by his Republic, he ſaid to the Attendants that his Excuſes were not true, however he would accept of them as ſuch. After ſome Days had paſſed in a Continuation of ſuch like Speeches and outward Demeanor, indicating the higheſt Wiſdom and Goodneſs, in order

der to proceed with Maturity, according to his Cuſtom, one Day he called a Council, and ſignified to them that he deſired their Advice how to regulate his Conduct with regard to the King of *France*, and what Ends he ought to ſerve by this Victory, commanding every one to give his Advice with Freedom in his Preſence. In conſequence of this Command, the Biſhop of *Oſma*, who held the Office of Confeſſor to *Cæſar*, made the following Speech: A. D. 1525.

The Speech of the Biſhop of *Oſma* to *Charles* V.

"THOUGH we are aſſured, moſt glorious Prince, that whatever happens in this lower World proceeds from the Providence of the Supreme Being, which daily gives Motion to Cauſes, and regulates Events, on ſome Occaſions diſcovering its Operations in an extraordinary Manner, yet never did it give more evident Tokens of its intervening Power than in the preſent Victory: A Victory, which on account of its Greatneſs, the Eaſe with which it was obtained, and the great Power of the Enemies, who abounded with all the neceſſary Proviſions of War

to

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to a far greater Degree than ourſelves, every one muſt own to have been by the expreſs Will of God, and almoſt miraculous. The greater therefore and more manifeſt the Favour of Heaven has appeared in this Event, the more ſtrictly is your Majeſty obliged to acknowledge it, and to ſhew all the Marks of a juſt Gratitude. This Behaviour conſiſts principally in the Direction and Improvement of the Victory in ſuch a Manner as may beſt promote the Service of God, and anſwer thoſe Ends for which we may believe it has been granted. And indeed when I conſider to what a low Ebb the State of Chriſtendom is reduced, I cannot ſee that any Thing can be more holy, more neceſſary, or more pleaſing to God, than an univerſal Peace between Chriſtian Princes, without which we muſt be ſenſible that Religion, the Catholic Faith, and a good Life muſt fall under moſt manifeſt Decay and Diſrepute. On one Side we have the *Turks*, who, taking Advantage of our Diviſions, have made an amazing Progreſs, and now threaten *Hungary*, the Kingdom of your Siſter's Huſband.

And

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And if they ſhould get Poſſeſſion of *Hungary*, as no doubt they will if the Chriſtian Princes are not reconciled, they will have an open Road into *Germany* and *Italy*. On the other Side this *Lutheran* Hereſy, ſo hateful to God, ſo reproachful to him who has Power to ſuppreſs it, and ſo dangerous to all Princes, has now gained ſuch a Footing, that without due Care it will fill the World with Heretics, and no Proviſion can be made againſt it but by the Imperial Power and Authority, which, while your Majeſty is involved in other Wars, cannot exert themſelves for the Extirpation of this moſt pernicious Poiſon. But beſides all this, had we nothing to apprehend either from *Turks* or Heretics, what can be more unſeemly, more wicked, and more peſtiferous, than that ſo much Chriſtian Blood, which might be glorioufly ſpent for propagating the Chriſtian Faith, or at leaſt reſerved for more neceſſary Occaſions, ſhould be idly ſpilt for the Gratification of our Paſſions, attended with ſo many Rapes, Sacrileges, and horrible Out-

A. D. 1525. Outrages? Evils, of which whoever is willingly the Author can never hope for Pardon from God, and which whoever commits out of Neceſſity, deſerves no Excuſe if he has not at leaſt a full Intention to redreſs them as ſoon as it ſhall lie in his Power. The End therefore which you are to have in View, ought to be univerſal Peace among Chriſtians, a Work above all others honourable, holy, and neceſſary, and which we are now to conſider by what Means it may be accompliſhed. There are three Reſolutions which lie at your Majeſty's Choice concerning the King of *France*; one of keeping him a perpetual Priſoner; another of ſetting him at Liberty with Marks of Affection, and in a brotherly Manner, without any other Conditions than ſuch as may ſerve to eſtabliſh a perpetual Peace and Friendſhip between your Majeſty and him, and to heal the Sores of Chriſtendom. A Third Way is to give him his Liberty, but with Care to make all the Profit of it that may be poſſible. Of theſe Reſolutions the firſt and laſt, if I miſtake not, prolong and increaſe

creaſe the Wars. A loving and brotherly Diſmiſſion is the only Way to extirpate them for ever. For who can doubt that the King of *France*, quite charmed by ſuch generous Treatment, and ſingular Liberality, from the Senſe of ſo extraordinary a Benefit, will be more bound in Mind, and more in your Power, than he is at preſent in Body? And if a ſincere Union and Harmony ſhould happily be effected between your Majeſty and that King, all the reſt of Chriſtendom will betake themſelves to follow that Road which ſhall be marked out for them by two ſuch Princes. But a Reſolution to keep the King in perpetual Cuſtody, beſides incurring the too juſt Imputation of Cruelty, and diſcovering a Mind ignorant and inſenſible of Fortune, is the ready Way to propagate Wars without End, ſince it preſuppoſes an Intention to conquer all or a great Part of *France*, which is impoſſible to be accompliſhed without new and very deſtructive Wars. If we chuſe the Mean between theſe two Reſolutions, which is to ſet the Royal Priſoner

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A. D. 1525. ſoner at Liberty, but on ſuch Conditions as to yield us all the Profit that can poſſibly be made of it, it is, in my Opinion, more perplexed, and more dangerous than both the others. For whatever Affinity he may contract, whatever Articles or Obligations he may conſent to ſign, he will always remain an Enemy, and he will never want the Aſſiſtance of all thoſe who are jealous of your Majeſty's Greatneſs, whence may be expected new Wars, and thoſe more bloody and more dangerous than the paſt. I am ſenſible how much this Opinion differs from the general Sentiment, that it is quite new and without Precedent; but theſe ſingular and extraordinary Reſolutions may very well become *Cæſar*, nor is it at all ſurpriſing that his Largeneſs of Soul is very capable of ſuch Notions as are above the Comprehenſion of all other Men, whom he ought to excel in Magnanimity as much as he is advanced above them in Dignity; and therefore he ought to know, above all others, how full of Glory an Act of

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ſuch great Generoſity would appear, and how much it is the Duty of *Cæſar* to pardon and ſhew Kindneſs rather than to make Conqueſts: That God has not in vain almoſt miraculouſly put into his Hands the Power of giving Peace to the World; that it is incumbent on him, after ſo many Victories, after ſo many Favours beſtowed upon him by the Almighty, after ſeeing all his Enemies proſtrate at his Feet, to proceed no longer as an Enemy to any Perſon whatever, but to provide, as a common Father, for the Welfare of all. The Names of *Alexander the Great* and *Julius Cæſar* were rendered more glorious by the Magnanimity of pardoning Enemies, and reſtoring Kingdoms to the Conquered, than by the Multitude of Victories and Triumphs. Their Example deſerves the more to be followed by him who, not propoſing to himſelf, for his ſole End, Glory, tho' a very great Reward, principally deſires to diſcharge the true and proper Office that belongs to every Chriſtian Prince. But to come cloſer to the Point, in order to convince

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those who estimate human Affairs by human Ends, let us consider what Resolution is looked upon to be the most serviceable to those very Ends. I verily think that of all your Majesty's Greatness, there is no Part more marvellous, more worthy, than the Glory you have attained of being hitherto invincible, and of conducting all your Enterprises to a most happy Issue with so much Reputation and Prosperity. This is without Doubt the most precious Jewel, the most singular Treasure among all your Treasures. How then can it be better secured, or more certainly be preserved than by closing the War with so generous and magnanimous an End, by putting the Glory acquired out of the Power of Fortune, and bringing this Ship, laden with Wares of inestimable Value, out of the wide Ocean into a safe Harbour? But let us insist farther; is not that Greatness which is preserved by Free-Will more desirable than that which is maintained by Violence? None doubts it, because it is more stable, more easy, more pleasing, and more honourable.

honourable. If *Cæſar* obliges the King of *France* by ſo ſignal an Act of Liberality, by ſo ineſtimable a Benefit, will not that King always be as a Guardian of him, and of his Kingdom? If he gives ſo manifeſt an Aſſurance to the Pope and to the other Princes, that he contents himſelf with the States which he has in Poſſeſſion, and has no Thoughts but how to promote the univerſal Welfare of Chriſtendom, will they not be ſatisfied, and renounce all Fears and Jealouſies? And when they have no farther Grounds for Apprehenſions or Diſputes, they will not only love but adore ſuch tranſcendent Goodneſs. Thus, with the voluntary Submiſſion of all, will he give Laws to all, and have it infinitely more in his Power to diſpoſe of Chriſtians by Benevolence and Authority than by Force and Imperiouſneſs. Aſſiſted then and followed by all, he will be enabled to turn his Arms againſt the *Lutherans* and Infidels with more Glory, and with more Opportunities of making greater Conqueſts, which I ſee no Reaſon why we ſhould not as well deſire to be made

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A. D. 1525. in *Africa*, or in *Greece*, or in the *Levant*, even tho' the Enlargement of Dominion among Chriſtians were attended with ſo much Facility as many, in my Opinion, vainly, imagine: For the Power of your Majeſty is ſo greatly augmented as to become too formidable to every one, and if they ſhould perceive that it is deſigned to be carried to a greater Height, they will all unite againſt you. The Pope dreads your Power, the *Venetians* are under Apprehenſions from it, all *Italy* ſtands in Awe of it, and, if we may judge by outward and frequent Signs, the King of *England* begins to take Umbrage at its Progreſs. The *French* may poſſibly be for ſome Months amuſed with Hopes and fruitleſs Negotiations, but at laſt it will be neceſſary to deliver their King, or they will be thrown into Deſpair, and when deſperate they will join with all the reſt of your Adverſaries. If the King be ſet at Liberty on Conditions of little Advantage to your Majeſty, where will be the Gain by loſing the Opportunity of exerciſing ſuch extra-

extraordinary Magnanimity, which, if not exerted at this Beginning, when you would afterwards ſeek to diſplay it, will carry with it neither Praiſe nor Glory, nor the like Grace? If you ſet him free on Conditions very advantageous and profitable to yourſelf, he will not obſerve them; for no Security that he may give can be of ſuch Importance to him, but that he will be much more concerned to prevent his Enemy from becoming ſo great, as afterwards to have it in his Power to oppreſs him. Thus ſhall we have either a uſeleſs Peace, or a dangerous War, the Iſſues of which are uncertain. Whoever has enjoyed a long State of Felicity has the greater Reaſon to dread a Change of Fortune, and he who once had it in his Power to ſettle all his Affairs on a good Foundation, feels the bittereſt Regret when Things fall out contrary to the Hopes with which he had flattered himſelf. I truſt, *Cæſar*, that I have ſatisfied your Command, if not with Prudence, yet at leaſt with Affection and Fidelity; and now nothing remains on my Part, but A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1535. to pray God to give you a Mind and Ability to take ſuch a Reſolution as may be moſt agreeable to his Will, and moſt conducive to the Advancement of your own Glory, and finally beſt ſuited for promoting the Good of the Chriſtian Commonwealth, of which, on account of the ſupreme Dignity in which you are placed, and becauſe it is manifeſtly the Will of God, it is fit you ſhould be Father and Protector."

CÆSAR heard this Counſel with great Attention, and without ſhewing any Sign of Diſpleaſure or Approbation: But, after he had been a while ſilent, he made a Sign for others to ſpeak; on which *Federigo*, Duke of *Alva*, a Perſon of great Authority in *Cæſar*'s Court, made the following Speech:

Speech of the Duke of *Alva* to *Charles* V.

"I SHALL hope to be excuſed, moſt invincible Emperor, if I ſhould confeſs that, as for my Part, I have no Judgment different from the common Judgment, nor Capacity of carrying my Underſtanding to a higher Pitch than that to which the

the ordinary Underſtandings of other Men have arrived; and, what is more, I ſhall perhaps be the more commended if I ſhould adviſe you to take the ſame Steps, and proceed by the ſame Methods by which your Fathers and Grandfathers always proceeded. For new and ſtrange Counſels may perhaps at firſt Sight appear more glorious and more magnanimous, but are ſure to prove in the End more dangerous and more fallacious than thoſe which have at all Times, and with all Men, been approved by Reaſon and Experience. The Will of God in the firſt Place, and, ſubordinate to that, the Valour of your Generals and Soldiers have given you a greater Victory than has been gained by any Chriſtian Prince for theſe many Ages; but all the Fruits of Succeſs in Battles conſiſts in making a right Uſe of the Victory, and not to do this is the more diſgraceful than not to overcome, as it is a greater Fault to be cheated of thoſe Things which are in the Power of him who ſuffers the Cheat to paſs upon him, than of thoſe which A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. depend on Fortune. The more then are we to beware of taking a Reſolution which muſt in the End create us Shame before others, and Repentance in our own Breaſts; and the more important the Affair is of which we treat, the more circumſpectly are we to proceed, and to take with Maturity thoſe Reſolutions which once found erroneous can never afterwards be rectified; and you are to conſider with yourſelves that if the King be ſet at Liberty, he is immediately out of your Reach, but while he is a Priſoner it is always in your Power to releaſe him. And he ought not to wonder at your Slowneſs, ſince, if I miſtake not, he is conſcious to himſelf in what Manner he would act if *Cæſar* were his Priſoner. The Capture of the King of *France* was certainly a very great Concern, but whoever well conſiders the Caſe will find his Diſmiſſion to be incomparably greater; nor can it ever be conſidered prudent to take a Reſolution of ſuch great Moment, without very long Conſultation, and revolving the Caſe infinite Times

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in the Mind. I ſhould not perhaps be of this Opinion, could I perſuade myſelf that the King, if he were at preſent ſet at Liberty, would acknowledge ſo great a Benefit with due Gratitude; and that the Pope and the other *Italian* Powers would lay aſide their Covetouſneſs and Ambition, together with their Jealouſies. But who knows not how dangerous it is to found ſo important a Reſolution on ſo fallacious and uncertain a Suppoſition? ſince whoever well conſiders the Condition and Manners of Men will ſooner judge the contrary. For nothing is in its own Nature more tranſitory, nothing of a ſhorter Date, than the Remembrance of Benefits, and the greater they are, the greater Meaſure of Ingratitude (according to the Proverb) is required to pay them. For he who is either unable or unwilling to cancel them by Recompenſation, often ſtrives to cancel them either by Forgetfulneſs, or by perſuading himſelf that they are not ſo conſiderable; and he who is aſhamed of having been reduced to a State that had need of Benefits,

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A. D. 1525. nefits, is beſides galled at the Thoughts of having received them; ſo that the Hatred ariſing from the Memory of the Neceſſity under which they were both fallen, operates more ſtrongly in them than the Obligation preſented from the Conſideration of the Kindneſs that had been ſhewed them. Beſides, what Nation is there to whom Inſolence is more natural, or Levity more proper, than to the *French*? Now where there is Inſolence, there is Blindneſs; where there is Levity, there is no Knowledge of Virtue, no Judgment to qualify a Man for diſcerning the Actions of others, and no Gravity to enable him to eſtimate what is fit and proper for himſelf. What then can be expected from a King of *France*, puffed up with as much Pride as can be conceived in a King of *Frenchmen*, but that he burns with Rage and Indignation at being a Priſoner to *Cæſar*, at a Time when he thought himſelf ſure of triumphing over him? The Memory of his Diſgrace will always be freſh in his Mind, and after he is at Liberty he will be ſo far from be-

believing that the Way to obliterate it is by Gratitude, that he will be always striving to get the Superiority over you. He will perſuade himſelf that he is diſmiſſed on account of the Difficulty of retaining him, not out of Goodneſs or Magnanimity. Such is the Nature of Men in general, but is always the Nature of *Frenchmen*, in whom whoever expects Gravity or Magnanimity muſt expect new Orders and Regulations in human Concerns. Thus, in the Room of Peace, and Re-eſtabliſhment of Order and Harmony in the World, new Wars and Contentions will ariſe, greater and more dangerous than the paſt. For your Reputation will be loſt, and your Army, which expects the due Fruits of ſo great a Victory, deceived in its Hopes, will no longer exert the ſame Valour and Vigour, nor will your Affairs be attended with the ſame Fortune, who will hardly ſtay with thoſe that would retain her, much leſs with ſuch as drive her away. Nor will the imaginary Goodneſs of the Pope and *Venetians* prove of any other Kind, but, on the con-

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A. D. 1525. contrary, repenting of having ſuffered you to obtain the paſt Victory, they will do their utmoſt to prevent you from obtaining any more, and the Fear which they now have of you will prompt them to uſe all their Endeavours to prevent their falling again under new Fears; and thus, when it is in your Power to hold your Enemies bound with the Chains of Terror and Amazement, you yourſelf, out of a fond Exceſs of Goodneſs, will be the Inſtrument to free them from thoſe Shackles that they might bid you Defiance. What may be the Will of God in this Caſe I pretend not to know, nor do I believe it known to others, becauſe we are uſually taught that his Judgments are a deep Secret and unſearchable: But if we may venture to gueſs from ſuch clear Appearances I imagine it favourable to your Greatneſs, and cannot ſuppoſe that he diſpenſes his Bleſſings to you in ſuch an Abundance with a Deſign that you ſhould caſt them behind your Back, but in order to render you as much ſuperior to others in

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Fact and Reality, as you are in Right and Title. To loſe therefore ſo fair an Opportunity, which God has put into your Hands, is wilfully to render yourſelf unworthy of his Favours. Experience has always demonſtrated, and Reaſon has made it appear, that Succeſs never attends an Affair that depends on many Hands: I much queſtion therefore whether he who imagines that the Heretics can be oppreſſed, or the Infidels ſubdued by the Union of many Princes, forms to himſelf juſt Notions of the Nature of Mankind. Theſe are Enterpriſes that require a Prince of ſuch Greatneſs as to dictate and give Directions to the others, without which all Treaties and Efforts for thoſe Purpoſes will meet with the ſame Succeſs for the future as they have had in Times paſt. For this End, I believe, God has opened you a Way to univerſal Monarchy, which alone is ſufficient to anſwer theſe holy Intentions; and it is beſt to delay the Commencement of the Undertaking, in order to proceed on better and more certain Foundations. Nor ſuffer yourſelf

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A. D. 1525 to be diverted from this Reſolution by the Fear of ſo many Confederates who threaten you, for the Opportunity is too great which you have in your Power: For if Matters be rightly negotiated the King's Mother, out of natural Tenderneſs, and from a Neceſſity of recovering her Son, will never ſuffer herſelf to be cut off from all Hopes of getting him out of your Hands by an Agreement; nor will the Princes of *Italy* ever unite with the Regency of *France*, knowing that it is always in your Power to break ſuch an Union by delivering the King, and even to make it turn to their Diſadvantage. They muſt of neceſſity remain in Suſpenſe and Amazement, and at laſt ſtrive who ſhall be foremoſt in receiving Laws from your Imperial Majeſty, for whom it will then be glorious to exerciſe Clemency and Magnanimity, when Affairs are reduced to ſuch a Situation that they cannot help acknowledging you for their Superior. In ſuch Caſes did *Alexander* and *Cæſar* exerciſe theſe Virtues, freely pardoning Injuries, but were not ſo inconſide-

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rate as voluntarily to involve themſelves afreſh in thoſe Difficulties and Dangers which they had overcome. He who acts in this Manner deſerves Praiſe becauſe he has but few Examples, but that Man is not perhaps to be commended for his Prudence who does a Thing for which there is no Example. Wherefore, *Cæſar*, my Opinion is that the greateſt Profit be made of this Victory that is poſſible, and that with this View the King, always treated with the Honours ſuitable to Kings, be conducted, if it cannot be into *Spain*, at leaſt to *Naples*; and that in Anſwer to his Letter you ſend him a Meſſenger with a very kind Meſſage, who ſhall at the ſame time propoſe the Conditions of his Liberty, which may be ſuch as, when they come to be particularly examined, may appear to carry in them a Reward worthy of ſuch a Victory. Theſe Foundations and Ends of your Proceedings being thus ſettled, Time and Accidents which ariſe, according to their Nature, will either haſten or retard the King's Deliverance, and ſhew whether we are

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A. D. 1525. to have Peace or War with the *Italians*, to whom at preſent it may be expedient to give Hopes, and to augment as much as poſſible the Favour and Reputation of our Arms by Art and Induſtry, that we might not every Day have occaſion to tempt Fortune anew, and may be prepared for an Accommodation with this or that Power, or with all together, or with none, as Opportunity ſhall direct. Theſe are the Methods which were always purſued by wiſe Princes, and particularly by thoſe who were the Founders of ſo much Greatneſs; they never rejected the Means that offered themſelves for their Promotion, nor ſlackened Sail before a proſperous Gale of Fortune. The ſame Duty is incumbent on you, to whom belongs in Juſtice what in ſome of them might appear Ambition. Remember, *Cæſar*, that you are a Prince, and that it is your Duty to proceed in the Way of Princes; and that no Perſon divine or human forbids you to embrace the Opportunity of reviving and reſtoring the uſurped and oppreſſed Authority of the

the Empire, but only obliges you to have an honeſt Mind and Intention in recovering them by lawful Means. And remember above all how eaſy it is to loſe great Opportunities, and how difficult to acquire them, and therefore that it is neceſſary to ſtrive with all Diligence to keep faſt Hold of them while we may, and not lay our Streſs on the Goodneſs or Prudence of the Conquered, ſince the World is full of Imprudence and Malignity. Concluding then that the Chriſtian Religion can rely on no other Means of Defence but from your Greatneſs, be not wanting to augment it with all your Might, not ſo much for the Intereſt of your own Glory and Authority, as for the Service of God, and out of Zeal for the univerſal Good."

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It would be impoſſible to expreſs the Satisfaction of the whole Council at this Speech of the Duke of *Alva*, every one having already propoſed in his Mind the Empire of almoſt all Chriſtendom; ſo that there was not a ſingle Member of the Aſſembly, who did not confirm the ſame Opinion, without making any Reply,

A. D. 1525. ply, *Cæſar* himſelf alſo approving it, tho' rather to ſhew that he was not willing to reject the Counſel of his Friends than by declaring what Part he was willing to take of himſelf. He diſpatched away therefore *Buren*, a Gentleman of his Bedchamber, and his intimate and well-beloved Confident, to notify his Reſolution to the Generals, and to viſit, in his Name, the King of *France*, and propoſe the Conditions on which he might obtain his Liberty. *Buren* having performed his Journey by Land, becauſe the King's Mother, for the more convenient Negotiation of her Son's Affairs, did not hinder the Paſſage of Couriers and other Perſons that came to and from *Cæſar*, went, together with *Bourbon* and the Viceroy, to *Pizzichitone*, where the King as yet remained, and offered him his Liberty, but on ſuch hard Conditions that the King heard them with a vaſt Deal of Uneaſineſs. For, beſides the Ceſſion of the Rights which he pretended to have in *Italy*, *Cæſar* demanded of him the Reſtitution of the Dutchy of *Burgundy* as his Property;

Conditions of Liberty propoſed to the King of *France*.

perty; that he ſhould beſtow *Provence* on the Duke of *Bourbon*, with other Conditions for the King of *England* and for himſelf of very great Importance. To theſe Demands the King conſtantly anſwered, That he was reſolved to die a Priſoner rather than deprive his Children of any Part of the Kingdom of *France*; and even if he ſhould reſolve otherwiſe it would not be in his Power to perform it, the antient Statutes of *France* not permitting the Alienation of any Thing belonging to the Crown without the Conſent of the Parliaments, and of others in whom reſided the Authority of the whole Kingdom, who were accuſtomed, in the like Caſes, to prefer the univerſal Safety to the particular Intereſt of the Perſons of Kings. Let them demand of him ſuch Conditions as were poſſible for him to execute, and they would find him very readily diſpoſed to enter into Engagements with *Cæſar*, and to favour his Greatneſs. Nor did he omit the Opportunity of propoſing different Conditions, making no Scruple of very large

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His Anſwer.

His Propoſals.

A. D. 1525. Conceſſions out of the States of others, that he might obtain his Liberty without any Obligation to diminiſh his own. As to the Subſtance of his Propoſals, he offered to take in Marriage *Cæſar*'s Siſter, Widow of the late King of *Portugal*, with an Acknowledgment that he held *Burgundy* in Right of her Dowry, to which the Children born of that Matrimony ſhould ſucceed: That he would reſtore to *Bourbon* his Dutchy, which had been confiſcated, and make an Addition to it of ſome other States; and in Recompenſe for *Cæſar*'s Siſter, who had been promiſed him, to give him his own Siſter, juſt now become a Widow by the Death of *Alençon*; to ſatisfy the King of *England*, and to pay a very large Sum to *Cæſar* for his Ranſom; to reſign up to him his Rights to the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*: To engage himſelf to accommodate him with a Fleet at Sea, and and an Army by Land, whenever he ſhould go to *Rome* to receive the Imperial Crown; which was indeed the ſame as to promiſe to give him all *Italy* for a Prey.

Prey. With this Draught of Articles *Buren* returned to *Cæſar*, accompanied by Monſ. *Montmorency*, a Perſon at that Time very agreeable to the King, who afterwards promoted him firſt to the Office of Great Maſter, and then to the Dignity of High Conſtable of *France*. *A. D.* 1525.

Conſternation in *France* on the News of the Defeat

But when the News came to *France* of the Defeat of the Army, and of the Captivity of the King, the Confuſion and Deſpair that ſeized all Ranks of People are beyond Imagination. For to the immenſe Grief which the lamentable Misfortune of their King excited in a Nation naturally moſt affectionate and devoted to the Royal Name, was added an Infinity of public and private Sorrows: Of a private Kind, becauſe there were few in the Court, and among the Nobility, who had not loſt in Battle Sons, Brothers, or other Kindred, or choiceſt Friends; and of a public Concernment, on account of ſo great a Diminution of the Authority and Splendor of ſo glorious a Kingdom: An Affliction the more grievous to them,

A. D. 1525. Conceſſions out of the States of others, that he might obtain his Liberty without any Obligation to diminiſh his own. As to the Subſtance of his Propoſals, he offered to take in Marriage *Cæſar*'s Siſter, Widow of the late King of *Portugal*, with an Acknowledgment that he held *Burgundy* in Right of her Dowry, to which the Children born of that Matrimony ſhould ſucceed: That he would reſtore to *Bourbon* his Dutchy, which had been confiſcated, and make an Addition to it of ſome other States; and in Recompenſe for *Cæſar*'s Siſter, who had been promiſed him, to give him his own Siſter, juſt now become a Widow by the Death of *Alençon*; to ſatisfy the King of *England*, and to pay a very large Sum to *Cæſar* for his Ranſom; to reſign up to him his Rights to the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*: To engage himſelf to accommodate him with a Fleet at Sea, and and an Army by Land, whenever he ſhould go to *Rome* to receive the Imperial Crown; which was indeed the ſame as to promiſe to give him all *Italy* for a Prey.

Prey. With this Draught of Articles *Buren* returned to *Cæſar*, accompanied by Monſ. *Montmorency*, a Perſon at that Time very agreeable to the King, who afterwards promoted him firſt to the Office of Great Maſter, and then to the Dignity of High Conſtable of *France*. *A. D.* 1525.

Conſternation in *France* on the News of the Defeat

BUT when the News came to *France* of the Defeat of the Army, and of the Captivity of the King, the Confuſion and Deſpair that ſeized all Ranks of People are beyond Imagination. For to the immenſe Grief which the lamentable Misfortune of their King excited in a Nation naturally moſt affectionate and devoted to the Royal Name, was added an Infinity of public and private Sorrows: Of a private Kind, becauſe there were few in the Court, and among the Nobility, who had not loſt in Battle Sons, Brothers, or other Kindred, or choiceſt Friends; and of a public Concernment, on account of ſo great a Diminution of the Authority and Splendor of ſo glorious a Kingdom: An Affliction the more grievous to them,

A. D. 1525. as they are by Nature arrogant and ſelf-conceited, and becauſe they were apprehenſive that ſo great a Calamity was but the Beginning of worſe Ruin, their King being taken Priſoner, and the Heads of the Government, and almoſt all the principal Officers of the Army being either taken with the King, or killed in the Battle, the Kingdom exhauſted of Money, and ſurrounded with very potent Enemies: For the King of *England*, tho' he had entered into ſeveral Treaties, and ſeemed irreſolute in many Things, yet a few Days before the Battle, breaking off all Negotiations with the King, had publicly declared that he would paſs into *France*, if Affairs ſucceeded proſperouſly in *Italy*. Wherefore it was much to be feared that *Cæſar* and that King, having ſo fair an Opportunity, would commence a War in *France*, where, becauſe there was no other Perſon at the Helm of Government than a Woman and the King's little Children, the eldeſt of whom was not full Eight Years old, and becauſe they had with them the Duke of *Bourbon*,

Bourbon, a Lord of ſuch great Power and Authority in the Kingdom of *France*, every Movement which they might make muſt be very dangerous. A. D. 1525.

Conduct of the Lady Regent in *France*.

NOR was the King's Mother, under ſo much Care and Fatigue, out of Love to her Son, and a Regard to the Dangers of the Kingdom, without her own proper Paſſions: For being ambitious, and moſt tenacious of Government, tho' ſhe was apprehenſive that, if the King's Deliverance ſhould be protracted, and ſome new Difficulties ſhould ariſe in *France*, ſhe might be conſtrained to reſign the Adminiſtration to thoſe who ſhould be commiſſioned by the States of the Kingdom, yet in the Midſt of ſo much Concern and Perturbation, recollecting her Spirits, and encouraging thoſe who were about her, beſides making Proviſions as ſoon as poſſible for the Defence of the Frontiers of *France*, and for raiſing vaſt Sums of Money, as Lady Regent, by whoſe Order, and in whoſe Name all public Buſineſs was diſpatched, ſhe wrote ſupplica-

A. D. 1525. She ſollicits her Son's Liberty.

tory Letters, full of moving Expreſſions tending to excite Compaſſion, by firſt introducing, and then, by degrees, ſolliciting as much as ſhe could a Treaty of Agreement. For this Purpoſe, a few Days after, ſhe ſet at Liberty Don *Ugo di Moncada*, and ſent him to *Cæſar* with Offers that her Son ſhould renounce all Claims to the Kingdom of *Naples* and the State of *Milan:* That he was content to have the Title to *Burgundy* examined, and that if it was found to belong to *Cæſar* he would acknowledge it in the Name of his Siſter's Dowry: That he would reſtore to *Bourbon* his State with his Movables which were of very great Value, and the Profits of it which had been ſeized by the Royal Chamber *: That he would give him his Siſter in Marriage, and conſent that he ſhould have *Provence*, if it ſhould be judged that he had the better Right to it.

THAT theſe Negotiations might be the more facilitated, rather than with a Mind

* Or confiſcated for the King's Uſe.

Mind bent on War, the Regenteſs immediately diſpatched proper Perſons to *Italy*, to recommend the Safety of her Son to the Pope and *Venetians*, offering, if, for their own Preſervation, they would enter into a ſtrict Alliance with her, and take up Arms againſt *Cæſar*, Five Hundred Lances, and a large Contribution of Money. But her principal Deſire, and that of the whole Kingdom of *France* ſhould have been to mitigate the Spirit of the King of *England*, judging, as it was true, that not having him for an Enemy the Kingdom of *France* was out of Danger of being moleſted. But if that King on one Quarter, and *Cæſar* on another ſhould make an Attack upon them, they would find themſelves involved in Difficulties and Dangers. But in a little Time the Regenteſs began to conceive ſome Hopes from that Side: For tho' the King of *England*, on the firſt News of the Victory, had ſhewed extraordinary Tokens of Rejoicing, and publicly declared that he deſigned to paſs into *France* in Perſon, and had alſo ſent Ambaſſadors

A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. baſſadors to *Cæſar* to treat, and ſollicit him to carry on a War in Conjunction, yet at the ſame time, proceeding in the ſame Humour in which he had proceeded on other Occaſions, he requeſted alſo of Madam the Regenteſs to ſend him over ſome proper Perſon. She immediately diſpatched a Perſon with a very ample Commiſſion, and a Charge to uſe all Submiſſion and poſſible Arts to mitigate the Mind of that King.

Seeks Peace with *England.*

HENRY, directed wholly by the Counſels of the Cardinal of *York*, ſeemed to propoſe for his principal End the Cogniſance and Arbitration of the Differences between the other Princes, that all the World migh know that the Deciſion of the main Point of Affairs of Moment depended on him. Wherefore at the ſame time he offered to *Cæſar* to paſs into *France* with a potent Army, and to put in Execution the Affairs which had ſome time ſince been agreed between them, and, to remove all Doubts, offered to conſign his Daughter, not yet of Years fit for Matrimony, to *Cæſar*'s Charge

Charge without Delay. But this Affair met with no ſmall Obſtruction, partly occaſioned by himſelf, and partly proceeding from *Cæſar*, who was not ſo forward to agree with him as he had been in Times paſt. For that King demanded in a manner all the Reward of the Victory for his own Share, as *Picardy*, *Normandy*, *Guyenne*, and *Gaſcony*, with the Title of King of *France*, and that *Cæſar*, tho' the Rewards were unequal, ſhould paſs into *France* in Perſon, and bear an equal Share in the Coſts and Danger. The Inequality of theſe Conditions ſhocked *Cæſar*, and much the more when he called to Mind that in the laſt Years, when *France* was in the greateſt Danger, he had always ſlackened the Proſecution of the War againſt it: Whence he perſuaded himſelf that no Streſs could be laid on ſuch an Alliance, and that, as he was greatly exhauſted of Money, and tired out with ſo many Fatigues and Dangers, he had Reaſon to hope for obtaining more of the King of *France* by means of Peace, than with Force of Arms, by acting in Con-

A. D. 1525.

Eſtrangement between *Cæſar* and the King of *England*.

A. D. 1525. Conjunction with the King of *England*. Induced therefore by a Deſire of having Children, and furniſhing himſelf with Money, he had an Inclination to eſpouſe the Siſter of *John* King of *Portugal*, of an Age fit for Matrimony, with whom he expected to receive in Dowry a very large Sum of Money; and conſiderable Contributions, in caſe the Match ſhould take Effect were offered by his own People, who were deſirous to have a Queen of the ſame Language and Nation, and who was likely to be ſoon a Mother.

From theſe Cauſes the Negotiations between the two Princes meeting every Day with new Difficulties, to which muſt be added the Inclination which the Cardinal of *York* continually bore to the King of *France*, and the Complaints which he openly made of *Cæſar*, as well for the Intereſt of his King, as becauſe he thought him beginning to fall into Contempt with *Cæſar*. For that Prince, before the Battle of *Pavia*, had never uſed to ſend him any Letters but ſuch as were written

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ten all with his own Hand, and ſubſcribed "Your Son and Couſin *Charles*;" but ſince that Victory he had ſent him Letters in which was nothing written with his own Hand except the Subſcription, which was no longer in Titles that betokened ſo much Reverence and Submiſſion, but barely his own proper Name "*Charles*." On theſe Accounts the King of *England* received the Perſon ſent by Madam the Regenteſs with very kind Words, and Marks of Reſpect; and, encouraging her to hope well of future Events, not long after he totally abandoned *Cæſar*'s Intereſt, and entered into an Alliance with Madam, who contracted in the Name of her Son, in which he cauſed to be inſerted an expreſs Condition, that it ſhould not be lawful to yield, even tho' it were for the Deliverance of the King, any Thing that was at that Time belonging to the Kingdom of *France*. *A. D.* 1525.

Confederacy between *France* and *England*.

THESE were the firſt Dawnings of Hope on the diſtreſſed Country of *France*, when ſhe began to take Breath after her ſevere

A. D. 1525.

vere Trials and Afflictions; and this Hope was afterwards continually increaſed by the Conduct of the *Cæſarean* Generals in *Italy*. Theſe Commanders, grown moſt inſolent by ſo great a Victory, and flattering themſelves that all Men muſt ſubmit, and all Difficulties give Way to their Will and Pleaſure, loſt the Opportunity of an Agreement with the *Venetians*, violated their Engagements to the Pontiff, and filled him, and the Duke of *Milan*, and all *Italy* with Jealouſies, ſcattering Seeds of new Diſturbances, which at laſt brought *Cæſar* under a Neceſſity of taking a precipitous Reſolution, to the very great endangering of his State in *Italy*, had it not been over-ruled by his old good Fortune, and the moſt malignant Fate of the Pontiff; Points certainly moſt worthy of particular Notice, becauſe from ſuch memorable Events are underſtood the Counſels and Foundations preparatory to them, which are often ſecret, and many times divulged in a Way and Manner very far diſtant from the Truth.

Inſolence of the Imperialiſts.

THE

A. D. 1525.

THE Pontiff then had hardly capitulated with the Viceroy, when he received large Offers from *France*, to incite him to a War; and tho' there were not wanting Encouragements from many to the ſame Purpoſe, and the Diſtruſt which he had before conceived of the Imperialiſts was not diminiſhed, yet he reſolved to proceed in all Affairs after ſuch a Manner as to give no Cauſe for entertaining any Suſpicion of his Actions. Wherefore as ſoon as he underſtood that the Viceroy had accepted and publiſhed the Convention that was made in *Rome*, he cauſed it to be alſo publiſhed in *St. John Lateran*, without waiting the Arrival of the promiſed Ratification of *Cæſar*, for the more effectual Demonſtration of his Mind, honouring the Publication, which was made the firſt of *May*, with his Preſence, and the Solemnity uſed at his Coronation. He ſollicited the *Florentines* to pay the Money they had promiſed, and employed all his Intereſt to bring the *Venetians* into an Agreement with the Im-

The Pope aggrieved by them.

A. D. 1525.

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kening to the Duke of *Ferrara*, and giving him Hopes that he would not compel him to evacuate *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and to prevail with *Cæsar* to take his State under his Protection, tho' he had every Day promiſed the Pontiff that as ſoon as the *Florentines* had finiſhed their Payments he would put him in Poſſeſſion of thoſe Towns. The Pontiff, to ſollicit the Accompliſhment, and to obtain that the Troops ſhould evacuate the State of the Church, ſent to him Cardinal *Salviati*, his Legate in *Lombardy*, and deputed Legate to *Cæsar*. The Viceroy aſſured the Cardinal that he would make the Duke reſtore *Reggio* by Force of Arms, if he refuſed to do it voluntarily; but the Effects did by no means correſpond with his Words, which, being a Point not excuſable by a Want of Money, for there would be a larger Sum coming to him on account of the Reſtitution of thoſe Towns, gave Room for probable Conjectures that it proceeded either from a Deſire to humble the Pope, or to gain over the Duke of

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A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. *Ferrara*, or from a Deſign, which they conſtantly had in View, to oppreſs the Liberties of *Italy*.

THESE Things gave Suſpicion, and almoſt incredible Vexation of Mind to the Pontiff, which were much exaſperated by his imagining that theſe Proceedings were conformable to the Will of *Cæſar*. That Prince, having ſent the Pontiff the Letters of Ratification of the Confederacy made in his Name by the Viceroy, delayed to ratify the Three Articles ſtipulated ſeparately from the Capitulation; alledging that, as to the Reſtitution of the Towns held by the Duke of *Ferrara*, it was not in his Power to prejudice the Rights of the Empire, nor uſe Force with that Duke, who declared that he held them in Fee from the Empire. He propoſed therefore that this Difference ſhould be decided by a Trial at Law, or by an amicable Compoſition; and it was underſtood that he would have been well pleaſed that the Towns ſhould remain to the Duke under his Inveſtiture, for which

Cæſar rejects the ſeparate Articles of the Treaty with the Pope.

which he ſhould pay him One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, paying alſo to the Pontiff the like Sum for the Inveſtiture of *Ferrara*, and for the Penalty charged on the Contract which he had made with *Adrian*. He alledged that it was impertinent to make an Agreement with his Miniſters about ſupplying the Dutchy of *Milan* with Salt, becauſe the head Profits of that Dutchy, by the Inveſtiture, which is granted, tho' not yet conſigned, belonged to *Franceſco Sforza*. And therefore the Viceroy had not bound himſelf ſimply in the Article to bring *Sforza* under an Obligation to take the Salt, but to procure his Conſent; which Promiſe, including in it the Act of a Third Perſon, was notoriouſly, as to any Effect of obliging either himſelf or others, null and invalid. However, out of a Deſire to gratify the Pontiff, he would have brought it about that the Duke ſhould give his Conſent, had not the Affair no longer concerned his own Intereſt, but that of another, becauſe the Duke of *Milan*, in Recompenſe for the Aſſiſtance he had received from the A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. Archduke, had agreed to take the Salt of him; and that he would yet interpoſe his Endeavours that his Brother, on receiving in Compenſation a handſome Sum of Money, ſhould give his Conſent, not for Perpetuity, as was expreſſed in the Article, but during the Life of the Pontiff. Nor did he admit of the Article relating to Benefices, unleſs to what was expreſſed in the Inveſtiture were added the Clauſe, "what had been practiſed by the Kings his Predeceſſors."

On account of theſe Difficulties the Pope refuſed to accept the Letters of Ratification, and to ſend his own to *Cæſar*, demanding that, ſince *Cæſar* had not ratified within the Term of Four Months, according to the Promiſe of the Viceroy, the *Florentines* ſhould be reimburſed the One Hundred Thouſand Ducats. To this Demand he received an Anſwer, rather captious and cavilling than reaſonable and ſolid: That the Condition of the Reſtitution of the One Hundred Thouſand Ducats was not inſerted

ſerted in the Inſtrument, but promiſed, in a ſeparate Article, by the Agents of the Viceroy, with an Oath, nor had any Reference to the Ratification of the Confederacy, which *Cæſar* had ratified within the Term of Four Months, and ſent the Letters of Ratification in due Form. The Pontiff alſo came to have Notice that the Talk of all the Court of *Cæſar* fully diſcovered their evil Diſpoſition towards the Affairs of *Italy*, and he knew alſo that the Generals of his Army went about to perſuade him that, in order to ſecure *Italy* wholly to himſelf, it was the beſt Way to cauſe *Modena* to be reſtored to the Duke of *Ferrara*, to reinſtate the *Bentivogli* in *Bologna*, and to take upon himſelf the Dominion of *Florence*, *Siena*, and *Lucca*, as Towns appertaining to the Empire Finding himſelf therefore full of Anxiety and Suſpicion, and at a Loſs where to apply for Support, and being appriſed that the *French* offered to give up *Italy* as a Prey to *Cæſar*, he was of neceſſity obliged to have recourſe to Temporiſing and Diſſimulation.

A. D. 1525.

The Pope apprehenſive of *Cæſar*'s Power.

A. D. 1525.

THE Pontiff was at this Time employed in negotiating an Accommodation between the *Venetians* and the Viceroy, who, beſides obliging themſelves anew to defend the Dutchy of *Milan* for the future, demanded of them a very large Sum of Money by way of Satisfaction for Non-obſervance of the paſt Confederacy. Many were the Reaſons which inclined the *Venetians* to yield to Neceſſity, many which, on the contrary, moved them to ſtand in Suſpenſe; ſo that their Counſels were variable, and full of Irreſolution. At laſt however, after many Diſputes, aſtoniſhed, like the reſt, at ſo great a Victory of *Cæſar*, and ſeeing themſelves ſtanding alone and deſtitute on all Sides, they commiſſioned their Ambaſſador *Pietro da Peſaro*, who reſided with the Viceroy, to confirm the League anew, in the ſame Manner as it had been done before, but paying *Cæſar*, in Satisfaction for what was paſt, Eighty Thouſand Ducats. But the Viceroy farther inſiſting, and abſolutely determining not to renew the Con-

Confederacy unleſs they paid One Hundred Thouſand, it happened, as it often falls out in Affairs which are debated with an ill Will, that ſo much Time was ſpent in diſputing about this ſmall Sum, that the *Venetians* received Notice that the King of *England* was no longer ſo much incenſed againſt the *French* as had been hitherto apprehended; and beſides, ſuch a Multitude of *German* Foot in the Imperial Army, after Payment of their Arrears, were diſmiſſed, that the *Venetian* Senate, ſecure of not being moleſted for the preſent, reſolved to ſtand a little longer in Suſpenſe, and to reſerve to themſelves, as much as poſſible, the Liberty of taking ſuch Reſolutions as, from the univerſal Progreſs of Affairs, they ſhould conclude to be moſt for their Advantage. *A. D.* 1525.

Treaty between the Viceroy and *Venetians* miſcarries

THESE Cauſes, beſides a conſtant Deſire to put the Thing in Execution, ſtimulated the Viceroy and the other Generals to remove the Perſon of the *French* King into a ſecure Place, judg-

A. D. 1525. ing that, from the bad Diſpoſition of all around them, they could not keep him without Danger in the Dutchy of *Milan*. They reſolved therefore to conduct him to *Genoa*, and from thence by Sea to *Naples*, in order to confine him in *Caſtel Nuovo*, where an Apartment was already prepared for him. The King was extreamly concerned at this Reſolution, for it had been his ardent Deſire from the Beginning to be conducted to *Spain*, flattering himſelf, I know not whether from imagining the natural Diſpoſition of others the ſame with his own, or becauſe Men are apt to deceive themſelves with vain Hopes of what they eagerly deſire, that, if he were once admitted to *Cæſar*'s Preſence, he could, either truſting to his Goodneſs, or by the Conditions he intended to propoſe to him, eaſily prevail upon him to ſet him at Liberty. The Viceroy ardently deſired the ſame for the Exaltation of his own Glory, but being reſtrained from executing his Deſign by Fear of the *French* Fleet, *Montmorency*, by common Conſent, was diſpatched to Madam the

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Regenteſs, and obtaining of her Six Light Gallies of thoſe that were in the Port of *Marſeilles*, on a Promiſe that, as ſoon as the King was arrived in *Spain*, they ſhould be reſtored, he returned with them to *Porto Fino*, whither the Perſon of the King was already conducted. Theſe Gallies, joined with Sixteen others of *Cæſar*'s, that had at firſt been deſigned to convey him to *Naples*, and all manned with *Spaniſh* Foot, on the Seventh Day of *June* ſet Sail, ſteering their Courſe for *Spain* (while not only the *Italian* Princes, but all the Imperial Generals, and *Bourbon*, aſſured themſelves that the King was on his Voyage to *Naples*) and, after a proſperous Navigation, arrived in Eight Days at *Roſes*, a Port of *Catalonia*, to the inexpreſſible Joy of *Cæſar*, who knew nothing till that Day of this Reſolution. On the firſt Notice of the King's Arrival he gave Orders that, in all Places through which he paſſed, he ſhould be received with the greateſt Honours; but took Care however, till it ſhould be otherwiſe determined, that he ſhould be

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King of *France* conducted to *Spain*.

A. D. 1525. be kept under ſafe Cuſtody, in the Caſtle of *Sciativa* near *Valentia*, a Caſtle appropriated by the Kings of *Aragon*, in antient Times, to the Impriſonment of great Men, and in which the Duke of *Calabria* had laſt of all for many Years been confined. But this Reſolution appearing too rigorous to the Viceroy, and very different from the Promiſes he had made the King in *Italy*, he obtained of *Cæſar*, by his Letters, that, till a new Reſolution, he ſhould have a Reſidence in a Country Seat near *Valentia*, where he had the Convenience of Hunting and other Diverſions. After the Viceroy had ſettled him in this Place under a ſufficient Guard, leaving with him General *Alarcone*, in whoſe Cuſtody he had continually remained, he waited, together with *Montmorency*, on *Cæſar*, to report to him the State of *Italy*, and of Affairs hitherto debated with the King, adviſing him, for many Reaſons, to think ſeriouſly of coming to ſome Agreement with him, ſince he could expect no ſincere Friendſhip, nor faithful Alliance from the *Italians*.

Cæſar

Cæſar therefore, after he had heard the Viceroy and *Montmorency*, reſolved that the King of *France* ſhould be conducted to *Caſtile*, and confined in the Caſtle of *Madrid*, a Place at a great Diſtance from the Sea, and from the Borders of *France*, where, tho' he was treated with all the Ceremonies and Reverence due to ſo great a Prince, he was under careful and ſtrict Cuſtody, with Leave to ride out ſeveral Times in a Day on a Mule. Nor did *Cæſar* conſent to admit him into his Preſence till an Agreement ſhould either be ſettled, or brought to ſuch a Forwardneſs as ſhould give certain Hopes of ſettling it. And that this Agreement ſhould be negotiated by an honourable Perſon, and in Effect the ſame as the King, *Montmorency* was diſpatched with Speed to *France*, to procure the Coming of the Dutcheſs of *Alençon*, the King's Siſter, a Widow, with full Power to conclude an Accommodation; and, to prevent all Obſtacles from new Difficulties, a Truce was ſoon after made between *Cæſar* and the Government of *France* till the End of A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. of *December* next enſuing. *Cæſar* alſo ordered that Part of the Gallies which came with the Viceroy ſhould return to *Italy*, for conveying the Duke of *Bourbon* to *Spain*, without whoſe Preſence he declared he would make no Agreement; but the Gallies for Want of Money were but ſlowly equipped.

CÆSAR ſeeming much diſpoſed to an univerſal Peace among Chriſtians, and at the ſame time to put in Order the Affairs of *Italy*, ſollicited with many Inſtances the Pontiff to haſten the Departure of Cardinal *Salviati*, or of other proper Perſons, with full Powers. And as he had determined to join in Matrimony with the Infanta of *Portugal*, his Couſin-German, and conſequently related to him in the ſecond Degree, he diſpatched *Lopes Urtado* to the Pontiff, to demand a Diſpenſation, having firſt excuſed himſelf to the King of *England*, by declaring that he knew not how to reſiſt the Will of his People. By the ſame *Lopes*, who ſet out at the End of *July*, he ſent the Privi-

Cæſar ſues for a Diſpenſation to marry his Couſin-German.

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leges of the Inveſtiture of the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Franceſco Sforza*, on Condition of his paying down One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, and obliging himſelf to pay Five Hundred Thouſand more at different Times, and to take Salt from the Archduke his Brother. He alſo carried Orders for all the Troops in the Marquiſate of *Saluzzo*, except the *Spaniſh* Foot, to be diſbanded, that Six Hundred Men at Arms ſhould return to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and the reſt remain in the Dutchy of *Milan*, and that the Marquis of *Peſcara* ſhould be Captain General of the Army. To theſe Orders *Cæſar* added that a Sum of Money which he had remitted to *Genoa* for fitting out Four Caraques, with an Intention of paſſing immediately into *Italy* in Perſon, ſhould be appropriated to the Uſe of the Army, for he had determined not to leave *Spain* at preſent, and that the Protonotary *Caracciolo* ſhould repair from *Milan* to *Venice*, with a Commiſſion to induce that Senate to a new Confederacy, or at leaſt that every one might

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His Orders.

A. D. 1525. might be ſatisfied that all his Actions tended to the univerſal Peace of Chriſtians.

Pope and *Venetians* uneaſy at the Removal of the King of *France*.

But the Removal of the King of *France* into *Spain* had given very great Uneaſineſs to the Pope and the *Venetians*, becauſe, as the Army of *Cæſar* was pretty much diminiſhed, it appeared to them that, in whatever Part of *Italy* the King's Perſon was confined, the Neceſſity of keeping him well guarded would ſufficiently embaraſs the *Cæſareans*; whence either ſome Opportunity might eaſily preſent itſelf for ſetting him at Liberty, or at leaſt the Difficulty of conducting him to *Spain*, or the little Security of holding him in *Italy*, would conſtrain *Cæſar* to model the public Affairs by the Patterns of Honour and Juſtice. But when they ſaw that he was gone for *Spain*, and that he himſelf, deceived with vain Hopes by his Enemies, had furniſhed hem with the Means for conveying him into a ſecure Priſon, they perceived that whatever was the Subject of Treaties or Debates

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was absolutely in the Power of *Cæsar*, and that nothing could be founded on the Negotiations and Offers of the *French*. Hence *Cæsar*'s Reputation every Day increasing, the Laws of all Proceedings were begun to be expected from that Court. *A. D.* 1525.

The same creates Misunderstandings betwenn *Cæsar*'s Generals.

Nor am I certain whether the Duke of *Bourbon*, and the Marquis of *Pescara* were not, tho' for different Reasons, as much dissatisfied that the Viceroy had, without their Knowledge, conducted the most Christian King to *Spain*: *Bourbon*, because, finding himself driven out of *France* on account of the Friendship which he had contracted with the Emperor, it more concerned him than any other to be present at all the Negotiations for an Agreement; and therefore he was disposed to pass also himself into *Spain*, but being necessitated to wait the Return of the Gallies which were gone with the Viceroy, he delayed his Departure longer than he could have wished: And the Marquis was not

A. D. 1525. not only provoked at his being ſlighted by the Viceroy, but alſo diſſatisfied with *Cæſar* for not acknowledging, as he fancied, in a due Proportion, his Merits, and the noble Exploits performed by him in the late Wars, and eſpecially in the Battle of *Pavia*, from which Victory he had acquired more Glory than all the reſt of the Generals; and yet it ſeemed to him that *Cæſar* was laviſh enough of his Acknowledgments to the Viceroy, beſtowing on him all his Praiſes, and Marks of Eſteem. This the Marquis no longer able to bear, wrote Letters to *Cæſar* full of moſt bitter Invectives againſt the Viceroy, complaining that he had been undeſervedly ſlighted by him to ſuch a Degree as not to be thought worthy to be at leaſt privy to ſuch a Reſolution; and that if Matters had been ordered, and Meaſures taken in purſuance of the Viceroy's Counſels and Determination, not only the King of *France* would not have been taken, but as ſoon as *Milan* was loſt the *Cæſarean* Army would have abandoned the Defence of *Lombardy*,

Marquis of *Peſcara* diſſatisfied on what Grounds.

Lombardy, and retired to *Naples*: That he was gone to triumph for a Victory in which it was notorious to the whole Army that he had no Share; and that being in the Heat of the Battle he loſt all Courage and Counſel, and was heard by many to cry out ſeveral Times, "We are undone;" which, if he ſhould deny it, he offered himſelf ready to prove to his Face, according to the military Laws, with Arms in Hand. The Diſcontent of the Marquis was increaſed, becauſe when, immediately after the Victory, he had ſent to take Poſſeſſion of *Carpi*, with an Intention to obtain that Town of *Cæſar* for himſelf, his Deſire was fruſtrated, becauſe *Cæſar*, having granted it to *Proſpero Colonna* two Years before, declared that, tho' he had never received the Inveſtiture, he was reſolved, for the Benefit of *Veſpaſiano* his Son, to preſerve to the Memory of *Proſpero* dead that Reward which he had given to the Merit and Services of him living. This Reaſon, tho' it was juſt and grateful, and the Marquis ought to have been pleaſed with Examples of Grati- A. D. 1525.

A. D. 1525. tude, if on no other account, yet becauſe they increaſed the Hopes that his great Services would in time come to be rewarded, had however no Effect upon him. For, as he had a high Opinion of himſelf, he thought it fit that this Deſire in him, ſprung from a covetous Ambition, and an implacable Hatred borne to the Name of *Proſpero*, ſhould be preferred to all other, tho' never ſo juſt, Regards. Wherefore he made moſt heavy Complaints againſt *Cæſar* and the whole Council, and lamented his Caſe ſo publicly in *Italy*, and with ſuch Deteſtations of *Cæſar*'s Ingratitude, as gave Encouragement to others to attempt the Execution of new Projects. Hence was *Cæſar*, even if he had entertained no Thoughts of making any farther Seizures in *Italy*, furniſhed with a juſt Cauſe, and in a manner neceſſitated to form new Schemes; and even, ſuppoſing that he had ambitious Ends, he had Opportunities of covering them with the moſt plauſible Pretences, and moſt ſpecious Colourings that his Heart could have wiſhed; and becauſe this was the Origin

Origin of very great Movements, it is neceſſary that it ſhould be very particularly explained. *A. D.* 1525.

THE War which, in the Time of *Leo* X. was commenced by him and *Cæſar* for driving the King of *France* out of *Italy*, was undertaken under Pretence of reſtoring *Franceſco Sforza* to the Dutchy of *Milan*; and tho' in the Execution of it, after the Victory was obtained, he was put in Poſſeſſion of that State, and of the Caſtle of *Milan*, and of the other Fortreſſes as ſoon as they were recovered, yet, from the Splendor and flouriſhing State of that Dutchy, and the Conveniency of its Situation, many were ſtill apprehenſive, as they had been from the Beginning, that *Cæſar* aſpired to the Sovereignty, fancying to themſelves that the powerful Oppoſition which he met with from the King of *France* was the Cauſe that as yet he concealed his ambitious Deſire, becauſe he would otherwiſe have put the People in a Ferment, who were ardently deſirous of *Franceſco Sforza*, Cauſes of new Commotions in *Italy*.

A. D. 1525. and have ſtirred up againſt him all *Italy*, which would by no means be ſatisfied at ſuch an Increaſe of his Grandeur. *Franceſco Sforza* therefore held that Dutchy, but under very great Subjection, and Burdens almoſt intolerable. For his whole Reſort for defending himſelf againſt the *Freneh* conſiſting in *Cæſar* and his Army, he was neceſſitated not only to reſpect him as his Prince, but alſo to ſtoop to the Will of his Generals, and was forced to maintain thoſe Troops which were not paid by *Cæſar*, ſometimes by giving them Money, which he drew from his Subjects with very great Strainings and Difficulties, ſometimes by ſuffering them to live at Diſcretion, now in one Quarter, then in another of his State, except in the City of *Milan*. Theſe Proceedings, tho' very grievous in themſelves, were yet rendered intolerable by the Temper of the *Spaniards*, which is avaricious, fraudulent, and, when they have Room for diſplaying their natural Diſpoſition, moſt inſolent. The Dangers however which hung over the People

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from the *French*, to whom they were bitter Enemies, and the Hopes that their Troubles would ſome Time or other have an End, made them bear even beyond their Strength, and more than their Means would admit. But after the Victory of *Pavia* the People could no longer endure to ſee the ſame Neceſſities ceaſed, ſince the King was taken Priſoner, and yet to feel themſelves labouring under the ſame Calamities, and therefore demanded that all or the greater Part of the Army ſhould be removed out of that Dutchy. The Duke, who had hitherto enjoyed nothing of the Sovereignty but the bare Name, was eagerly deſirous of the Removal, and the more becauſe he apprehended that *Cæſar*, now ſecure of the King of *France*, would either ſeize on his State for himſelf, or grant it to Perſons who ſhould wholly depend on him. This Suſpicion, which aroſe from the very Nature of Things, was not a little increaſed by the inſolent Speeches thrown out by the Viceroy before he conducted the King of *France* into *Spain*, and alſo by the

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other Generals, and by the Marks of Diſreſpect which they ſhewed to the Duke, as well as by their openly wiſhing that *Cæſar* would oppreſs him, but much more when *Cæſar* having, after many Delays, put into the Hands of the Viceroy the Articles of the Inveſtiture, that Miniſter, in offering it to the Duke, had demanded that, for the Reimburſement of the Charges which *Cæſar* had been at for the Acquiſition and Defence of that State, he ſhould pay at certain Times One Million and Two Hundred Thouſand Ducats: So exorbitant a Charge, that the Duke was obliged to have recourſe to *Cæſar* for reducing it to a tolerable Sum*! But theſe Difficulties raiſed a Doubt that thoſe extravagant Demands were interpoſed in order to delay the Inveſtiture. There have ſince been alledged, by thoſe who have endeavoured to excuſe *Franceſco Sforza* from Neceſſity, many other Cauſes

Cæſar ſuſpected of aſpiring to the Dutchy of *Milan*.

Cauſes of Suſpicion.

* The Viceroy in making this Demand affirmed that it was not by way of Sale, for the Emperor had ſpent a greater Sum in acquiring that State. *Capella*.

Cauſes that juſtly raiſed his Suſpicion, and particularly his having received Notice that the Generals had appointed to detain him, for which Reaſon, when he was called by the Viceroy to a certain Meeting, he had refuſed to go, feigning himſelf ſick; and obſerved the ſame Caution as to all other Places where they had it in their Power to offer him Violence. This Suſpicion, whether true or vain, was the Cauſe that when he ſaw there were but few Troops left in the Dutchy of *Milan*, Part of the *Spaniards*, being gone, firſt with the Viceroy, and afterwards with *Bourbon* into *Spain*, and many alſo who had enriched themſelves by ſuch vaſt Plunder, having retired one after another into various Places, and conſidered alſo the high Indignation which appeared in the Marquis of *Peſcara*, applying his Thoughts on ſecuring himſelf from this Danger, he entered into Hopes that, with the Conſent of the Marquis, he might get rid of the Army. The Author of this Counſel was *Girolamo Morone*, his Great Chancellor, and of the higheſt Autho-

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rity with him, and for his Wit, Eloquence, Dexterity, Invention, and Experience, and for his often reſiſting, with the greateſt Conſtancy, the Shocks of adverſe Fortune, was a noted Man in our Times, and would have been more ſo, if thoſe Talents had been accompanied with a greater Sincerity of Mind, a Love of Honeſty and Juſtice, and with ſuch a Maturity of Judgment, as that his Counſels had not been often rather precipitous or imprudent, than honourable and circumſpect.

Character of *Morone*.

THIS Miniſter, ſounding the Mind of the Marquis in their private Conference, puſhed the Matter ſo far that they had under Debate the cutting thoſe Troops in Pieces, and making the Marquis King of *Naples*, provided they could procure the Concurrence of the Pope and *Venetians*. The Pontiff, full of Suſpicion and Anxiety, being conſulted by the Direction of *Morone*, did not ſeem at all averſe to the Project, but, on the other hand, not to diſcover the Plot, but to prepare himſelf a Refuge in caſe it

it did not ſucceed, under a Show of Affection, admoniſhed *Cæſar* to keep his Generals well contented. The *Venetians* embraced the Scheme with great Eagerneſs, and every one perſuaded themſelves they ſhould find no leſs Readineſs in the Mother of the King of *France*, who was already ſenſible that ſince her Son was arrived in *Spain* his Deliverance would not proceed with that Facility as had been imagined. It is not doubted but that ſuch a Project would have ſucceeded, if the Marquis of *Peſcara* had ſincerely proceeded againſt *Cæſar*; but whether he hearkened to thoſe Counſels at firſt, or not, there are various Opinions even among the *Spaniards*, and in the Court of *Cæſar* itſelf. The Generality, making an Eſtimate of the Times, and of the Movements of Affairs, have believed that, in the Beginning, he really concurred with the reſt, but that afterwards, on conſidering the Multitude of Difficulties that might ariſe in Proceſs of Time, and deterred eſpecially by the continu-

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4. D. 1525. al Negotiations of the *French* with *Cæſar*, and at laſt by the Reſolution taken to ſend the Dutcheſs of *Alençon* to *Cæſar*, he took other Meaſures. Some go farther, and affirm that he ſo long delayed to give Notice to *Cæſar* of the Innovations that were contriving in *Italy*, till Advice of the Plot coming from *Antonio da Leva*, and *Marino* Abbot of *Nagera*, Commiſſary in the *Cæſarean* Army, all the Court ſtood amazed at the Silence of the Marquis. But, however the Caſe then ſtood, it is certain that not long after he ſent *Giovanni Battiſta Caſtaldo* to *Cæſar*, and laid open to him the whole Plot, and by his Conſent continued the ſame Practices; and, what is more, that he might dive into the Thoughts of every one, and deprive them of all Shifts and Power of ever denying that they had given their Conſent to the Plot, he undertook of himſelf to ſpeak of it to the Duke of *Milan*, and perſuaded *Morone* to uſe his Intereſt with the Pontiff, who had very lately conferred upon him the perpetual Government of the City of *Benevento*,

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nevento, and with whom the Marquis himſelf correſponded with the greateſt Profeſſions of Friendſhip and Service, ſo far that his Holineſs deputed *Domenico Sauli*, a *Genoeſe*, with a Brief of Credentials, to confer with him on the ſame Subject.

League forming againſt *Cæſar*.

The Articles.

THE Articles under Debate were in Subſtance, That between the Pope, the Government of *France*, and other States of *Italy* ſhould be contracted a League, of which the Marquis of *Peſcara* was to be conſtituted Captain General; and that the ſaid Marquis, after diſtributing the *Spaniſh* Infantry into Quarters in different Places in the Dutchy of *Milan*, ſhould put himſelf at the Head of thoſe who were willing to follow him, and that the reſt with *Antonio da Leva*, who was next to him in Command, ſhould be ſtripped and put to the Sword: And that the Enterpriſe on the Kingdom of *Naples* ſhould be undertaken by the joint Forces of all the Confederates in favour of the Marquis, on whom the Pope was to confer the Inveſtiture.

To

A. D. 1525. To all this the Marquis ſeemed to interpoſe no other Difficulty than that he was willing, before he ventured any farther, to be well ſatisfied that he could undertake ſuch an Enterpriſe without ſtaining his Honour and Loyalty, in caſe it ſhould be commanded him by the Pope. On this Point it came to be conſidered, to whom the Marquis, who was a Native, and a Baron of the Kingdom of *Naples*, owed moſt Obedience, whether to *Cæſar*, who, by the Inveſtiture of the Church, had the Profits of the Dominion of that Kingdom, or to the Pontiff, who, by virtue of being ſupreme Lord, had the direct Dominion. On this Article, both at *Milan*, by Order of *Franceſco Sforza*, and at *Rome*, by Appointment of the Pope, the ableſt Civilians were conſulted very privately, with a Suppreſſion of the true Names.

The Hopes conceived againſt *Cæſar* were increaſed by the Offers of the Princeſs Regent, who imagining that *Cæſar*'s Neceſſities, or at leaſt his Fears would

would promote the Treaty that was in Agitation for the Delivery of her Son, ſollicited the taking up Arms, promiſing to ſend into *Lombardy* Five Hundred Lances, and to contribute a great Sum of Money towards the Expences. Nor was *Morone* wanting to confirm the Minds of the reſt in this Reſolution; for, beſides demonſtrating the Facility, even without the Aſſiſtance of the Marquis of *Peſcara*, of deſtroying that Army, which was conſiderably diminiſhed in Number, he promiſed, in the Name of the Duke, that if the Marquis did not ſtand firm to the Meaſures concerted, as ſoon as the other Deſigns were in Readineſs, he ſhould be ſecured in the Caſtle together with the other Commanders who daily reſorted thither to conſult. Though theſe Opportunities appeared very promiſing, they would not have been thought by the Pontiff ſufficient to induce him to take up Arms without the Marquis of *Peſcara*, if, at the ſame time, he had not heard that Proviſions were ordered to *Genoa* for fitting out Four Caraques, and

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A. D. 1525. and had alſo received Information from *Spain* of *Cæſar*'s Inclination to paſs into *Italy*. Theſe Advices creating him vaſt Uneaſineſs, both from the Condition of the preſent Times, and from the inveterate Diſpoſition of the *Roman* Pontiffs, to whom nothing uſed to be more dreadful than the Coming of *Roman* Emperors armed into *Italy*, out of a Deſire to obviate that Danger, he diſpatched, with Conſent of the *Venetians*, privately to *France*, one *Sigiſmondo*, Secretary to *Alberto da Carpi*, a Perſon of Dexterity, and a great Confident of the Pope, in order to conclude the Treaty negotiated with Madam the Regenteſs. *Sigiſmondo*, riding Poſt, was murdered in the Night by ſome Highwaymen, near the *Lago d' Iſeo*, in the Territory of *Breſcia*. This Accident not coming to Light for many Days, the Pontiff much doubted that the Man had been way-laid, and taken privately into ſome Place by Orders of the Imperial Generals, and perhaps of the Marquis himſelf, whoſe Proceedings, on account of

Pope's Envoy to *France* murdered

of the Delays which he interpoſed, began to be much ſuſpected. A D. 1525.

In this State of Affairs arrived Diſpatches given by *Cæſar* to *Lopes Urtado*, who lying ſick in *Savoy*, ſent them by a proper Meſſenger to *Milan*, with Letters Patent, veſting the Office of Captain General in the Perſon of the Marquis of *Peſcara*, who, to continue in the ſame Diſſimulation with the others, pretended that he was not very well pleaſed with his Advancement, tho' he immediately accepted of the Patent. He carried alſo a Commiſſion to the Protonotary *Caracciolo* to repair to *Venice* in the Name of *Cæſar*, for inducing that Senate to a new Confederacy, or at leaſt for ſatisfying all Perſons of *Cæſar*'s Deſire to live in Peace with all Chriſtian Powers. *Franceſco Sforza*, who began already to labour under a dangerous Diſorder, accepted of the Inveſtiture of the Dutchy, and paid towards the Coſt Fifty Thouſand Ducats, but did not on that account break off the Negotiation begun with the Marquis.

Marquis of *Peſcara* made Captain General.

VARIOUS

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VARIOUS were the Opinions whether theſe Diſpatches or Inſtructions of *Cæſar* were ſincere or artificial; for many believed that it was not his real Intention to give Peace to *Italy*: Others doubted that, under Fear of new Movements, he was willing to keep Men under Suſpenſe with various Hopes, and thought of gaining Time by granting the Inveſtiture, and giving in Appearance a Commiſſion for calling off the Army, which would be highly acceptable to all *Italy*, but that he had given private Orders to his Generals not to remove the Troops. Nor were there wanting afterwards ſome who perſuaded themſelves that *Cæſar* was before well informed by the Marquis of *Peſcara* of the Plot carried on with *Morone*, and had therefore given ſuch Orders, not that they ſhould be obeyed, but ſhould ſerve for his Juſtification, and by theſe Hopes to lull the Minds of the People in Security till a proper Time appeared for putting his Deſigns in Execution. It being very difficult, in

Dubious Step of *Cæſar*.

in ſo doubtful a Caſe, to come to the Knowledge of the Truth, eſpecially ſince it is not known whether at the Time when *Giovanni Battiſta Caſtaldo*, ſent by the Marquis to make a Diſcovery of the Plot, arrived at the Court, *Lopes Urtado* had been as yet diſpatched; but, conſidering the Steps taken afterwards by *Cæſar* in many Affairs, it is without Doubt leſs fabulous to adopt for Truth the better and more favourable Interpretation. *A. D.* 1525.

Marquis of *Peſcara* continues his Diſſimulation.

THE Marquis in the mean time continued to entertain *Morone* and the reſt with the ſame Hopes, and yet to delay the Execution under various Pretences, for which he had an Opportunity given him by the Sickneſs of the Duke of *Milan*, which increaſed to ſuch a Degree that every one expected his Death. For all the Generals pretending that in ſuch a Caſe that State would revert to *Cæſar*, the ſupreme Lord of the Fief, the Marquis would not only be prevented from removing the Army, but be under a Neceſſity of ſending for Two

A. D. 1525. Thouſand more *German* Foot, and to give Orders for keeping in Readineſs a greater Number. Such a powerful Body of Forces quartered in the Dutchy of *Milan*, he alledged, would deprive him of the Means of diſbanding or injuring them, but gave them Hopes that he would execute the Meaſures concerted between them as ſoon as ever it lay in his Power. In the mean time, while an Opportunity was expected, to declare to the World, by his Proceedings, the profound Reverence he had for the Pontiff, he freed the State of the Church from the Garriſons of which his Holineſs had made ſuch heavy Complaints.

King of *France* ſick and recovers.

But at the ſame time a new Accident that happened in *Spain* had like to have introduced a new Scene of Affairs: For the King of *France*, extremely mortified at *Cæſar*'s refuſing to afford him his Preſence when he requeſted it, took it ſo much to Heart that he fell into a Diſorder while he was in the Caſtle of *Madrid*, which reduced him to ſuch Extremity, that the Phyſicians

Phyſicians appointed to attend him ſignified to *Cæſar* that there were no Hopes of his Recovery if he himſelf did not come in Perſon to comfort him, and give him Hopes of his Liberty. While he was propoſing to go, his Great Chancellor diſſuaded him, telling him that his Honour required him not to go thither, unleſs with a Diſpoſition to releaſe him immediately, and without any Sort of Convention: Otherwiſe it would be not a royal but mercenary Humanity, and a Deſire to procure his Recovery not out of a Tenderneſs of his Health, but purely from a Regard to Self-intereſt, and a Fear of loſing by his Death the Opportunity of reaping the Fruits expected from the Victory: Advice certainly deſerving Remembrance, and worthy to be accepted by ſo great a Prince; but others counſelling him to the contrary, he ſet out Poſt to pay the King a Viſit. The Viſitation was but ſhort, becauſe the moſt Chriſtian King lay, in a manner, at the Point of Death, but full of kind Words, and certain Aſſurances of Releaſement immediately upon Recovery.

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A. D. 1525. very. And, whatever was the Cauſe, whether the Conſolation which he received, or that Youth was of itſelf ſuperior to the Nature of the Diſorder, he began after this Viſit to find ſuch Relief, that in a few Days he was out of Danger, tho' he was but ſlow in recovering his former Health.

But neither the Difficulties which appeared on the Part of *Cæſar*, nor the Hopes given by the *Italians*, had diverted the Journey of Madame *d' Alençon* to *Spain*, becauſe nothing was more difficult to the *French* than to break off the Negotiations for an Agreement with thoſe who had it in their Power to reſtore them their King; and nothing more eaſy to *Cæſar* than by feeding the *French* with Hopes to divert them from the Thoughts of taking up Arms, and by this Artfulneſs to keep the *Italians* in Suſpenſe, ſo that they ſhould not venture to take new Reſolutions: And thus ſometimes by ſlackening, ſometimes by ſtraining the Reins of his Conduct, he

Artful Conduct of *Cæſar*.

he held the Minds of all in Confuſion and Perplexity. A. D. 1525.

MADAME *d' Alençon* met with the Marks of a gracious Reception, and Hopes from *Cæſar*, but the Succeſs of her Affair proved hard and difficult. For in a Conference on the Fourth Day of *October*, when ſhe requeſted of him his Widow Siſter in Marriage for the King, *Cæſar* anſwered her Demand by ſaying that it was not in his Power without the Conſent of the Duke of *Bourbon*. The other Particulars were debated by Commiſſioners appointed on each Side, *Cæſar* obſtinately inſiſting on the Reſtitution of *Burgundy* as his proper Inheritance, and the *French* not conſenting unleſs he would either receive it in Dowry, or have it legally tried to which of the two Princes it belonged; in the other Conditions the Parties might have eaſily come to an Agreement. But there remaining ſo wide a Difference between them in the Affair of *Burgundy*, Madam *d' Alençon* at laſt returned into *France*, without obtaining

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taining any other End by her Journey than the Opportunity of ſeeing her Brother, who, at parting with her, deſpairing now more than ever of his Liberty, is ſaid to have ordered her to recommend, on his Part, to his Mother and thoſe of the Council, a ſtrict Regard to the Honour and Benefit of the Crown of *France*, without any Conſideration of his Perſon any more than if he were dead. The Negotiations, however, were not interrupted by her Departure, for there remained the Preſident of *Paris*, with the Biſhops of *Ambrun* and *Tarbe*, who had been treating till now, but with ſmall Hopes, *Cæſar* not hearkening to any Condition without the Reſtitution of *Burgundy*, nor the King conſenting to yield it up without the utmoſt Neceſſity.

Madam *d' Alenſon* returns to *France* without Succeſs.

At this Time arrived at Court Cardinal *Salviati*, the Pope's Legate: He was received by *Cæſar* with very great Honour, and began to treat of the Heads of his Commiſſion, which principally contained the Ratification of the Articles

Cardinal *Salviati* Pope's Legate to *Cæſar*.

Articles ſtipulated by the Viceroy, ſoliciting alſo the Grant of the Inveſtiture to the Duke of *Milan* for the common Security. But the Viceroy himſelf diſſuaded the Reſtitution of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and by his Advice, and encouraged by the Hopes he had given him, the Duke of *Ferrara*, deſirous of managing his own Cauſe at the Court of *Cæſar*, having obtained of the Pontiff a Promiſe that his State ſhould not be moleſted by him for ſix Months, took a Progreſs as far as the Borders of the Kingdom of *France*, with a Reſolution to paſs forwards; but the Regenteſs refuſing him a Paſs, he returned at laſt to *Ferrara*. A. D. 1525.

THERE came alſo on the Carpet the Cauſe, between the Pontiff and *Cæſar*, of obtaining a Diſpenſation for enabling *Cæſar* to join in Matrimony with the Siſter of the King of *Portugal*, whom he was determined to marry, tho' he had formerly promiſed the King of *England* with an Oath, that he would never take any other for his Wife than

A. D. 1525. that King's Daughter. The Pontiff proceeded but ſlowly in granting this Diſpenſation, being perſuaded by many that the Deſire of obtaining this Favour would render *Cæſar* more eaſy of Compliance in the Points under Debate; or at leaſt that it was an imprudent Step, if a War ſhould break out between them, to furniſh him with Means for accumulating ſuch a Maſs of Money as he would certainly accumulate by this Matrimony; for the King of *Portugal* offered him in Dowry Nine Hundred Thouſand Ducats, from which deducting that Part which by Agreement was to be allowed in Payment of Debts contracted by him to the King, it was ſuppoſed there would remain clear to him at leaſt Five Hundred Thouſand Ducats, beſides Four Hundred Thouſand Ducats, which, his own People conſented to give him for what they called *Service-Money*, which, taking its Riſe in antient Times from the Free Will of the People to ſuccour the Neceſſities of their Kings, was reduced to an ordinary and ſtated Subſidy; and they offered

ed beſides to give him Four Hundred Thouſand more in caſe he conſummated this Matrimony. On the other ſide the Pontiff knew not how to reſiſt the Importunities of the Duke of *Seſſa*, the *Cæſarean* Ambaſſador: For you might obſerve in him an almoſt conſtant Repugnance between the Diſpoſition of Things and the Execution of them, ſince being by Nature extreamly averſe from granting any Favour demanded of him, he knew not alſo how to raiſe Difficulties, or to refuſe with Conſtancy, but often ſuffered his Will to be overcome by the Importunities of the Petitioners; ſo that ſeeming for the moſt part to grant what was requeſted more out of Fear than Favour, he did not proceed in this Part of his Conduct with that Conſtancy, nor with that Majeſty which the Greatneſs of his Dignity, and the Importance of the Buſineſs under Negotiation required. Thus is happened with reſpect to the Diſpenſation that was demanded, where, amidſt the inward Struggles of his own Intereſt on one Side, and his Softneſs on the other, he

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Foible of Pope *Clement.*

A. D. 1525. he eaſed himſelf, as his Cuſtom was, on the Backs of others, of a Load which, I know not whether for want of Boldneſs, or Conſtancy of Reſolution, he was unable to ſupport himſelf. He expedited by a Brief the Diſpenſation in the Form demanded by *Cæſar*, and ſent it to Cardinal *Salviati*, with an Order that, if his Affairs with *Cæſar* took a happy Turn, as he was made to believe they would, the Cardinal, as ſoon as he arrived at Court, ſhould give the Brief to *Cæſar*; otherwiſe ſhould keep it in his Cuſtody: A Commiſſion in which the Servant, as ſhall appear in its proper Place, ſhewed as much Weakneſs and Inconſtancy as his Lord.

But while the Cardinal was negotiating with *Cæſar* on the Heads of his Inſtructions, and was continually fed with Hopes that they would be ratified according to his Deſire, there fell out in *Lombardy* Events of a very different Tendency. For the Duke of *Milan* being relieved from his Diſorder in ſuch a manner as to make it believed that he was

was at leaſt out of Danger of dying ſoon, the Marquis of *Peſcara*, who had Orders from *Cæſar* by *Caſtaldo* above-mentioned to provide againſt thoſe Dangers by ſuch Means as he thought moſt convenient, reſolved to make himſelf Maſter of the Dutchy of *Milan*, under a Pretence that the Duke, by the Plot which he had carried on with the Aſſiſtance of *Morone*, had forfeited the Rights of Inveſtiture, and that the Fief was reverted to *Cæſar*, the ſupreme Lord. The Marquis therefore being at *Novara*, tho' labouring under a conſiderable Diſorder, Part of the Army being at *Pavia*, and the *Germans* quartered about *Lodi*, which two Cities he had cauſed to be fortified, ſent unexpectedly for the Troops quartered in *Piedmont* and in the Marquiſate of *Saluzzo*,, which laſt they had ſeized ſoon after the Victory, to come to *Novara*, under colour of diſtributing them into Quarters through the whole State of *Milan*. He ſent alſo for *Morone*, in whoſe Perſon, it may be ſaid, conſiſted the Importance of every Thing; for it

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was

A. D. 1525. was certain that as ſoon as he ſhould be ſecured the Duke of *Milan*, being left deſtitute of Men and Counſel, would make no Reſiſtance; but while he was at Liberty it might be doubted that by his Parts, by his Experience, and by his Reputation, he would greatly obſtruct the Execution of his Deſigns. It was alſo neceſſary that *Cæſar* ſhould have in his Power the Perſon of *Morone*, who had been the Author and Inſtrument of all the ſecret Practices, that he might be enabled, from his Proceſs, to juſtify the Charge againſt the Duke of *Milan*. There is nothing more difficult to avoid than Fate, and there is no Remedy againſt predeſtined Misfortunes. *Morone* might long ſince have known that what was concerted with the Marquis of *Peſcara* would not take Effect, he knew that he was extreamly hated by all the *Spaniſh* Soldiers, who already talked very freely of his Unfaithfulneſs, and that *Antonio da Leva* had threatened in Public to have him aſſaſſinated. It is not to be ſuppoſed that he had not conſidered the Importance of his Perſon,

Perſon, and that he had not conſidered the melancholy Condition of the Duke of *Milan*, at that Time uſeleſs and of no more Signification than if he were dead. Not many Days before the Plotters had been in Suſpenſe, and full of Jealouſies among themſelves, every one adviſed him not to go, and he himſelf ſtood in doubt whether to go or not. And yet, whether he had his Mind ſtill poſſeſſed with the Diſſimulation and Artifices of the Marquis, or relied on the great Friendſhip which he fancied he had contracted with him, or, truſting to his Word of Honour, which, as he ſaid afterwards, he had obtained of him in one of his Letters, or, to ſpeak more truly, drawn by that Neceſſity which drags along thoſe who will not ſuffer themſelves to be led, he reſolved to go as it were to a manifeſt Priſon: A Conduct to me the more ſurpriſing as I remember to have heard *Morone* ſay ſeveral Times in the Army, in the Time of *Leo*, that there was not a Man in *Italy* of greater Malignity, or of leſs Faith than the Marquis of *Peſcara*.

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cara. *Morone* was kindly received by him, and they conferred together in a Chamber by themſelves on the firſt Scheme of the Plot, and of cutting the Throats of the *Spaniards* and of *Antonio da Leva*, but in a Place where *Antonio*, whom the Marquis had concealed behind ſome Hangings of Tapeſtry, heard all the Diſcourſe, and who, as ſoon as the Marquis was gone, it being the Fourteenth day of *October*, took *Morone* into Cuſtody, and committed him to the Caſtle of *Pavia*, whither the Marquis himſelf went to examine him on the Particulars of what they had debated together, and where he gave an ample Detail of the whole Proceeding of the Conſpiracy, accuſing the Duke of *Milan* as privy to every Thing, which was the chief Point in View.

Morone made a Priſoner.

Demands of the Marquis of *Peſcara* on the Duke of *Milan*.

MORONE being impriſoned, the Marquis, who was before in Poſſeſſion of *Lodi* and *Pavia*, demanded of the Duke that, for Security of the Emperor's State, he would give Orders for reſigning into his Hands the City of *Cremona*, and the

the Fortreſſes of *Trezzo*, *Lecco*, and *Pizzichitone*, which, for their Situation on the Paſſes of the *Adda*, are accounted the Keys of the Dutchy of *Milan*, promiſing, on Compliance, to make no further Innovation. The Duke finding himſelf bare of every Thing, and deſtitute of Counſel and Hopes, immediately ordered the Places to be put into the Hands of the Marquis, who, after this was done, demanded farther to be admitted into the City of *Milan*, to confer, as he ſaid, with the Duke; which was granted with the ſame Facility. As ſoon as he was entered *Milan* he ſent to inſiſt on the Delivery of the Caſtle of *Cremona*, not requiring that of *Milan*, becauſe it was an improper Demand, ſince that Fortreſs was the Reſidence of the Duke's Perſon; he demanded however that, for the Security of *Cæſar*'s Army, the Duke ſhould conſent that the Caſtle ſhould be ſurrounded with an Entrenchment. Moreover he required him to deliver into his Hands *Gian Angelo Riccio* his Secretary, and *Politiano*, Secretary of *Morone*, that they might be examined on an

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A. D. 1525. an Information which he had received of their having acted againſt *Cæſar*.

The Duke's Anſwer.

To theſe Demands the Duke anſwered that he held the Caſtles of *Milan* and *Cremona* in the Name, and at the Requeſt of *Cæſar*, to whom he had always been a moſt faithful Vaſſal, and that he would not reſign them to any one before he knew his Will, which that he might clearly underſtand he would immediately depute to him a proper Perſon, provided the Marquis would grant him a Paſſport; and that it did not appear to him conſiſtent with Decency to conſent to be in the mean time ſhut up in a Caſtle, from which Violence he would defend himſelf by any Means that lay in his Power: That he could not part with *Gian Angelo*, becauſe he was intruſted in all his important Affairs, and was the only Miniſter he had at preſent about him; and that he had ſtill greater Need of *Morone*'s Secretary, in order to bring him before *Cæſar*, and by his Evidence to juſtify himſelf, in proving that during

during his Sickneſs his Maſter had, in his Name, without his Knowledge, made many Diſpatches, which might be laid to his Charge, if he did not by this Means juſtify his Innocence, and make it appear that the Buſineſs and Correſpondence of *Morone* were different and ſeparate from what concerned him. At laſt, after a Multitude of Proteſtations and Replies that paſſed from one to the other in writing, the Marquis conſtrained the People of *Milan* to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Emperor, contrary to their Will, and with extream Reluctance and Mortification of all Parties; he beſtowed Offices through the State in the Name of *Cæſar*, and began to caſt an Entrenchment about the Caſtle of *Cremona*, and that of *Milan*, in which the Duke, being mightily encouraged with the Hopes of Relief given him by the Pope and *Venetians*, was determined to defend himſelf, having with him Eight Hundred choſen Men, and furniſhed it with as great a Stock of Proviſions as the Shortneſs of Time would permit. Nor did he omit to obſtruct

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A. D. 1525. as much as poſſible the Working on the Trenches, which were carried along on the Outſide, with a Ditch before them, at a greater Diſtance from the Caſtle than thoſe caſt up by *Proſpero Colonna*.

ALL *Italy* was alarmed, and with Reaſon, on the Seizure of the Dutchy of *Milan*, being ſenſible that there would be no way left to avoid manifeſt Slavery whenever *Cæſar* ſhould become Lord of *Milan* and *Naples*. The Pontiff above all was afflicted, ſeeing, with utmoſt Concern, thoſe Negotiations which he had carried on with ſuch Secrecy, not only for the Security of *Milan*, but for the Deſtruction of *Cæſar*'s Army, and depriving him of the Kingdom of *Naples*, all blown up, and laid open to the World. This Diſcovery, perhaps, procured the Marquis of *Peſcara* Favour with *Cæſar*, but in the Sight of all others eternal Infamy, not only becauſe moſt People were ſtill poſſeſſed with an Opinion that in the Beginning he had really an Intention to fall off from

from *Cæſar*, but alſo becauſe, on a Supposition that he had been always faithful to him, it was eſteemed an infamous Piece of Treachery to have given Encouragement to Men, and drawn them in by ſuch a Strain of Double-dealing, and over-reaching Arts of Fraud, to enter into a Conſpiracy with him, on purpoſe that he might have an Opportunity to detect them, and to make himſelf great out of the Sins of others procured by his own Deceits and Subtleties.

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Conduct of *Peſcara* cenſured.

THIS Change in the Face of Affairs damped the Hopes of an Agreement, which was negotiated by the Protonotary *Caracciolo* with the *Venetian* Senate, and was in ſuch a Forwardneſs as to ſeem drawing to a Concluſion, by which the *Venetians* would have been obliged to renew the firſt Confederacy on the ſame Conditions, and to pay unto *Cæſar*, in Recompenſe of paſt Failings and Omiſſions, Eighty Thouſand Ducats, excluding all Demands of future Contributions in Money. But this new Event which happened at *Milan* threw the Senate

A. D. 1525. into very great Perplexity, being on one hand vaſtly concerned to find themſelves the only Power left in *Italy* to make Reſiſtance againſt *Cæſar*, with the Danger, already threatened by the Marquis of *Peſcara*, of having the War transferred into their own Dominions, for which Purpoſe there appeared already ſome Preparations; and no leſs embaraſſed on the other hand, as knowing how mightily an Agreement with themſelves would facilitate to *Cæſar* the Acquiſition of the *Milaneſe*, which added to ſo many States, and to ſo many other Advantages, was the ready Way to bring themſelves, with all the reſt of *Italy*, under the Yoke. This Reflexion was enforced by the continual and pathetic Perſuaſions of the Biſhop of *Bajeux*, whom Madam the Regenteſs had appointed to treat of a Union between herſelf and the *Italians* againſt *Cæſar*. In this Exigency their Conſultations were frequent, but dubious, and full of various Opinions; and, tho' it were moſt conformable to their Cuſtom to accept of an Agreement, becauſe it removed the

the preſent Danger, whence they might have Hopes to truſt their Affairs to Length of Time, and to Opportunities that Republics, which, in Compariſon to Princes, are immortal, have Reaſon to expect, yet it appeared alſo to them a Matter of too much Importance that *Cæſar* ſhould eſtabliſh himſelf in the State of *Milan*, and that the *French* ſhould be excluded from all Hopes of having any Friend or Ally in *Italy*. Wherefore, being determined at laſt to enter into no Obligation, they anſwered the Protonotary *Caracciolo*, That their paſt Conduct was ſufficient Evidence to all the World, and he himſelf, who had been preſent at the Concluſion of the Confederacy, was a good Witneſs, how much they always coveted the Friendſhip of *Cæſar*, with whom they had confederated at a Time when their joining with the *French* would have been, as every one knew, of mighty Importance: And that they had always perſevered, and now more than ever, in the ſame Diſpoſition; but that they were of neceſſity held in Suſ-

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Anſwer of the *Venetians* to the Imperial Plenipotentiary.

A. D. 1525. penſe by obſerving a Change of ſo great Importance newly made in *Lombardy*, and eſpecially when they reflected that both their Confederacy with *Cæſar*, and ſo many other Movements which had been ſet on Foot of late Years in *Italy*, were made for no other End than with a Deſign that the Dutchy of *Milan* ſhould be ſettled on *Franceſco Sforza*, as the principal Foundation of the Liberty and Security of *Italy*. Wherefore they intreated his Majeſty, that, acting in this Caſe ſuitably to his own Temper, and known Goodneſs, he would remove this Innovation, and eſtabliſh the Repoſe of *Italy*, as it was in his Power to do it, ſince he ſhould always find them moſt readily diſpoſed, both by their Authority and Forces, to follow this holy Inclination; nor would they ever give him any Cauſe to charge them with being wanting in any good Office that concerned either the univerſal Good, or his own particular Intereſts. This Anſwer, giving no Hopes of a Concluſion, did not however produce a Rupture and Hoſtilities, becauſe the

the Diſorder of the Marquis of *Peſcara* increaſed every Day, and *Cæſar*'s Deſire of firſt making himſelf Maſter of the whole State of *Milan*, and to eſtabliſh that Acquiſition on a firm Bottom, and ſo many other Affairs which lay upon his Hands, and wanted firſt to be diſpatched, gave him no Leiſure to ſet about an Enterpriſe of ſuch great Moment. A. D. 1525.

Memorable Paſſage of *Bourbon*.

BOURBON was by this time arrived, and on the Fourteenth Day of *November* he appeared at the Imperial Court. Of this Nobleman it deſerves to be recorded that, tho' he was received by *Cæſar* with all the Demonſtrations of Honour and Regard, and careſſed as a Brother-in-Law, yet all the Lords of the Court, who are accuſtomed, as it always happens, to follow, in other Caſes, the Example of their Prince, abhorred him as an infamous Perſon, calling him a Traitor to his own King; and, what is more, when one of them was requeſted, in the Name of *Cæſar*, to conſent that his Palace ſhould be aſſigned

A. D. 1525. him for his Lodgings, he anſwered, with a *Caſtilian* Greatneſs of Soul, that he would not refuſe *Cæſar* whatever he pleaſed to deſire, but knew that as ſoon as *Bourbon* ſhould leave it, he ſhould ſet it on Fire, as a Palace infected with *Bourbon*'s Infamy, and unworthy to be inhabitted by Men of Honour.

But the Honour paid by *Cæſar* to the Duke of *Bourbon* increaſed the Deſpondency of the *French*, who, on this account, and more by the Return of Madam *d' Alençon* without Effect, entertaining but ſmall Hopes of an Agreement, tho' it was continually negotiated by proper Perſons reſiding at *Cæſar*'s Court, inſiſted with all Eagerneſs on making a League with the Pope, in which they were ſeconded by the Advice and Authority of the King of *England*, and by the frequent and earneſt Sollicitations of the *Venetians*. Beſides, there offered itſelf an Opportunity doubtleſs of great Moment, for about this Time, which was in the Beginning of *December*,

December, died the Marquis of *Peſcara*, perhaps by the juſt Judgment of God, who would not ſuffer him to enjoy the Fruits of that Seed which he had ſown with ſo much Malignity *. This Gentleman was of the Houſe of *Avalos*, by Origin a *Catalan*, his Anceſtors came into *Italy* with King *Alfonſo* of *Aragon*, who firſt of that Houſe conquered the Kingdom of *Naples*. Since the Battle of *Ravenna*, in which, while yet a Youth, he was taken Priſoner, he ſerved in all the Wars of the *Spaniards* in *Italy*, ſo that, tho' young in Years, for he was not paſt Six and Thirty, he was old in Experience, ingenious, courageous, very diligent, and very crafty, and in vaſt Credit and Favour with the *Spaniſh* Soldiers, of which he had been a long Time

A. D. 1525.

Death and Character of the Marquis of *Peſcara*.

* The Marquis of *Peſcara* was of the *Davala* Family in *New Caſtile*, near *Toledo*, rather antient than illuſtrious. He died of a lingering Conſumption, occaſioned by his continual drinking of Water, and the many Fatigues and Watchings that he endured in the Wars. He was buried at *Milan*, *November* 30, 1525, and afterwards carried to *Naples*, and interred in the Church of *San Domenico*.

A. D. 1525. Time Captain General, whence the Victory of *Pavia*, and all the memorable Exploits performed by that Army for the Space of ſome Years, were principally owing to his Counſel and Conduct. He was a General certainly of great Worth, but one who knew very well by his Artifices and Diſſimulation how to promote and increaſe his own Intereſt, was alſo haughty, treacherous, malicious, void of Sincerity, and worthy, as he often uſed to wiſh, of having *Spain* for his native Country rather than *Italy*. His Death then occaſioned conſiderable Confuſion in that Army, with which he was in ſuch great Favour and Reputation, and put others in Hopes that it might be deſtroyed with much greater Eaſe, ſince it was deprived of a General of ſuch great Worth and Authority. Thoſe Powers, therefore, who were deſirous that a League ſhould be made, were ſo much the warmer and more importunate in their Inſtances with the Pontiff. But on the other hand his Doubts and Suſpenſions were equivalent, and juſtly; for very

very perſuaſive Arguments offered themſelves on both Sides of the Queſtion, ſufficient to puzzle and perplex a Man however warm and reſolute, and much more *Clement*, who always proceeded ſlowly and with Deliberation in his Affairs. A. D. 1525.

It was no longer expected that *Cæſar* would take any Reſolution for the Security of *Italy*, he ſeemed very intent on making himſelf Maſter of the Caſtle of *Milan*, which being taken, all the other Powers, and eſpecially the Pope, whoſe State was but weak, and ſituated in the Midſt between *Lombardy* and the Kingdom of *Naples*, would manifeſtly become his Prey. And ſuppoſing it ſhould lie in his Power to oppreſs him, it was much to be doubted whether he would not make uſe of it, either out of Ambition, which is in a manner natural to Emperors againſt Popes, or for his own Security, or to revenge himſelf, as he was reaſonably ſuppoſed to be full of Indignation and Diſtruſt on account of the Plot carried on with the

A. D. 1525. the Marquis of *Peſcara*; and tho' the Neceſſity of providing againſt that Danger was great, yet the Foundation and Hopes of being enabled to accompliſh it did not appear to be ſlight, ſo that either the Remedy muſt ſucceed by means of ſo potent a League and Conjunction, or the Caſe muſt be thought deſperate for ever. The Government of *France* promiſed Five Hundred Lances, and to contribute, every Month during the War, Forty Thouſand Ducats, with which it was propoſed to hire a Body of Ten Thouſand *Swiſs*. It was deſigned that the Pope and *Venetians* together ſhould bring into the Field Eighteen Hundred Men at Arms, Twenty Thouſand Foot, and Two Thouſand Light Horſe: The *French* and *Venetians* were to put to Sea a large Fleet, for attacking either *Genoa* or the Kingdom of *Naples*. Madam the Regenteſs promiſed to open the Campaign, without Delay, with a numerous Army on the Frontiers of *Spain*, that ſo *Cæſar* might be prevented from ſending Troops for maintaining the War in *Italy*. The

Deſign of the Princes formed againſt *Cæſar*.

Cæſarean

Cæsarean Army that remained in *Lombardy* was not great, had no Generals of Authority as formerly, the Marquis being dead, and *Bourbon* and the Vice-roy in *Spain*, it had no Means of raising Money, and did not abound with Provisions, was extreamly hated by the People, from a Desire of their Duke, and the intolerable Exactions of the Soldiers, both in the City of *Milan*, and throughout the State; the Castles of *Milan* and *Cremona* were in the Hands of the Duke, and the *Venetians* gave Hopes that the Duke of *Ferrara* would also enter into this Confederacy, provided *Clement* would be content to grant him *Reggio*, of which City the Duke was determined at any Rate to keep Possession. A. D. 1525.

On the other Side Difficulties arose from the Cunning and Valour of the Enemies, from their being accustomed to maintain themselves for a long Time, when Necessity required, with a little Money, and to put up with many Wants and Inconveniencies; the Towns in

A. D. 1525. in their Poſſeſſion were fortified, and, from their Situation in a Plain, eaſy to have their Fortifications repaired, and ſtrengthened with new Works; in theſe they might maintain themſelves till Succours arrived from *Germany*, of ſuch a Nature as to reduce the whole War to the Fortune of one Battle. The Troops of the League could be no other than new-raiſed Men, and of ſmall Value in compariſon of that veteran Army, fluſhed with ſo many Victories. It was difficult to fix on a Captain General, for the Marquis of *Mantoua*, at that time General of the *Venetians*, was not equal to ſo great a Charge, nor could it with any Security be intruſted in the Hands of the Duke of *Ferrara*, or of the Duke of *Urbino*, who had received ſo many Injuries that it was impoſſible for them to be pleaſed with the Pope's Greatneſs. The Weapons of the Church had naturally blunt Edges, and thoſe of the *Venetians* were no keener, and if each were but a bad Cutter when alone and

and acting ſeparately, what could be expected when employed in Conjunction! In the Armies of the League there never would be a Concurrence of all the neceſſary Proviſions at one Time; for amidſt ſo great a Variety of Wills, where are different Intereſts, and different Ends, there will be apt to ariſe Diſorders, Indignation, Reſentments and Diſtruſt, and, at beſt, you will never find among them that Promptneſs and Alacrity for vigorouſly purſuing the Favour of Fortune when ſhe ſhews herſelf kind, nor a firm Diſpoſition to make a reſolute and conſtant Reſiſtance when ſhe looks upon them with a frowning Aſpect. But, that which above all occaſioned the greateſt Difficulty and Fear in this Reſolution, was an Apprehenſion that the *French*, whenever *Cæſar*, on finding himſelf ſtraitened, ſhould offer to releaſe their King, would not only break off from the League, but aſſiſt him againſt the Confederates. And tho' the King of *England* paſſed his royal Word for them that they ſhould come to no Agreement, and it was propoſed that

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A. D. 1525. that they ſhould give Security in *Rome*, *Florence*, or *Venice*, for three Months Payments, yet no Means were found to remove that Suſpicion: For the *French* having no other End than the Recovery of their King, and it being well known that they had no Inclination to a War but when they had no Hopes of an Agreement, it ſeemed probable that, whenever it pleaſed *Cæſar* to conſent to their Wiſhes, they would prefer an Accommodation with him to all other Intereſts and Regards; nay further, every one was ſenſible that the greater the Preparations and Forces of the League ſhould appear, the more would *Cæſar* ſhew himſelf inclined to agree with the King of *France*, and therefore it ſeemed a very dangerous Step to engage in a War in which the powerful Forces of the Confederates might do as much Hurt as Good. With theſe Reaſons was the Pontiff plyed on all Sides, by the Ambaſſadors of the Princes, and no leſs by his own Miniſters, for there was a Diviſion in his Family and in his Council, where every one favoured his own Incli-

Inclination, with ſo much the leſs Reſpect, as the Authority which they had arrogated with him was the greater; for he had till this Time ſuffered himſelf in a great meaſure to be carried by thoſe who ought to have paid Obedience to his Nod, and to look upon themſelves as no other than Miniſters of the Will and Orders of their Maſter. To underſtand this and many other Occurrences, it is neceſſary to look back on ſome Tranſactions of an older Date. A. D. 1525.

Characters of Pope *Leo*, and Pope *Clement*.

LEO, who brought the chief Eccleſiaſtical Dignity into the Houſe of the *Medici*, and with the Authority of the Cardinalſhip ſo well ſuſtained himſelf and that Family, which was fallen from the Height of Grandeur to ſo low a State of Decay, that it had reaſon to expect a Viciſſitude and Return of proſperous Fortune, was a Man of conſummate Liberality, if it be proper to give that Name to a Profuſeneſs in Expences that paſſes all Bounds and Meaſures. After his Aſſumption to the Pontificate he diſplayed ſo much Magnificence and

A. D. 1525. Splendor, with a truly Royal Spirit, as would have been ſurpriſing even in one who had deſcended by long Succeſſion from Kings and Emperors. Nor was he only moſt profuſe of Money, but of all Favours which are at the Diſpoſal of a Pope, which he beſtowed ſo unmeaſurably that he brought the Spiritual Authority into Contempt, diſordered the Oeconomy of the Court, and by his exceſſive Expences brought himſelf under a Neceſſity of perpetually contriving to raiſe Money by extraordinary Means. To this ſo remarkable an Eaſineſs was added a moſt profound Diſſimulation, with which he circumvented every one in the Beginning of his Pontificate, and made himſelf paſs for a very good Prince; I dare not ſay of an Apoſtolical Goodneſs, for in our corrupt Times the Goodneſs of a Pontiff is commended when it does not ſurpaſs the Wickedneſs of other Men; but he was reputed merciful, deſirous of doing Good to all, and quite averſe from every Thing that might give Offence to any Perſon. Among other good Gifts of Fortune, which

were very great, he was ſo happy as to have about him *Giulio de' Medici*, his Couſin, whom from a Knight of *Rhodes*, tho' illegitimate, he raiſed to the Cardinalſhip. For *Giulio* being naturally grave, diligent, aſſiduous in Buſineſs, averſe from Pleaſures, temperate and thrifty in every Thing, and having in his Hands, by Appointment of *Leo*, the Management of all the important Affairs of the Pontificate, reſtrained and moderated many Diſorders proceeding from his Profuſeneſs and Eaſineſs; and, what is more, not following the Cuſtoms of other Nephews and Brothers of Popes, but preferring the Honour and Grandeur of *Leo* to the Conſideration of making a comfortable Proviſion to ſupport himſelf after his Death, he approved himſelf a moſt faithful and moſt obedient Miniſter to him, in ſuch a manner that it ſeemed as if he were really his ſecond Self. On theſe accounts he was continually more and more promoted by the Pope, and ſtill more and more entruſted with Buſineſs, which, in the Hands of two Perſons

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A. D. 1525. ſons of ſuch different Natures, is a Demonſtration how well the Mixture of two Contraries may ſometimes agree together; as here, for Inſtance, Aſſiduity, Diligence, Conduct, and Gravity of Manners, with Indolence, Prodigality, and an inordinate Love of Pleaſure and Mirth. This Management made it believed by many that *Leo* was governed by *Giulio*, and that he himſelf was not a Man qualified to undertake ſo great a Charge, but of a harmleſs Diſpoſition, unwilling to hurt any Body, and very glad to enjoy the Sweets of the Pontificate; and that, as a Contraſt, *Giulio* was full of Spirit, Ambition, and a Deſire of Innovations. Hence all the Severities, all the Movements, and all the Enterpriſes that happened during the Time of *Leo* were imagined to proceed from the Inſtigation of *Giulio*, who was reputed of a malignant Temper, but a Man of Parts, and of a great Spirit. This Opinion of his Merit was confirmed and increaſed after the Death of *Leo*, for, amidſt all the Oppoſition and Difficulties with which he was ſurrounded,

ed, he ſupported his Affairs with ſuch Dignity, that he appeared almoſt like a Pope, and preſerved his Authority with many of the Cardinals to ſuch a Degree, that he entered into Two Conclaves abſolute Maſter of Sixteen Votes, and at laſt after the Death of *Adrian*, in ſpite of the infinite Contradictions and Oppoſitions of the greater Part and of the ſenior Members of the College, he made his Way to the Pontificate, not full Two Years from the Deceaſe of *Leo*, entering on his Office with ſuch high Expectations, that it was the univerſal Opinion he would be the greateſt Pontiff, and perform the greateſt Actions that had ever been performed by any one who had hitherto ſat in the Papal Chair. But it was ſoon known what vain Judgments they had formed of *Leo* and of him; for *Clement* had many Qualities different from what was at firſt imagined of him, ſince he had nothing of that ambitious Deſire of Novelties, nor was endowed with that Greatneſs of Soul, and Inclination of Mind to generous and magnanimous

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A. D. 1525. Ends, as the Public had at firſt believed; and it appeared that he had been with *Leo* rather a Miniſter and Executor of his Deſigns, than a Director and Introducer of his Counſels and Will; And tho' he had a very capacious Underſtanding, and a wonderful Knowledge of all public Affairs, yet his Reſolution and Execution were by no means anſwerable; for being hindered, not only by a remarkable Timorouſneſs of Mind, and by a Deſire to ſave Expences, but alſo by a kind of Irreſolution and Perplexity, which was natural to him, he ſtood almoſt continually in Suſpenſe and Ambiguity, when he was brought to a Determination of ſuch Affairs as he had oftentimes foreſeen at a Diſtance, conſidered, and in a manner ſettled. Hence it happened that, both in his reſolving as well as executing what he had reſolved, every trifling Concern that juſt then diſcovered itſelf to him, every ſlight Impediment that came athwart his Way, appeared ſufficient to make him relapſe into the ſame Confuſion in which he had ſtood heſitating

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ing before he had reſolved, as he always fancied, after he had taken a Reſolution, that the Counſel which he had rejected was the beſt: For, repreſenting to himſelf at the preſent Inſtant only thoſe Reaſons which he had neglected, he never recalled to Examination thoſe which had moved him to make his Choice, by the Claſhing and Compariſon of which the oppoſite Reaſons would have their Force weakened; nor could the Memory of his being often under the Power of vain Fears teach him to avoid giving way to ſuch Weakneſs for the future. In this intangled Situation, and confuſed Manner of Proceeding, ſuffering himſelf to be often biaſſed by his Miniſters, he ſeemed rather led than counſelled by them.

Two leading Miniſters of Pope *Clement.*

Of the Miniſtry thoſe who had a mighty Intereſt with him were *Nicolas Schomberg*, a *German*, and *Gian Matteo Giberto*, a *Genoeſe*; the former reverenced, and in a manner feared by the Pontiff; the other very acceptable, and greatly

A. D. 1525. beloved by him; *Schomberg*, following the Authority of *Girolamo Savonarola*, entered himſelf, while he ſtudied the Law, in the Order of Preaching Friars; but afterwards, relinquiſhing his Convent, tho' retaining the Name and Habit, he applied himſelf to ſecular Buſineſs. *Giberto* was dedicated to a monaſtic Life in his Childhood, but afterwards leaving his Cloiſter, by his Father's Authority, tho' he was but a Baſtard, quite abdicated his Profeſſion, with the Name and Habit.

THESE two Miniſters, while they agreed together when *Giulio* was but a Cardinal, and afterwards in the Beginning of his Pontificate, guided him at their Diſcretion; but ſince, falling at Variance, either out of Ambition, or from a Difference of Tempers, they put all Things in Confuſion, and ruined his Affairs. For Friar *Nicolas*, on account of a national Tye, or for ſome other Reſpect, being devoted to the Intereſt of *Cæſar*, and by Nature obſtinately attached to his own Opinions, which were

At Variance.

were often different from thoſe of others, ſo immoderately favoured the Cauſe of *Cæſar*, that he was often ſuſpected by the Pontiff as one who had more Concern for the Intereſts of others than for thoſe of his Maſter. The other in truth knew no other Patron, or Object of his Affection, than the Pontiff; but, being naturally eager and vehement in the Management of his Affairs, tho', in the Time of *Leo*, he had been a moſt bitter Enemy to the *French*, and a Favourer of *Cæſar*'s Cauſe, yet ſince his Death he was become quite the contrary. Hence thoſe two Miniſters, who bore the greateſt Sway with the Pontiff, being at open Variance, and not proceeding with Maturity, or with any Regard to the Honour of their Maſter, but expoſing his Coldneſs and Irreſolution to all the Court, rendered him contemptible and in a manner ridiculous to the Generality of Mankind. As he was then by Nature irreſolute, and thoſe whoſe Duty it was to aſſiſt him in coming to a Determination on ſo difficult and perplexed an Affair helped

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ed only to increaſe his Doubts and Confuſion; he knew not which Way to turn himſelf. At laſt, rather from a Neceſſity of coming to ſome Determination, than out of a manly Reſolution, or firm Judgment, eſpecially as he found himſelf in ſuch a Situation that to come to no Determination was a kind of Determination, he inclined to make a League and to join with the others in beginning a War with *Cæſar*.

Errera arrives at *Rome* from *Cæſar*.

They had agreed on Articles, which were drawn up in Writing, and only wanted to be ſigned, when the Pope received Advice that the Commendatory *Errera* was arrived at *Genoa*, deputed to him from *Cæſar*, and coming with all Diligence would ſoon be at *Rome* with good and gracious Diſpatches. He reſolved therefore to wait his Arrival, tho' with very heavy Complaints from the Ambaſſadors, to whom he had given ſtrong Aſſurances of ſigning the Confederacy the ſame Day. *Errera* was ſent on this Meſſage becauſe *Cæſar*, after he had given ſuch a Commiſſion to the

Marquis of *Peſcara* as gave him full Power at leaſt to ſeize on the State of *Milan*, doubting that ſuch a Step would occaſion new Movements in *Italy*, carried on with great Application the Negotiations for an Agreement with the Legate *Salviati*, ſo that a Capitulation was made between them, with a Reſerve however on Condition of its Ratification by the Pontiff. By this Agreement Proviſion was made for the Reſtitution of *Reggio* and *Rubiera*, and there was included in it the Defence and Preſervation of the Duke of *Milan*, which were the principal Points that *Clement* deſired, but with one expreſs Condition that, in caſe of his Death, *Cæſar* ſhould neither keep that Dutchy for himſelf, nor give it to his Brother the Archduke, but inveſt with it M. *de Bourbon*, whom, together with *George*, the natural Brother of *Maximilian Cæſar*, the Pontiff himſelf, at the Perſuaſion of the Archbiſhop of *Capua*, had been ſo inconſiderate as to propoſe at the Time when *Franceſco Sforza* lay ſo ill that every one deſpaired of his Life. *A. D.* 1525.

The

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Cæſar obtains a Diſpenſation for his Marriage.

THE Capitulation being made the Legate, without waiting for *Clement*'s Ratification, could not, or knew not how to deny giving *Cæſar* the Brief of Diſpenſation that he ſo much deſired, which having been drawn before with an Expreſſion only of the Impediment in the ſecond Degree, without nominating the Daughter of the King of *Portugal*, for the ſake of giving the leſs Offence to the King of *England*, or becauſe, there being a double Tye of Kindred between them, Mention had been made only of the ſtronger Tye, it was neceſſary to draw up another, which ſhould comprehend all the Impediments, together with an expreſs Nomination of the Perſons. The Commendatory *Errera* ſet out from *Cæſar*'s Court with the Diſpatches of this Confederacy a Day or two after *Cæſar* had received Advice of the Impriſonment of *Morone*, and on the ſixth of *December*, being conducted before the Pope, beſides many Offers, and moſt ample Proteſtations of the good Diſpoſition

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ſition of *Cæſar*, preſented him with the Articles of the Capitulation; and tho' thoſe Articles that concerned the Salt, and the beneficial Matters in the Kingdom of *Naples* were different from thoſe which had been concluded with the Viceroy, yet becauſe the principal Point which he had in View was to free himſelf from Suſpicions, he would have accepted them had he been convinced of the Sincerity of the Proceedings in relation to the Duke of *Milan*: But ſince, in the Article that related to *Franceſco Sforza*, there was no Mention made of what had been laid to his Charge, nor any Promiſe to reſtore the State of which he had been deprived, nor of pardoning the Errors which he had committed, but on the contrary *Cæſar*, in the Concluſion made with the Legate, and in the Inſtructions given to this his Agent, had not given the leaſt Indication that he knew any Thing of it, one might eaſily comprehend the Subtleties and Artifices of his Miniſters. For the Confederacy, and the Promiſe to defend and preſerve *Franceſco Sforza* in

Pope's Exceptions to the Treaty with *Cæſar*.

A. D. 1535. in the Dutchy of *Milan*, did not deprive *Cæſar* of the Power of proceeding againſt him as his Vaſſal, and of declaring the Fief devolved on account of the Charge of his having conſpired againſt his Majeſty; and *Bourbon*, who was ſubſtituted in caſe of his Death, would alſo ſucceed him on his Deprivation, becauſe the Laws conſider a civil Death as equivalent to a natural, and he, they ſay, who is condemned for a Crime of that Nature, is dead in Law. The Pope therefore very gravely anſwered, that he had no private Cauſe of Diſagreement with *Cæſar*, but, on the contrary, in all Differences and Diſputes that might happen between them, he would never chuſe any other Judge than him; but that it was alſo neceſſary to ſettle the public Affairs on ſuch a Foundation as might put *Italy* in a State of Security, which could not be effected without once more reſtoring the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Franceſco Sforza*. He ſhewed him alſo the Reaſons why this Article, ſo generally worded was not ſatisfactory; concluding that he ſhould be extreamly

treamly mortified to find himſelf under a Neceſſity of taking new Reſolutions, and to break off from *Cæſar*, to whom he had always been moſt firmly attached. *A. D.* 1525.

To this the Duke of *Seſſa* replied, that *Cæſar* was very ſincere in his Intentions, and was doubtleſs contented that, notwithſtanding what had happened, the Dutchy of *Milan* ſhould remain in the Poſſeſſion of *Franceſco Sforza*; but that, through Inadvertency, the Article had not been drawn up in ample Form, but the Pope might make what Corrections or Alterations in it he ſaw fit; that he promiſed him the Ratification within the Term of Two Months, provided that his Holineſs would alſo promiſe that, during that Time on his Part, he would not conclude the League he was negotiating with *France* and the *Venetians*. Duke of *Seſſa*'s Reply.

EVERY one daily perceived that this Offer had no other Foundation than a Deſire to gain Time by a Delay of

Two

A. D. 1525. Two Months, for *Cæſar* the better to regulate his Reſolutions, and to provide himſelf with Remedies againſt ſo formidable an Union. The Pontiff, however, after many Diſputes, to the very great Diſpleaſure of the other Ambaſſadors, conſented to this Demand, as well out of a Deſire to defer, as long as he could, the involving himſelf in Expences and Troubles, as becauſe it appeared to him a very dangerous Step to contract an Allance with the King's Mother while he himſelf was a Priſoner, it lying in the Power of *Cæſar* to diſſolve it whenever he pleaſed, and this Delay might poſſibly, tho' he ſaw but little Hopes, bring about the Accompliſhment of his deſired Ends; and tho' it ſhould occaſion an Agreement between the two Kings, he profoundly conſidered, tho' others were of a contrary Judgement that it was beſt to have it effected at a Time when *Cæſar* was under leſs Neceſſity, becauſe the better ſhould be the Situation of his Affairs, the harder would be the Conditions that he would propoſe to the King of *France*, the Rigour

Rigour of which gave Hopes that the King, after he ſhould be releaſed, would not think himſelf bound to obſerve them. It was alſo inſerted in this Treaty that at the ſame time no new Works ſhould be raiſed, or any Thing farther undertaken againſt the Caſtle of *Milan*, provided *Franceſco Sforza* would oblige himſelf not to annoy or moleſt the Troops that lay before it; which Condition he would not accept. *A. D.* 1525.

THUS ended the Year of the Nativity of the Son of God Almighty 1525, with Diſpoſitions rather for War than for Peace, and we are now entering on 1526, a Year full of great Events, and ſurpriſing Commotions. In the Beginning of it *Errera* returning to *Cæſar*, the Pope writ a long Letter to that Prince, with his own Hand, in which neither wholly denying nor confeſſing the Plot formed againſt him, but laying the Fault on the Marquis of *Peſcara*, he endeavoured to excuſe *Franceſco Sforza*, who, if he had committed any Error, was ſeduced by the Counſels of 1526. Pope writes to *Cæſar*.

A. D. 1526. *Girolamo Morone*; intreating him alſo in the moſt pathetic Manner, that, for the Quiet and Benefit of all Chriſtendom, he would prevail with himſelf to pardon him.

CÆSAR, at that Time, in Expectation of the Pontiff's Anſwer, put a Stop to all Negotiations with others; and tho' *Bourbon*, who was pretty much careſſed and confirmed in his Hopes of the Affinity, inſiſted on the Celebration of the Nuptials, he was put off with an Excuſe that *Cæſar* was willing firſt to ſolemniſe his Marriage with his *Portugueſe* Spouſe, who was every Day expected: But this Delay was deſigned to leave Room for making an Accommodation with the King of *France*, in which it was propoſed to give him the ſame Lady in Matrimony as had been promiſed to *Bourbon*, Intereſt, as it is cuſtomary with all Princes, being preferred before Honour and Honeſty. *Cæſar* had ſolemniſed his Nuptials at *Seville*, when *Errera* arrived from *Rome*, with the Minutes of a very long Article drawn up

up by the Pope in favour of *Franceſco Sforza*. Wherefore *Cæſar*, being certified alſo that the Legate had no Commiſſion but what concerned the Contents of that Article, and his whole Council concurring in the Opinion that it was neceſſary to break the League that was in Agitation, and dangerous to have ſo many Enemies to deal with at once, found himſelf reduced to a Neceſſity, either of ſatisfying the Pope and the *Venetians* by reſtoring *Franceſco Sforza*, or to agree with the King of *France*. That King at laſt, after many Diſputes about *Burgundy*, finding no Hopes of obtaining from *Cæſar* his Liberty on any other Conditions, offered to reſtore that Province, together with its Appurtenances and Dependencies, and to yield up his Rights and Pretenſions to the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*, and to give his Two Sons as Hoſtages for the Performance of his Engagements.

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Offers of the King of *France*.

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VERY warm were the Debates on the Choice of either of the Expedients: The Viceroy, who had conducted the moſt Chriſtian King into *Spain*, and had given him ſuch great Hopes, and ſo ardently ſollicited his Deliverance, more earneſtly inſiſted on it than ever; and his Authority, with regard only to his Fidelity and Good Will, had great Weight with *Cæſar*. But his Counſel was oppoſed, rather with exclaiming than diſputing againſt it, by *Mercurio di Gattinara*, the Great Chancellor, a Man who, tho' born of low Parentage in *Piedmont*, was yet of great Credit and Experience, and had for ſeveral Years the Management of the important Buſineſs of that Court. Theſe two great Men one Day aſſiſting in Council, and *Cæſar* being preſent, in order to put a final Determination to an Affair that had been under Debate ſo many Months, the Great Chancellor ſpoke thus:

"I

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"I HAVE been always under Apprehenſions, moſt invincible *Cæſar*, that our exceſſive Deſires, and immoderate Views would be the Cauſe that in the End we ſhould reap neither Honour nor Profit from ſo great and famous a Victory; but I did not however imagine that the coming off Conquerors would endanger your Reputation and your State, which I now plainly ſee is like to be the Reſult. For we have now under Debate the making an Agreement, by which all *Italy* may be thrown into Deſpair, and the King of *France* ſet at Liberty, but on ſuch burdenſome Conditions, that, if not by Inclination, yet at leaſt out of Neceſſity, he may become a greater Enemy to us than he was before. I could wiſh, as heartily as others, that at the ſame time *Burgundy* might be recovered, and the Foundations laid for the ſubjecting *Italy*; but I know that he who is thus haſty in graſping ſo much is in Danger of holding faſt nothing, and that no Rea-

Speech of the Great Chancellor againſt releaſing the King of *France*.

A. D. 1526. ſon requires that the King of *France*, after he is ſet at Liberty, ſhould fulfil his Engagements to you, in ſuch important Articles. Does he not know that if he reſtores to you *Burgundy* he opens you a Gate of *France?* and that it will be in your Power to make Incurſions as far as *Paris?* and that, when you have the Means of annoying *France* on ſo many Quarters, it will be impoſſible for him to reſiſt you? Does he not know, and every one elſe, that his conſenting that you ſhould go to *Rome* armed, that you ſhould put a Bridle on *Italy*, and that you ſhould reduce the ſpiritual and temporal State of the Church to your Devotion, would be the Cauſe of doubling your Power? and that you never can want for Money nor Arms to moleſt him, and that he muſt be neceſſitated to accept all the Laws you ſhall pleaſe to impoſe on him? Who then can believe that he will think himſelf bound to an Agreement, by which he may become your Slave, and you his Lord? Can he want for the Complaints

and

and Exclamations of the whole Kingdom of *France*, the Perſuaſions of the King of *England*, and the Stimulations of all *Italy*? The Love perhaps that ſubſiſts between you two will be the Cauſe that he will repoſe Confidence in you, and willingly ſee the Increaſe of your Power; or were there ever two Princes between whom there were more Grounds for Hatred and Contention? Here is not only an Emulation of Greatneſs, which uſes to put Weapons in the Hands of Brothers againſt one another, but antient and very bitter Enmities, commenced from the Times of the Fathers and Grandfathers of your Grandfathers, ſo many Wars long carried on between theſe two Houſes, ſo many Treaties of Peace and Agreement not obſerved, ſo many Injuries and Affronts given and received. Can we chuſe but believe that he burns with Indignation to reflect that he has been for ſo many Months your Priſoner, kept under ſo ſtrict a Guard, without ever having had the Favour of being conducted into your Preſence? That

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A. D. 1526. in this Priſon, thro' Vexation and Inconvenience, he had been at Death's Door; and that he was not now ſet at Liberty out of Magnanimity or Love, but from the Apprehenſions of ſo formidable an Union againſt you? Can we believe that an Affinity contracted by Neceſſity is of more Force than ſo many Incentives? And who knows not what Value Princes ſet upon theſe Ties? And where is there better Evidence of the Regard they pay to Affinities than among ourſelves? Some perhaps may fancy that paſſing his Word, which he will give us for his returning to Priſon, may be ſufficient for our Security; but, alas! what inconſiderate Grounds, what imprudent Hopes would this Conſideration ſuggeſt for our Reliance! The extream Grief that affects me, when I find ſome are for taking ſo pernicious and dangerous a Reſolution, conſtrains me, *Cæſar*, to ſpeak my Mind freely. We all know but too well what Value is to be ſet on the Word of Honour, when the Intereſt of the State is concerned, and what Streſs is to be laid on the Promiſes

Promiſes of the *French*, who, tho' frank and open in all other Matters, are in this Regard perfect Maſters in the Arts of Diſſimulation and Deceit, and that their King is by Nature as much deficient in Deeds as he is redundant in Words. We may therefore well conclude that no Benevolence between two Princes, whoſe Injuries and Hatred deſcend with their Blood by antient Inheritance; no Faith nor Promiſes, which in the important Concerns of State have but little Weight with many, and with the *French* none at all, will induce that King to make good an Agreement, that will exalt his Enemy to Heaven, and bring himſelf and his Kingdom under manifeſt Subjection. You would anſwer I am ſenſible, that, for Fear of what is here ſuggeſted, there is demanded of him Security in the Perſons of two of his Sons, one of them his Eldeſt, the Love of whom muſt needs occaſion him to ſet a higher Value on them than on *Burgundy*. But I am afraid that this Love of his Children will rather have a contrary Effect, when their Memory ſhall

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A. D. 1526. ſhall preſent itſelf to his Mind, and he ſhall conſider that by obſerving the Agreement he lays a Foundation for making them your Slaves. I know not whether this Pledge would be ſufficient, when he ſhould be quite deprived of all Hopes of recovering them any other Way *. For it is a Matter of too ſerious Concern to endanger his Kingdom, which once loſt is very difficult to be recovered; but he might well hope to recover his Sons with Time, or by Agreement, or on ſome other Occaſion, and the Delay will be leſs troubleſome on account of their tender Age. But having found Means to bring almoſt all the Chriſtian Princes to unite with him againſt you, who doubts but he will enter into cloſe Confederacy with them, and ſeek to moderate the Agreement by Force of Arms, and that the Fruits we ſhall reap from the Victory will be a very

* He doubts whether the King's Children be a ſufficient Pledge for reſtoring *Burgundy*, ſuppoſing that the King had no other Way to recover them, becauſe ſuch a Reſtitution would open a Door of *France*, as before obſerved.

very vigorous and dangerous War, excited by Hatred, Neceſſity and Deſperation, from the King of *England*, King of *France*, and all *Italy*? from all which we ſhould be able to defend ourſelves, would it pleaſe God not to ſlacken his Hand in working for us every Day thoſe Miracles which he has ſo often wrought for us till this preſent Time; and if Fortune ſhould change her Nature in our Behalf, and her Inconſtancy and Mutability ſhould become towards us an Example of Stability and Conſtancy, contrary to all the Examples of paſt Events. We have in all our Counſels, for ſo many Months together, concluded that we are to uſe our utmoſt Endeavours that the *Italians* might not join with the Government of *France*; and now we precipitate ourſelves into a Reſolution which removes all the Difficulties that have hitherto kept them in Suſpenſe, that multiplies our Dangers, that multiplies the Forces of the Enemy: For who knows not how much more potent a League will be which ſhall have for its Head the King of *France*, than

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A. D. 1526. than one made with the Government of *France* while the King remains your Priſoner? Who knows not that no Cauſe has hitherto held the Pope in Ambiguity and Heſitation from confederating againſt you, but the Fears that you may ſeparate the *French* from them by offering them their King? That they will fear leſs, when we ſhall have his Children and not him? Thus the Remedy which we provide for avoiding the Danger will, without Compariſon, do more Hurt than Good, and increaſe the Evil, and, inſtead of breaking that Union, we ſhall ourſelves be the Inſtruments of rendering it more firm and powerful. It will be ſaid to me, What is then your Opinion? Is it your Advice that we reap no Profit from ſo great a Victory? Are we to remain continually in this State of Perplexity? I confirm what I have often ſaid, that it is very pernicious to take in more Food at one Time than the Stomach is able to digeſt, and that it is neceſſary for us to regain the Friendſhip of *Italy*, which demands nothing of us but its Security,

rity, and to endeavour to obtain of the *French* King *Burgundy*, with whatever elſe ſhall be poſſible for us; or otherwiſe to make an Agreement with him, by which *Italy* may be left to our Diſcretion, but ſo mild and moderate with regard to his Intereſts that he may have Reaſon to obſerve it. And in making a Choice between theſe two Ways it is requiſite, *Cæſar*, that your Prudence and Goodneſs ſhould prefer what is ſtable and juſter to that which at firſt Sight may perhaps appear more profitable and grand. The State of *Milan*, I confeſs, is richer, and more convenient on many accounts than that of *Burgundy*, and there is no Friendſhip to be contracted with the *Italians* but by leaving *Milan* in the Hands of *Franceſco Sforza*, or of ſome other who ſhall content the Pope. And yet I much prefer taking this Courſe to an Agreement with the *French*, becauſe *Burgundy* is more yours in Juſtice than *Milan*, and eaſier to keep than the other, where you have not a ſingle Perſon that is well affected to you. To attempt the Reſto-

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A. D. 1526. Reſtoration of *Burgundy*, your antient Inheritance, is highly commendable: To aſpire after *Milan*, either for yourſelf or one who ſhall wholly depend on you, diſcovers ſome Marks of Ambition. The firſt is required of you by the Memory of ſo many of your glorious Progenitors, whoſe Bones interred in Captivity cry for nothing but to be delivered and removed by you, and their ſo juſt, compaſſionate, and holy Prayers are perhaps the Cauſe of rendering God the more propitious to you. It is a more prudent as well as more feaſible Reſolution to ſeek to eſtabliſh a Friendſhip with one who unwillingly becomes an Enemy, than with him who cannot poſſibly at any time be your Friend. For in the King of *France* will never harbour any other than Hatred, and a malicious Deſire to oppoſe yoar Deſigns: But the Pope and the other Powers of *Italy*, as ſoon as the Army is removed from *Lombardy*, being freed from Jealouſies, will have no Occaſion to contend with you either from Fear or Emulation, but remaining your ſteady Friends you will now

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now and always enjoy the Convenience and Profit of their good Correſpondence. You are invited therefore to chuſe that Friendſhip by Honour, Utility, and Security, and, if I deceive not myſelf, no leſs by Neceſſity. For, even ſuppoſing that you ſhould make an Agreement with the King on no other Obligation than of aſſiſting you in your Enterpriſe on *Italy*, it does not appear to me probable that he will fulfil it, becauſe he will imagine that his leaving *Italy* to be your Prey will too much endanger his own Kingdom. And, on the other hand, he will appear to himſelf to have vaſt Opportunities and Hopes, by means of ſo potent an Union, to create you much Trouble and Uneaſineſs, and to reduce you to an Agreement on leſs burdenſome Conditions. Thus of a King Priſoner we ſhall make him free, and our Enemy, and ſhall give a Head to the Kingdom of *France*, that, in Conjunction with ſo many others, he may make War upon us with more Forces, and with greater Advantage. How much better is it to agree with the *Italians!*

to

A. D. 1526. to enter into a firm and ſincere Alliance with the Pontiff, who has continually deſired it, and to deprive the *French* of all Hopes of a Conjunction with the *Italians*; for in ſuch a Caſe not Neceſſity, nor the Fears of new Leagues, but your own Will, and the Quality of the Conditions will be ſufficient to draw you to an Agreement with the *French*; then you will ſee that Want and Deſpair will force them not only to reſtore *Burgundy*, and to make you greater Offers, but alſo to put into your Hands ſuch Security as ſhall leave no Room to doubt of the Performance of their Engagements; ſince the Children are not ſufficient to ſecure you while they can feed themſelves with Hopes of ſo conſiderable a Conjunction, and if they were to make an Addition of *Bayonne*, *Narbonne*, and the Fleet, it would hardly be enough to warrant their Obſervance. In this Manner you will be ſure to reap great, honourable, juſt, and ſecure Fruits from your Victory; otherwiſe, either I have no Underſtanding at all in any Affair, or this Agree-

ment

ment will ſo endanger your State, that I know not what will ſecure it if the Imprudence of the King of *France* proves no greater than ours." A. D. 1525.

THE Great Chancellor by this accurate and vehement Speech, and by the Reputation of his Wiſdom, had affected the Minds of a great Part of the Council, when the Viceroy, who was the Author of the contrary Opinion, ſpoke, as it is ſaid, in the following Manner.

Speech of the Viceroy of *Naples* in Anſwer to the foregoing.

"IT is undoubtedly true, moſt glorious *Cæſar*, that the Man who, out of a greedy Deſire of having too much, aims at graſping more than he can hold faſt, is by no means to be commended; but then he is no leſs to be blamed who, from a needleſs Suſpicion and Diſtruſt, voluntarily deprives himſelf of vaſt Opportunities, acquired with a Multitude of Difficulties and Dangers. The Errors are indeed very conſiderable on both Sides; but a Fault that proceeds from a Timidity and Meanneſs of Spi-

A. D. 1526. rit is more inexcuſable in ſo great a Prince, than that which ariſes from a certain Generoſity and Greatneſs of Mind; and it is more laudable to ſeek with Danger the Acquiſition of too much, than, for the ſake of avoiding Danger, to let ſlip and vaniſh the rareſt Opportunities that a Man is bleſt with. Now this however is in effect the Counſel of the Chancellor, who doubting that this Agreement will not procure both *Burgundy* and *Milan* (for we are by no means to ſuſpect that he is under the Influence of a Love to *Italy*, his Country, or of the Good Will that he bears to the Duke of *Milan*) propoſes a Way by which, according to him, you gain *Burgundy* and loſe *Milan*, a State without Compariſon of the greater Importance, but, according to me, by which you loſe *Milan* without gaining *Burgundy!* And thus, where this Victory has moſt gloriouſly opened you a Way to the Lordſhip of all Chriſtendom, there will remain nothing for us, if we follow his Advice, but Loſs and Diſgrace. And indeed I ſee no Safety in his Counſel,

but

but rather very great Danger attended with very ſmall Advantage, which beſides may eaſily ſlip out of our Hands. But, on the contrary, an Agreement with the King of *France* appears to me attended with very great Glory, very great Profit, and ſufficient Security. For I would aſk you, Chancellor, what Reaſon have you, what Security, what Promiſe, that the *Italians*, after we ſhall have evacuated the Dutchy of *Milan*, will take care not to violate the Agreement, nor intermeddle between the King of *France* and us? And not rather that, after we ſhall have debaſed our Reputation, after we ſhall have diſbanded that Army, which is a Bridle on their Malice, after they ſhall be ſecured from the Coming of new Bodies of *Germans* into *Italy*, becauſe there will be no Place in *Lombardy* to receive them, nor where they can ſhelter themſelves; what Security, I ſay, have you that the *Italians*, at ſuch a Time, continuing their Plots, beſides threatening the Kingdom of *Naples*, which will remain in a manner at their Diſcretion, will not make A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. an Effort to deliver the King of *France*? Have you any Truſt, Chancellor, in the Gratitude of *Franceſco Sforza*, who, after ſo many Benefits, has requited you, O *Cæſar*, with ſuch baſe Treachery? What will he not do now, when he has been made ſenſible that you are deſirous to puniſh ſo heinous a Piece of Iniquity with Juſtice? now, that he fears Puniſhment from you, and expects Safety from our Enemies? Have you any Confidence, Chancellor, in the Friendſhip of the *Venetians*, who are both Enemies to the Empire and to the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and trembling at remembering that as it were but yeſterday your Grandfather *Maximilian* bereaved them of ſo many of thoſe Towns which they now poſſeſs? Have you any Faith in the Goodneſs of *Clement*, or in his Inclination to the Emperor? The Motive of *Leo*'s Alliance with *Cæſar*, after he had attempted many Things againſt us, was a Deſire of Revenge, or of Security from the *French*, or an ambitious Deſign of ſeizing on *Ferrara*. After the Death of *Leo*, this Man, hated

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by Half the World, continued our Friend out of Neceſſity; but after he was made Pope, immediately returning to the Nature of the Pontiffs, which is to fear and hate the Emperors, he has nothing in more Deteſtation than the Name of *Cæſar*. All theſe Parties excuſe themſelves by pretending that their Plots and Devices proceeded not from Hatred, or from any other Paſſion, but only from a Jealouſy of your Greatneſs, which ceaſing all their Machinations have ceaſed with it. This is either not true, or, tho' it might perhaps have been true in the Beginning, it is neceſſary that it muſt have ſince taken other Roots, and become another Paſſion; for it is natural for Jealouſy to be followed by Hatred, and by Injuries, attended by a Conjunction and Intimacy with the Enemies of the injured Perſon, together with Deſigns not only of being ſecured from his Reſentment, but alſo of profiting by his Ruin, the Memory of Injuries being greater without doubt, and more implacable in him who does, than in him who receives them. Wherefore A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. granting that in the Beginning they might be incited only by Jealouſy, the ſame would have been the Cauſe of making them become your Enemies, of diverting their Inclinations, and placing their Hopes on the *French* Side, and afterwards of beginning, as they have done in all the Conventions which they have negotiated, to divide the Kingdom of *Naples* among themſelves. And now whatever Security we give them, or whatever Agreement we make with them, the ſame Paſſions of Hatred and Fear will always remain kindled in their Breaſts; and putting no Faith in what they imagine extorted from you by Neceſſity, but thinking they may with the greater Facility bend us to a Compliance with their Will, apprehenſive alſo that at laſt there will be an Appointment between us and the King of *France*, like to that made at *Cambray*, and deſirous, to uſe their own Words, of freeing *Italy* from the Barbarians, they will have the Boldneſs to think of preſcribing Laws to you, and to demand the Deliverance of the King of *France*. If you

you ſhould deny their Demand, *Cæſar*, how will you defend the Kingdom of *Naples* againſt them? If you ſhould grant it, you loſe all the Fruits of the Victory, and remain the moſt diſhonoured, the moſt debaſed of all Princes. But let us grant that *Italy* would be diſpoſed to obſerve the Agreement, and that you would be under a Neceſſity either of relinquiſhing *Milan*, or of not recovering *Burgundy*, what Compariſon is there between one Side and the other? *Burgundy* is a little Province, of ſmall Revenues, and beſides not of ſuch mighty Conveniency as many perſuade themſelves. The Dutchy of *Milan*, for the Riches and Beauty of ſo many noble Cities, for the Number and Quality of its Subjects, for the Greatneſs of its Revenues, and for its Capacity of ſubſiſting all the Armies in the World, is ſuperior to many Kingdoms. But tho' it be ſo large and ſo powerful, yet the Conveniences that ariſe from its Acquiſition are more to be valued than the Country in itſelf conſidered: For while *Milan* and *Naples* are at your Devoti-

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A. D. 1526. on, the Pontiffs muſt of neceſſity, as they uſed formerly, depend on the Emperors. All *Tuſcany*, the Duke of *Ferrara*, and the Marquis of *Mantoua* may be ſubjected to you: The *Venetians*, ſurrounded by *Lombardy* and *Germany*, will be obliged to accept your Laws. Thus, I do not ſay with Arms or with Armies, but with the Reputation of your Name, with a Herald alone, with the Imperial Enſigns you will command all *Italy*. And who knows not what is *Italy*? A Country, for the Commodiouſneſs of its Situation, for the Temperateneſs of the Air, for the Multitude and Ingenuity of its Inhabitants, who are extremely well diſpoſed for all honourable Undertakings, for the Abundance of all Things convenient for human Life, for the Largeneſs and Beauty of ſo many moſt noble Cities, for Riches, for the Seat of Religion, for the antient Glory of the Empire, and for infinite other Reſpects, the Queen of all Countries, which if you command, all other Princes will tremble before you. To compaſs this Deſign is more conducive

ducive to your Greatneſs, and to the Augmentation of your Glory, and more grateful to the Bones of your Grandfathers (ſince they too muſt be called into Council) who, on account of their Goodneſs and Compaſſion, muſt be ſuppoſed to deſire nothing but what is moſt convenient for you, and moſt glorious to your Name. If we follow then the Counſel of the Chancellor we ſhall loſe a very large Acquiſition for a ſmall one, and that too very inconſiderable, and beſides very uncertain, of which we ought to have taken Warning by what was like to have happened ſome Months paſt. Does he not remember, when the King of *France* was in ſuch great Danger of Death, in what an uneaſy Situation we were, as knowing that by his Death we ſhould loſe all the Fruits expected from the Victory? Who can ſecure us that the ſame Accident may not poſſibly intervene at preſent, and more eaſily, becauſe the Reliques of the Diſorder remain upon him ſince that Time, and becauſe the Hopes, that have hitherto ſupported him, being cut off, his

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A. D. 1526. his Anxiety, which was the Cauſe of his Diſorder, will return upon him with greater Violence; and eſpecially when, in debating on inextricable Conditions and Security, the new Negotiations muſt of neceſſity be ſpun out to a tedious Length, which will be ſubject to the ſame Accident, and perhaps to others as great, and no leſs dangerous. Don't we know that nothing has ſo much conduced to keep the Government of *France* in due Order and Steadineſs, as an Expectation of a ſpeedy Releaſement of the King, by which the great Men of that Kingdom have been kept in Quietneſs and Obedience to the Mother; and that as ſoon as this Hope ſhould fail the Kingdom would eaſily be ſenſible of it, and the Government would be altered? And when once the Nobles have got the Bridle in Hand, they will take no Care of the King's Liberty, but will rather be pleaſed with his Captivity, for the Sake of maintaining themſelves independent and abſolute Lords. Thus inſtead of *Burgundy* and of ſuch a Multitude of Acquiſitions,

we

we ſhall no longer have any Thing to expect either from his Impriſonment or Releaſement. But I would aſk you farther, Chancellor, is *Cæſar* in this Reſolution to have any Regard to his Dignity and Majeſty? Now what greater Diſgrace can he incur, what more remarkable Diminution of his Honour, than to be conſtrained to pardon *Franceſco Sforza*? than that a Man who has one Foot in the Grave, your Rebel, a ſingular Example of Ingratitude, not by humbling himſelf and flying to your Mercy, but by throwing himſelf into the Arms of your Enemies, ſhould force you to yield to him, to reſtore the State ſo juſtly taken from him, and to receive Laws from him? It is better, *Cæſar*, and more ſuitable to the Dignity of the Empire, and to your own Greatneſs, to truſt once more to Fortune, and again to hazard every Thing, than, forgetting your Rank, the Authority of a Prince ſupreme above all other Princes, and the *Cæſarean* Name, and the Glory of ſo many Victories over a moſt potent King, to accept, from Prieſts and

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A. D. 1526. and Merchants, Conditions of ſuch a Nature, that more grievous and more unworthy could not have been impoſed, had you been overthrown and conquered. Wherefore, on conſidering all theſe Reaſons, and how ſmall the Advantage is that can poſſibly reſult from an Agreement with the *Italians*, and by how many Accidents it may eaſily ſlip out of our Hands, how unſafe it is to repoſe Confidence in them, how full of Indignity to abandon the State of *Milan*, that it is neceſſary for us to come to a Reſolution, and to have for once ſome Conſideration of the End, and that the Impriſonment of the King is of no Service to us, but only on account of the Profits which may be drawn from his Freedom, I have adviſed, and do adviſe, that an Agreement be firſt made with him before you agree with the *Italians*; which none can deny to be more glorious, more reaſonable, and more uſeful, provided we can ſecure ourſelves of the Obſervance: And of this I have ſome Grounds for Hope, both from the Gratitude of the King

for

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for the Benefit that he will receive from us, and from the Tie of Affinity, and alſo from the Virtues of your Siſter, a fit Inſtrument for maintaining this Friendſhip, but much more from the Pledge of the two Sons, one of them the Firſt-born, and the greateſt and moſt important Pledge, I think, that we can poſſibly receive of him. And, ſince Neceſſity conſtrains us to come to ſome Reſolution, we ought ſurely to put more Confidence in a King of *France* with ſo great a Pledge, than in the *Italians* with no Pledge at all; to have more Faith in the Word of ſo great a King, than in the immoderate Covetouſneſs of Prieſts, or in the ſuſpicious Baſeneſs of Merchants; and we may with more Eaſe contract, as our Anceſtors have often done, an Alliance for ſome time with the *French*, than with the *Italians*, our natural and eternal Enemies. Nor do I only ſee in this Way of proceeding greater Hopes that Faith will be kept with us, but leſs Danger in caſe of any Infringement: For tho' the King ſhould not yield you up *Burgundy*,

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gundy, he will not dare, while his Children remain as Hoſtages, to give you any further Provocations, but will ſeek to moderate the Agreement by Negotiations and Intreaties; beſides, as he was in a manner but yeſterday overcome, and to-day let out of Priſon, he will ſtill ſtand in Awe of your Arms, and never have the Boldneſs to make another Tryal of your Fortune: And if he does not take up Arms againſt you, *Cæſar*, it is certain that all the reſt will ſtand ſtill, till you ſhall have acquired the Caſtle of *Milan*, and confirmed yourſelf in that State in ſuch a Manner, that you ſhall no longer have any Thing to fear from the Malice of any Perſon whatſoever. But as for the *Italians*, if you ſhould now make an Agreement with them, and they ſhould have a Mind to break it, there will be no Bridle capable of curbing or reſtraining them; and as their Power of doing you Injuries increaſes, their Inclination to do them will be more free, and increaſe in proportion. Wherefore, in my Opinion, it would be the higheſt Timidity

midity and Imprudence to loſe, out of Jealouſy, an Opportunity of making an Agreement attended with ſo much Glory, with ſo much Greatneſs, and with ſufficient Security, and in its Stead to take a Reſolution very dangerous, if I miſtake not, and very pernicious." A. D. 1526.

When the Viceroy had done ſpeaking various were the Opinions of the other Members of the Council, it appearing to all who were of ſound Judgment that to make an Accommodation with the King of *France*, in the Manner propoſed, would be a very dangerous Step. The *Flemings*, however, were poſſeſſed with ſuch a longing Deſire of recovering *Burgundy*, as it was the antient Patrimony and Title of their Princes, that it would not ſuffer them to diſcern the Truth. It was reported alſo that the large Gifts and Promiſes of the *French* had a conſiderable Influence on many: And above all *Cæſar*, either becauſe ſuch was his firſt Inclination, or becauſe the Authority of the Viceroy, eſpecially in conjunction with

that

A. D. 1526. that of *Nanſau*, who was of the ſame Opinion, was of very great Moment, or elſe becauſe he thought it too much beneath his Dignity to be conſtrained to pardon *Franceſco Sforza*, willingly hearkened to thoſe who adviſed an Agreement with the King of *France*. Hence, after he had ordered the Legate *Salviati* to be once more ſounded whether he would conſent that the Dutchy of *Milan* ſhould be beſtowed on the Duke of *Bourbon*, and was certified that he had no Commiſſion to accept that Expedient, in which Caſe he would have preferred the Friendſhip of the Pontiff, he took a Reſolution to agree with the King of *France*, with whom, the chief Points having been already diſcuſſed beforehand, and in a manner ſettled, he came in two or three Days to a Concluſion, without the Intervention of the Pope's Legate in any Matter, *Cæſar* having before obtained the Conſent of the Duke of *Bourbon* that his Siſter promiſed to him ſhould be married to the King of *France*. The Duke, it ſeems, after much Intreaty, had given his

Cæſar chuſes to agree with the King of *France*.

his Conſent, not ſo much out of a Deſire of poſſeſſing the Dutchy of *Milan*, which was promiſed him contrary to the Sentiments of the Great Chancellor and of the Viceroy, tho' with the Obligation of heavy Payments, as becauſe his Affairs were reduced to ſuch a Situation, that, neither having nor capable of having, Dependence on any but *Cæſar*, he was forced to accommodate himſelf to his Will. As ſoon as he had given his Conſent, that he might avoid appearing at Court at ſo unſeaſonable a Time, he ſet out with all Expedition, by Orders from *Cæſar*, towards *Barcelona*, to wait there for the Proviſions neceſſary for his Paſſage into *Italy*, which, for want of Ships, there being at that Time no more than three Light Gallies in *Spain*, and of Money, proceeded but ſlowly. A. D. 1526.

THE Contents of the Capitulation, ſtipulated on the Fourteenth of *February*, in the Year 1526, were in Subſtance, That between *Cæſar* and the King of *France* ſhould be a perpetual Peace, Articles of the Convention on which the *French* King obtained his Liberty.

A. D. 1526. Peace, in which ſhould be comprehended all thoſe who ſhould be nominated by common Conſent: That the King of *France*, on the Tenth Day of *March* next, ſhould be ſet at Liberty on his own Borders on the Coaſt of *Fonterabia*; and within the Term of Six Weeks following ſhould reſign unto *Cæſar* the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, the County of *Charolois*, the Lordſhip of *Noyers*, and *Chateau Chinon*, Dependencies on the ſaid Dutchy, the Viſcounty of *Auſſone*, and *Le Reſort de St. Laurent de la Roche*, Dependencies of the *Franche Comte*, with all the uſual Appurtenances of the ſaid Dutchy and Viſcounty, all which ſhould for the future be ſeparated and exempt from the Sovereignty of the Kingdom of *France*: That, at the Time, and at the ſame Inſtant the King ſhould be ſet free, ſhould be delivered into the Hands of *Cæſar* the Dauphin, and beſides him either the Duke of *Orleans*, the King's Second Son, or twelve of the principal Lords of *France*, who ſhould be nominated by *Cæſar*, referring it to the Regenteſs, either to give the Second Son

Son or the Twelve Barons, and remain as Hoſtages till Reſtitution ſhould be made of the ſaid Territories, and the Peace ratified and ſworn with all its Articles by the States General of *France*, and regiſtered (which they call *enterined)* in all the Parliaments of that Kingdom, with the neceſſary Formalities, for which was prefixed the Term of Four Months, at which Time the Hoſtages being reſtored, *Angouleſme*, the King's Third Son, ſhould be put into the Hands of *Cæſar*, to be educated near his Perſon, for the better cultivating and maintaining the Peace: That the Moſt Chriſtian King ſhould renounce and yield up to *Cæſar* all his Rights to the Kingdom of *Naples*, and even thoſe which would have come to him by the Inveſtiture of the Church: That he ſhould make the ſame Renunciation and Ceſſion of his Rights to the State of *Milan*, *Genoa*, *Aſti*, *Artois*, *Arras*, *Tournay*, *Liſle*, and *Doway*; that he ſhould reſtore alſo the Town and Caſtle of *Hedin*, as a Member of the County of *Artois*, with all the military Stores, Artillery and Mov- *A. D.* 1526.

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ables which were in it when taken laſt: That he ſhould renounce the Sovereignty of *Flanders* and of *Artois*, and of every other Place in the Poſſeſſion of *Cæſar*. On the other Side, that *Cæſar* ſhould renounce all Rights to any Place whatſoever in the Poſſeſſion of the *French*, and particularly to *Peronne*, *Mondidier*, the Counties of *Bologne*, *Guines*, and *Ponthieu*, and to the Towns ſituated on both Sides of the River *Somme*: That there ſhould be a League between them, and a perpetual Confederacy for the Defence of their States, with an Obligation of aſſiſting each other, when it ſhould be needful, with Fifteen Hundred Men at Arms, and Ten Thouſand Foot: That *Cæſar* ſhould promiſe to give Lady *Eleonora*, his Siſter, in Marriage to the Moſt Chriſtian King, to whom, as ſoon as a Diſpenſation could be procured from the Pope, ſhe ſhould be betrothed with obligatory Words for the preſent, and be conducted into *France*, for ſolemniſing the Matrimony, at the ſame time that the Hoſtages, according to the Articles,

ticles, were to be reſtored; and that her Dowry ſhould be Two Hundred Thouſand Crowns, with ſuitable Gifts, one Half to be paid within Sixteen Months, and the other Half afterwards within the Year next enſuing: That between the Dauphin and the Daughter of the King of *Portugal* by *Eleonora*, a Marriage ſhould be contracted, as ſoon as the Parties came of Age: That the King of *France* ſhould uſe his utmoſt Endeavours for inducing the old King of *Navarra* to yield to *Cæſar* the Rights of that Kingdom; and, in caſe of Refuſal, the King ſhould give him no Aſſiſtance: That the Duke of *Guelderland*, Count of *Zutphen*, and the principal Towns of thoſe States ſhould promiſe, under ſufficient Security, to ſurrender themſelves, after his Death, to *Cæſar*, and that the King ſhould give no Aſſiſtance to the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, nor to *Robert de la Marche*: That the King ſhould furniſh *Cæſar*, when he had a Mind to paſs into *Italy*, and within two Months after it ſhould be required, with twelve Gallies, four Ships, and Four Galleons, A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. fitted out wholly at his own Expence, except the Payment of the Soldiers on board; and that theſe Veſſels ſhould be reſtored within Three Months from the Day of Embarkation: That, inſtead of the Land Forces which the King offered for *Italy*, he ſhould pay unto *Cæſar* Two Hundred Thouſand Crowns, one Half within Six Months, and the other Half within the next Year afterwards: That at the Time when the Hoſtages were to be ſet at Liberty he ſhould give Bank Bills to *Cæſar* for the Payment of Six Thouſand Foot for Six Months, as ſoon as he ſhould arrive in *Italy*, ſupplying him alſo, at his own Coſt, with Five Hundred Men at Arms, and a Train of Artillery: That he ſhould indemnify *Cæſar* for his Promiſe made to the King of *Eagland* to pay him the Penſions due from the King of *France*, the Arrears of which amounted to Five Hundred Thouſand Crowns, or elſe pay *Cæſar* in ready Money: That both ſhould ſupplicate the Pontiff to give public Notice, as ſoon as poſſible, of a general Council for treating of Peace among

among Chriſtians, and forming Enterpriſes againſt the Infidels and Heretics, and to grant a general Croiſſade for Three Years: That the King ſhould within Six Months reſtore the Duke of *Bourbon* in ample Form to the Poſſeſſion of all his States, and of his Goods movable and immovable, with all the Profits received, and ſhould not be at Liberty to moleſt him for what was paſt, nor conſtrain him to inhabit or come into the Kingdom of *France*, but ſhould leave him at full Liberty to proceed in a Courſe of Law concerning the County of *Provence*; and ſhould alſo reſtore all thoſe who had followed the Duke, and namely the Biſhop of *Autun*, and M. *de St. Valier*: That the Priſoners on both Sides taken in War ſhould be ſet at Liberty: That the Princeſs *Margaret* of *Auſtria* ſhould be reſtored to the Poſſeſſion of all that ſhe enjoyed before the War: That the Prince of *Orange* ſhould be ſet at Liberty, and be reſtored to the Principality of *Orange*, and to whatever he poſſeſſed at his Father's Death, which

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A. D. 1526. had been taken from him on account of his following the Party of *Cæſar*; and the ſame Benefit was allowed to ſome other Noblemen: That the Marquis of *Saluzzo* ſhould be reſtored to his State: That the King, as ſoon as he arrived in the firſt Town of his Kingdom, ſhould ratify this Capitulation, and cauſe it to be ratified by the Dauphin as ſoon as he came to the Age of Fourteen Years. They nominated many by common Conſent, among others the *Swiſs*, but not one of the *Italian* Potentates except the Pontiff, who was named to be a Conſervator of this Agreement, more out of Form and Ceremony than for any ſubſtantial Reaſon. To all this they added, that the King gave his Word of Honour, that if at any Time he ſhould, for any Cauſe whatever, refuſe to fulfil his Engagements, he would, of his own Accord, voluntarily return to Priſon.

This Agreement was Matter of vaſt Surpriſe to all Chriſtendom; for, as ſoon as it was underſtood that the firſt Thing

to

to be put into Execution was the Deliverance of the Moſt Chriſtian King, it was the univerſal Opinion that, after he was ſet at Liberty, he would on no account give up *Burgundy*, becauſe it was a Member of too great Importance to the Kingdom of *France*: And, except thoſe few who had adviſed *Cæſar* to this Step, his whole Court had the ſame Sentiments; and, above all the reſt, the Great Chancellor blamed and deteſted the Convention, and with ſuch Vehemence that, tho' he had been commanded to ſubſcribe the Capitulation, yet he refuſed to do it, alledging that the Authority with which he was inveſted ought not to be employed by him in dangerous and pernicious Affairs, as this before him certainly was. Nor could he be removed from his Reſolution by all the Indignation of *Cæſar*, who at length, finding him to perſiſt in his Obſtinacy, ſubſcribed the Inſtrument with his own Hand, and a few Days after went to *Madrid*, to ſettle the Affinity, and by familiar and friendly Converſation to lay a Foundation for a laſting Friendſhip

A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. Friendſhip and Benevolence between himſelf and the King. Wonderful were the Ceremonies and outward Profeſſions that paſſed between them, they were often ſeen together in Public, had ſeveral long Conferences in private, went in one Coach in the Middle of the Day to a neighbouring Caſtle where reſided Queen *Eleanora*, with whom the King made a Contract of Matrimony. But among ſo many Tokens of Peace and Friendſhip the Guards were not ſlackened, the Liberty not enlarged, but at the ſame time that he was careſſed like a Brother he was guarded like a Priſoner: Whence it might eaſily be judged that this was a Concord full of Diſcord *, an Affinity without Affection, and that the old Emulations and Jealouſies between them would, on every Occaſion, prevail over all Regard to Tyes and Alliances contracted by Force more than from any other Cauſe.

King of *France* eſpouſes *Eleonora*.

After

* He ſeems here to allude to a Verſe of *Lucan*, ſpeaking of an Agreement between the Triumvirate,

Temporis anguſti manſit Concordia diſcors.

A. D. 1526.

AFTER ſeveral Days ſpent in this Manner arrived the Ratification of the Regenteſs, with a Declaration that ſhe choſe to have the Dauphin of *France* accompanied by the Second Son rather than by the Twelve Lords. The King then ſet out from *Madrid* for the Frontiers, where he was to make an Exchange of his Perſon for his Two little Sons. He was accompanied by the Viceroy, the Author of his Liberty, on whom *Cæſar* had beſtowed the City of *Aſti*, and other States in *Flanders*, and in the Kingdom of *Naples*.

Cæſar notifies the Agreement to the Pope.

AT this Juncture *Cæſar* wrote a ceremonial Letter to the Pontiff, ſignifying that, out of a Deſire of Peace, and of the common Good of Chriſtendom, burying in Oblivion a Multitude of Offences and Enmities, he had reſtored Liberty to the King of *France*, and given him his own Siſter in Marriage, and that he had choſen for Conſervator of the Peace his Holineſs, of whom he always deſired to be a moſt obedient Son.

A. D. 1526. Son. And a few Days after he writ him another Letter with his own Hand and ſent it by *Errera*, the ſame who had brought him a Letter from the Pontiff written with his own Hand, in which he anſwers his, partly in a mild Strain, partly intermixed with ſomewhat harſh Expreſſions, concluding that he would reſtore the Dutchy of *Milan* to *Franceſco Sforza*, if he ſhould not be found guilty of the Crime laid to his Charge, and that he intended to have the Cauſe tried in a Court of Juſtice by Judges appointed by himſelf as his Superior: But if it ſhould appear that he had tranſgreſſed, he could not diſpenſe with himſelf from giving the Inveſtiture of that State to the Duke of *Bourbon*, to whom his Holineſs himſelf had been the Cauſe that he had promiſed it, having propoſed it to him when *Franceſco Sforza* lay ſick: That to ſatisfy him, and to make the *Italians* eaſy, he had reſolved not to keep it for himſelf, nor to give it to his own Brother, proteſting, upon his Honour, that this was really his Intention, which he earneſtly beſeeched

ſeeched him to approve, offering him at all times his Authority and Forces, as an obedient Son of the Apoſtolic See. *Errera* carried alſo an Anſwer to the Minutes of the Articles that had been drawn up by the Pope in Favour of *Franceſco Sforza*, which *Cæſar*, perſiſting in his firſt Reſolution had not been willing to approve. A. D. 1526.

He ſent alſo by him to the Duke of *Seſſa* the Form of an Agreement, which was his ultimate Reſolution, with Authority to conclude it, in caſe the Pope would accept it. The Contents of it were in Subſtance, That *Franceſco Sforza* ſhould be comprehended in their Confederacy, if he ſhould be found not guilty of Treaſon againſt *Cæſar*; but, in caſe of his Death or Deprivation, the Duke of *Bourbon* ſhould ſucceed in the Confederacy, and be inveſted by the Emperor with the Dutchy of *Milan*. The Obligation contracted by the Viceroy, for the Reſtitution of the Towns poſſeſſed by the Duke of *Ferrara*, was confirmed, but on Condition that the Pope ſhould

Articles propoſed by *Cæſar* to the Pope.

A. D. 1526. ſhould be bound to grant him the Inveſtiture of *Ferrara*, and releaſe him from the Penalty of the Contravention; a Thing contrary to the Pope's Intention, for he deſigned to exact of him the Penalty of One Hundred Thouſand Ducats, to pay the One Hundred Thouſand promiſed to *Cæſar* in caſe of that Reſtitution. He did not conſent that the State of *Milan* ſhould be obliged to take Salt from the Church, nor that in Matters concerning the Collation of Benefices in the Kingdom of *Naples*, Reference ſhould be made to the Tenor of the Inveſtitures, but to the Ceſſion of preceding Kings, who in many Caſes had deſpiſed the Rights and Authority of the Apoſtolic See. And becauſe it had been agreed with the Legate that, in order to remove from *Lombardy* the Army, that was become burdenſome to all *Italy*, there ſhould be diſburſed by the Pope, by himſelf, as King of *Naples*, and by the other Powers, One Hundred and Fifty Thouſand Ducats, in which Caſe it would be conducted to *Naples*, or to ſome Country out of *Italy*, where

where it pleaſed *Cæſar*, who, it was ſaid, had a Deſign to make it paſs over to *Barbary*, it was propoſed that, the Arrears of the Army being increaſed ſince that Time, the ſaid Sum ſhould be augmented to Two Hundred Thouſand Ducats. The Duke of *Seſſa*, and *Errera*, preſented a Copy of theſe Articles to the Pontiff, with a Proteſtation that it was not in their Power to alter ſo much as one Syllable of it; All the Difficulties however would have been eaſily removed, had the Dutchy of *Milan* been diſpoſed of in ſuch a manner as to give no Cauſe of Jealouſy to the Pontiff, and to the other Powers. But it was conſidered that the Duke of *Bourbon* was ſo implacable an Enemy to the King of *France*, that, either for his own Security, or from a Deſire of invading *France*, he had always been very ſubmiſſive to *Cæſar*, nor could it be expected that he would ever be uneaſy at his exorbitant Greatneſs; and that the Article of removing the Army from *Lombardy*, which was ſo much deſired by all, and for which Purpoſe they would A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. would not have grudged any Sum of Money, was of no Signification, ſince at *Milan* remained a Duke who would not only at every Beck from *Cæſar* admit his Troops, but perhaps deſire and ſollicit their Preſence for his own Intereſt.

Pope rejects them.

WHEREFORE the Pontiff, who, becauſe, in the Agreement made by *Cæſar* with the King of *France*, there had been no material Mention made of him, and none at all of the Security of the States of *Italy*, had confirmed himſelf in the Perſuaſion he had before entertained that the Greatneſs of *Cæſar* muſt prove his Slavery, reſolved not to accept the Agreement in the Manner in which it was propoſed to him, but to preſerve himſelf free till he ſhould be certified of the Meaſures taken by the King of *France* with reſpect to the Obſervance of his Appointment. And he was the more encouraged becauſe, beſides the Probabilities of the Caſe, he had been informed of ſome Words ſpoken by the King before he was ſet at Liberty, and

by

by others who were privy to his Counſels, by which it appeared he had no Mind to fulfil his Engagements with *Cæſar*. To confirm the King in this Reſolution, as a Point on which his own Security depended, he diſpatched away poſt to *France Pagolo Vettori*, a *Florentine*, Commander of his Gallies, that he might be at Court at the ſame Time as the King ſhould arrive, making this Speed not only to know as ſoon as poſſible his Mind, but alſo that the King, by receiving Hopes of an immediate Alliance with the Pontiff and *Venetians* againſt *Cæſar*, might the more readily determine himſelf. *Pagolo* therefore was commiſſioned, in the Name of the Pope, to congratulate his Majeſty on his Deliverance, and to inform him of the Means uſed by the Pope for bringing about this happy Event, and how greatly the Treaty that he had held for confederating with his Mother had inclined *Cæſar* to ſet him at Liberty: That after this he ſhould repreſent to the King that the Pope was very deſirous of an univerſal Peace among Chriſtians,

A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. ſtians, and that *Cæſar* and his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty ſhould jointly undertake an Expedition againſt the *Turks*, who were intent on making mighty Preparations for invading the Kingdom of *Hungary* this very Year. Theſe were the apparent Subjects of his Commiſſion, but the ſubſtantial and ſecret Point was, firſt to attempt, with all his Dexterity, to know the Inclination of the Moſt Chriſtian King, and, if he ſhould find him diſpoſed to obſerve the Agreement, to proceed no farther, leſt he ſhould, to no Purpoſe, bring him more out of Favour with *Cæſar* than ever: But if he ſhould perceive him otherwiſe inclined, or ambiguous, he ſhould endeavour to confirm him, and take all Opportunities for encouraging him to take that Courſe, by Aſſurances of the Pontiff's Deſire to unite with him for the common Good. He alſo diſpatched into *England* the Protonotary *Gambara*, to uſe his Endeavours with that King to the ſame End: And, at his Sollicitations, the *Venetians* ſent into *France*, with the like Commiſſion, *Andrea Roſſo* their Secretary.

Secretary. And becauſe *Pagolo*, as ſoon as he arrived at *Florence*, fell ſick and died, the Pontiff, tho' he took it for an ill Omen that the Miniſters, whom he had now twice ſent to *France* on this Negotiation, had periſhed on the Road, diſpatched away in his Place *Capino da Mantoua*. In the mean time his Holineſs and the *Venetians* were not wanting to employ all poſſible Means for encouraging and keeping alive the Hopes of the Duke of *Milan*, leſt his Fears, and the Peace of *Madrid*, ſhould drive him to precipitate himſelf into ſome Accommodation with *Cæſar*. A. D. 1526.

Ceremonies obſerved on ſetting the King of *France* at Liberty.

By this time the King of *France* was arrived at *Fonterabia*, a Town of *Cæſar*'s, ſituate on the Ocean, upon the Borders between *Biſcay* and the Dutchy of *Guyenne*; and, on the other Side, the Mother with the two Children were come to *Bayonne*, a few Leagues diſtant from *Fonterabia*, where ſhe ſtaid ſeveral Days before the Day appointed for making the Exchange, becauſe ſhe had been ſeized with the Gout on the Road. On the

A. D. 1526. Eighteenth of *March*, then, the King, attended by the Viceroy, General *Alarcone*, and about fifty Horſe, was conducted to the Bank of the River that divides the Kingdom of *France* from that of *Spain*, and at the ſame time *Lautrech* preſented himſelf on the Bank with the Regenteſs, and an equal Number of Horſe, and in the Middle of the River was a large Barge at Anchor with no Perſon in it. The King approached the Barge in a Skiff, in which, beſides himſelf, was the Viceroy, *Alarcone*, and Eight others, all armed with ſhort Weapons: On the other Side of the Barge came up *Lautrech* in another Skiff, or ſmall Boat, with the Hoſtages, and Eight Men armed in the ſame Manner; then the Viceroy mounted the Barge with all his Men, and the King with them, and immediately after mounted *Lautrech* with his Eight Attendants; ſo that in the Barge was an equal Number on both Sides, the Viceroy having with him *Alarcone*, and Eight others, and the King attended by *Lautrech* and his Eight Men. As ſoon as they were all on board the Barge, *Lautrech* took the Dauphin out

of

of the Skiff into the Barge, and put him into the Hands of the Viceroy, who delivered him to *Alarcone*, by whom he was immediately put into their Boat; and at the ſame Inſtant the little Duke of *Orleans* was taken into the Barge, and was no ſooner in, than the Moſt Chriſtian King leaped out of the Barge into his own Boat with ſuch Quickneſs that this Exchange came to be made in the ſame Moment. As ſoon as the King got out of the Boat, on the Bank, he mounted a *Turkiſh* Horſe of wonderful Swiftneſs, provided for that Purpoſe, and without ſtopping poſted to *St. Jean de Luz*, a Town of his own, four Leagues diſtant, from which, after taking ſome ſhort Refreſhment, he ſpurred on with the ſame Speed to *Bayonne*, where he was received with inexpreſſible Joy by the whole Court. From hence he immediately diſpatched, with all Diligence, a Meſſenger to the King of *England*, with a Letter written with his own Hand, ſignifying to him his Deliverance, and acknowledging, in the moſt kind and affectionate Manner,

A. D. 1526.

A. D. 1526. Manner, that he was entirely indebted for his Liberty to his good Offices, notifying his hearty Desire to enter into a strict Union and Intimacy with him, and his Resolution to proceed in all Occurrences by his Advice: And not long after he dispatched other Ambassadors to ratify, in a solemn Manner, the Peace which his Mother had made with him, laying a vast Stress on the Friendship of that King.

The End of the Sixteenth Book, and Eighth Volume.

THE Sixteenth Book properly terminates the Hiſtory of *Guicciardini*, for here he finiſhed the Reviſal of his Works, and therefore his Nephews, who, after his Death, obliged the World with this excellent Performance, gave us no more than Sixteen Books, which paſſed ſeveral Editions. But finding afterwards, by the Quickneſs of the Sale, that neither their own Profit, nor the Reputation of their Uncle were like to ſuffer by the Addition of the other Four which had not received his laſt Hand, they ventured to publiſh the whole Twenty Books, without regarding the Inequality and Incorrectneſs of the Four Laſt, which were the Reaſons why the Tranſlator, till the Publication of the Second Volume, intended only to give the firſt Sixteen, and comprehend them in Seven Volumes, as may be ſeen in his firſt Propoſals. But theſe Reaſons have been ſince outweighed by the Conſideration of the uſual Candour ſhewn by the Public to the imperfect tho' genuin Remains of a great Genius, and by the Encouragement given him by the unexpected Number of thoſe who have favoured him with their Subſcriptions; and therefore he is tranſlating theſe Four Books, which will be delivered to the Subſcribers without any additional Expence.

This Sixteenth Book properly terminates the History of Gunpowder, for here he finished the Revival of his Works, and therefore his Nephews, who, after his Death, obliged the World with this excellent Performance, gave us no more than Sixteen Books, which passed several Editions. But finding afterwards, by the Quickness of the Sale, that neither their own Profit, nor the Reputation of their Uncle were like to suffer by the Addition of the other Four which had not received his last Hand, they ventured to publish the whole Twenty Books, without regarding the Inequality and Incongruity of the Four Last, which were the Production only of the Translator, till the Publication of the Second Volume, intended only to give the first Sixteen, and compleated them in Seven Volumes, as may be seen in his first Propolals. But these Reasons have been since outweighed by the Gentlemen of the usual Candour shewn by the Public to the imperfect but genuine Remains of a great Genius, and by the Encouragement given him by the unexpected Number of those, who have favoured him with their Subscriptions; and therefore he is translating these Four Books, which will be delivered to the Subscribers without any additional Expence.

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